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Nearly a decade has passed since the Bank  nomic, distributional, and financial objectives-
codified its position on cost recovery policies for  primarily through carefully designed tariff
public sector projects, in Operational Manual  structures.
Statement (OMS) 2.25.  OMS 2.25 recom-
mended that a common analytical framework be  In the other six sectors the focus is heavily
used in all sectors to determine appropriate  on either distributional (health, education,
pricing guidelines and cost recovery targets.  housing) or financial (fertilizer, ports, railways)
ma: framework involved two steps:  concerns - with little attempt to incorporate
economic  pricing  principles.
* Estimating efficiency prices - prices that
would maximize the net economic benefit from  Efficiency pricing is not irrelevant or
the project.  impossible in these sectors, and - even if used
*nly as a bencbhmark  - could improve sector
* Adjusting those prices to take into account  management and project selection and design.
nonefficiency objectives (distributional, fiscal,
or financial) and implemnentation  constraints.  The fiscal dimension of public sector pricing
has received iittle attention in most sectors. In
In a review of 13 sectors, the authors have  view of the serious constraints on growth that
found that those Bank guidelines are followed  several less developed countries face because of
fairly closely in seven sectors: coal. irrigation,  scarce fiscal resources, tWs  is a major shortcom-
oiVgas,  power, roads, telecommurications, and  ing - and deserves priority attention in the
water/sewerage. In these sectors, the approach  formulation of future price recommendations.
has proven effective in accommodating eco-
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PBLIC  SECTOR  PRICING  POLICIES:
A Review of Bank Policy and Practice
I  I.  ODUICTION
1.  Nearly a decade has passed since the Bank codified its  position
on "Cost Recovery Policies for Public Sector Projects" in Operational
Nanual Statement (OMS)  2.25.  That statement  provoked  controversy  by
explicitly eschewing rules of thumb about appropriate target levels of
cost recovery.  Instead it recomended  a general analytical approach to  be
followed in all projects, with the outcome heavily dependent on the
relative importance of economic, fiscal and distributional concerns in the
country, as well as the particular measurement and implementation  problem
in the sector.
2.  This approach  put a major burden on the project analyst.
Although guidelines on pricing and cost recovery  have been developed in
many sectors, and country economists  have calculated shadow prices and
distributional parameters, the final judgments on pricing policy a-sn  cost
recovery remain at the project level.  Thus a review of Bank prac  must
begin  with  Bank  projects.
Obiectives
3.  The purpose of this  paper is to review the Bank's experience--on
a  cross-sectoral  basis--with  its  policy  on  public  sector  pricing.  In
particvlar,  we  seek  to  answer  two  sets  of  questions:
- Thi  Policy:  How  closely  has  the  recommended  approach
been  followed?  How  well  has  it  stood  up  to  rigorous
application?
- hi Practice:  What have been the results?  Based on our
experience,  can  we  now  generalize  about  appropriate
levels of cost recovery by sectors or within sectorsl
Have any patterns emerged about the importance  of
competing  objectives?  How  have  common  problems,  such  as
externalities  or  metering,  been  dealt  with  in  different
sectors?  Has the Bank been more successful in some
sectors  than  in  others  at  providing  praetical  pricing
guidelines or at implementing its  pricing
recommendations?  Are  there  lessons  that  can  be
transferred  from  one  sector  to  another?
Limitations
4.  Public sector pricing is a large topic in itself,  but it also has
close links to other major subjects such as the economic evaluation of
projects and the degre. of financial cost recovery.  To the extent possible
we have tried to restrict our focus to recomendations  produced at the
appraisal stage for  pricing  public  sector  goods and services.  Thus we have
not  examined how  prices  are  used for project evaluation.  Except as they
are  relevant  in  setting  prices,  we  have  not  considered  financial  covenants-2-
in  detail  nor  have  we compared  overall  levels  of cost  recovery  across
sectors.
5.  The  definition  of  a  public  sector  price  is not  always  clear.
Where  a  charge  is  made  for  incremental  use--as  in  water,  power  or railway
projects--it  is fairly  straightforward  to compare  that  charge  with the
economic  cost  of production.  However,  in sectors  such  as roads  or
irrigation,  constraints  on  measuring  usage  have  meant  that  benefit  taxes  or
user charges  are  more  common  than  prices  which  vary  strictly  with
consumption.  We have included  such  non-price  instruments  in this  review
where  relevant.
AnDroach
6.  Our approach  is  primarily  empirical. Appraisal  reports  from  13
sectors  rep;esenting  149  projects  sent  to the  Board  in FY84  and  FY85  have
be-n reviewed,  focusing  particularly  on their  treatment  of  pricing  and  cost
recovery  issues. In  addition,  we have  reviewed  the  sector  specific
guidelines,  staff  working  papers  and  other  outputs  (mainly  from  OPS)
designed  to  assist  project  staff  on pricing  issues.
7.  Following  this  Introduction,  Part  II  provides  a  brief  su  mary of
the  Bank's  general  policy  on public  sector  pricing. In Part  III  we review
the  practice  across  the  13 sectors  in (a)  calculating  efficiency  prices,
(b)  adjusting  for  implementation  constraints,  (c)  adjusting  for
distributional  objectives,  (d)  adjusting  for  fiscal  objectives  and (e)
adjusting  for  financial  objectives  in  public  sector  enterprises.  Finally,
Part  IV  presents  our  conclusions  in terms  of the  questions  set  out  above,
along  with  suggestions  for  future  work in the  various  sectors. Thirteen
Annexes  are  attached  which  summarize  the  pricing  guidelines  and  data
collected  from  appraisal  reports  by sector.
II.  THE  BANK'S  POLICY  ON PUBLIC  SECTOR  PRICING
8.  As set  out in  OMS  2.25,  the  Bank's  policy  on public  sector  pricing
is  that  a couson  analytical  framework  should  be used in  all  sectors  to
determine  appropriate  pricing  guidelines  and  cost  recovery  targets. That
framework  has two  steps. In the  first  step,  efficiency  prices  are
estimated. These  are  the  prices  that  would  maximize  the  net  economic
benefit  from  the  project. In  most  cases,  this  means  that  the  price  should
be set  equal  to the  current  economic  cost  of  producing  the  last  unit  sold,
plus  a  mark-up  if  needed  to  clear  the  market. Complications  that  may  be
involved  in calculating  these  efficiency  prices  include  indivisibilities  of
investment  costs,  externalities  and  projecting  the  effect  on demand  of
future  price  expectations.  In  addition,  complications  may  arise  in
inlemaneint  efficiency  prices  because  of  difficulties  in  measuring  :.he
consumption  of project  outputs  (i.e.,  metering  costs),  price  instability
and  constraints  imposed  by non-economic  pricing  of competing  and
complementary  goods  and  services  (i.e ,  'second  best"  problems).
9.  After  calculating  efficiency  prices,  the  second  step  is to adjust
those  prices  to take  into  account  non-efficiency  objectives.  The  mostcommon of  these  are (i)  income  distributional  objectives,  (ii)  fiscal
objectives,  and (iii)  financial  objectives,  in  the  case  of  public  sector
enterprises.  With  respect  to the  first,  OMS  2.25  notes  that  not all
subsidies  are for  distributional  reasons. Some  are  justified  on effictency
grounds;  for  example,  using  promotional  prices  to stimulate  initial  demand
in a  new  market. Where  subsidies  are  meant  to  be targeted  on low  income
consumers,  the  objective  should  be to  find  the  least  cost  method  of
providing  the  subsidy.
10.  Fiscal  objectives  are  accorded  high  priority  in the  OMS.  There
were thought  to  be many  cases  where  public  revenues  will  be scarce  enough
to make  it desirable  to  price  public  goods  and services  above  their
efficiency  prices. Questions  then  arise  as to the  least  distortionary
nmthod of raising  public  revenue. Discriminatory  taxes  on  project
beneticiaries  may sometimes  be  preferable  to raising  prices,  particularly
if the  product  is  an intermediate  good.
11.  With  respect  to financial  objectives,  the  OS  makes  a  clear
distinction  between  the  needs  of  public  enterprises,  providing  goods  such
as water  or  electri-ity,  and those  of  goverment departments,  providing
health  care  or  transportation.  It  argues  that  the  former  have  legitimate
financial  objectives  that  contribute  to  their  efficient  operation.  These
might  include  financial  independence;  the  ability  to  meet  operating  costs,
service  debt  and  earn  a  reasonable  return  on  invested  capital;  or  the
ability  to  self-finance  a  portion  of  future  investments.  Since  public
enterprises  do  not  usually  have  recourse  to  benefit  taxes,  they  must raise
the  revenue  to  achieve  such  objectives  through  the  pricas  charged  for  the
goods  and  services  they  provide,  even  if  that  means  pricing  higher  than
efficiency  prices.  It  is  sometimes  possible  to  mitigate  any  resulting
uneconomic  effects  on  demand  by  careful  design  of  the  jiZMLt=u  of  prices
or  tariffs.
12.  The  OMS  rejects  the  notion  of  financial  6bjectives  for  whole
sectors  or sub-sectors;  for  example,  recovering  the  cost  of low  cost
housing  schemes  from  profits  made  on selling  other  real  estate  to  wealthier
clients,  or financing  village  water  supply  out  of  profits  from  urban  water
systems. The  rationale  for  subsidizing  or  taxing  certain  beneficiaries
should  not  depend  on whether  cross-subsidization  within  the  sector  is
possible.
13.  While  the  OMS  calls  for  a iigorous  application  of this  two-step
framework  across  all  sectors,  it suggests  that  efficiency  pricing  will  be
most  relevant  in  electricity,  telecommunications,  ports,  railroads  and
industry. There  efficiency  pricing  should  be the  starting  point  with the
financial  objectives  of the  enterprise  an "equally  impo:tant
consideration.'  Pricing  and  cost  recovery  were  not  expected  to  plav  a
significant  role in  education  or  health  sectors,  and  there  was thought  to
be little  scope  for  efficiency  pricing  in  urban,  village  water  or rural
development  projects.-4
III. APPLICATION  OF THE  POLICY
A.  Use  of the  Two-SteR  A22roach
14.  Of the  13 sectors  reviewed,  the  two-step  approach  was  consistently
used in  the  project  Staff  Appraisal  Reports  (SARs)  of seven  sectors: coal,
highways,  irrigation,  oil/gas,  nower,  telecommunications  and  water. While
not  yet  widely  reflected  in  App  cal  reports,  sector-specific  guidelines
or research  papers  that  follov  t  - two-step  approach  are  also  available  in
health  and  education. In the  pot  £  sector,  a theoretical  treatment  of
efficiency  pricing  issues  is  available,  but  without  an  empirical  trial.
For  railroads,  there  is  an excellent  paper  on cost  estimation,  but little
on efficiency  pricing. For  housing  and  fertilizer,  the  pricing  focus  tends
to  be on cost  recovery.
15.  In comparing  the  experience  with efficiency  pricing  across
sectors,  it is  useful  to  distinguish  among  three  categories  of publicly
provided  goods  and  services: those  with  external  economies  in consumption;
those  with external  economies  in  production;  and  those  in the  public  sector
for  some  other  reason. While  these  categories  are  not  mutually  exclusive
(e.g.,  telecomunications  exhibits  external  economies  of  both consumption
and  production),  they  serve  to  highlight  the  different  approaches  that  have
been  developed  to  deal  with  essentially  similar  problems.
Sectors  with External  Economies  in  Consuantion
16.  The  first  category  includes  three  of our  13 sectors: education,
health  and  water/sewerage.  In each  case,  the  utility  of one individual  is
positively  affected  by the  consumption  of the  good  or service  by others.
Thus,  in  order  to  maxiize utility,  the  economic  price  for  each  consumer
should  be lower  than  the  marginal  cost  of production. In  addition  to
efficiency  arguments,  income  distributional  objectives  have  justified  low
prices  in  these  sectors. All  three  are  sometimes  classified  as  merit  goods
which  society  may  wish to  provide  to  all its  citizens,  regardless  of their
ability  to pay.
17.  In a number  of countries,  these  arguments  have  been carried  to
their  extreme  and  the  services  are  provided  free. The consequences  have
been  remarkably  similar.1/ Excess  demand  has  overwhelmed  available
supplies,  the  quality  of service  has deteriorated  (e.g.,  higher
student/teacher  ratios,  longer  waits  at the  health  clinics,  daily  or
seasonal  water  shortages),  funds  have  been  insufficient  to  provide  for
maintenance  and  operating  costs,  morale  of the  professional  staff  in  the
sector  has declined  and  centralized  budgeting  has led  to inefficient
investment  allocations  and little  managerial  incentive  for  cost  control.
Distributional  objectives  have  been frustrated  by the  lack  of funds  for
service  expansion. In some  cases,  income  disparities  have  been  exacerbated
by a zero-fee  policy  since  rural  services  are  the  hardest  to justify  on  a
per capita  cost  basis,  given  fiscal  constraints.
18.  As a result  of such  experiences,  the  pricing  question  is  being
reexamined  in the  education  and  health  sectors. In the  water  sector,perhaps  because  of its  traditional  links  with  powir  and  tslecoomunications
as a "public  utility"  operation,  considerable  research  and  development  of
practical  pricing  Aethodologies  has  already  taken  place  (Annex  13).
Paradoxically,  the  calculation  and  implementation  problems  with  efficiency
pricing  are  probably  more  severe  in  water  than  in  health  or education.
Thus,  while  much  of the  work  on  water  relates  to its  own  problems  (e.g.,
capital  indivisibilities,  metering  costs),  the  general  approach  developed
there  should  be useful  to  education  and  health.
1S.  An important  initial  step  in  designing  tariffs  or  user  charges  is
to disaggregate  costs  according  to  services  provided  and  to relate  those
costs  to the  relevant  market  segments. In the  water  sector,  this  has  meant
assigning  pumping  costs  to  are-s  of higher  elevation  and  canacity  expansion
costs  to  peak season  consumers. In  the  education  sector,  it  means
disaggregating  costs  according  to level  of  education: primary,  secondary,
tertiary;  while  in  health  a  finer  distinction  may  be appropriate:  primary
health  care (imunizations,  staternal/child,  general  practitioner  curative)
and  referral  service  (district  clinics,  national  hospitals).
20.  The  next step  is  to examine  the  rationale  for  diverging  from
efficiency  pricing & *mch  lya-l,  of cost  and  for  each  market  segment  within
the  sector. For  water,  external  economies  of  consumption  accrue
predominantly  with the  initial  25-50  liters  per capita  per  day  of safe
water  for  drinking  and  basic  hygiene. A  tariff  structure  with a low  charge
for  the  first  consumption  block  and  charges  equal  to long-run  margir.4l  cost
(LRMC)  for incremental  consumption  would  satisfy  both  economic  and
distributional  objectives. (Because  LRUCs  are  typically  above  average
costs  in  water,  financial  objectives  would  normally  be met  as  well).  In
the  education  sector,  external  economies  of consumption  are  most
significant  at the  primary  school  level. This  is also  where  costs  per
oupil  are  the  lowest,  although  total  costs  may  be large  because  of the
larger  number  of pupils. Substantial  subsidies  at the  primary  school  level
are  probably  justified. However,  at  higher  education  levels  most  of the
benefit  will  accrue  to the  consumer,  and  he is  better  able  than  the  primary
school  student  to  recognize  its  value  and  compare  it  with the  cost. Unlike
in the  water  sector,  distributional  concerns  are  still  important  at  higher
consumption  levels  in  education. Advanced  education  should  be rationed  not
only  by willingness-to-pay  but  also  by ability  to  benefit. Thus  a
scholarship  and/or  government-guaranteed  loan  program  is  a  necessary
complement  to  a system  of cost-reflecting  tuition  charges  for  secondary  and
tertiary  education  (Annex  2).
21.  The  design  of user  charges  in  the  health  sector  should  also  be
based  on a disaggregated  analysis  of costs  and  the  incidence  of  benefits.
A rough  distinction  has  been drawn  between  preventive  and  curative
services,  where  the  former  is further  divided  intg  patient-related
(maternal/child  health,  home  visits,  community  health  programs)  and  non-
patient  related  (pest  control,  mass immunization  campaigns)  costs.2/ User
charges  are  clearly  impractical  for  the  non-patient  related  services,  which
also  have significant  positive  externalities.  However,  for  patient-related
preventive  care  and  for  non-referral  curative  care,  the  major  efficiency
objections  to  user  fees  do  not  apply. On distributional  and  financial
grounds,  the  Chinese  system  of service  fees  to cover  marginal  costs  plus
general  coverage,  or subscriber,  fees  paid  by all  has  much to  recommend  it.-6-
22.  The general  consensus  in the  education  and  health  sectors  is  that,
for  fiscal  and  X-efficiency  reasons,  economic  pricing  is  now  thought  to  be
more relevant  than  was  expected  at the  time  that  OHS  2.25  was  prepared.
The  basic  research  and  thinking  has  been  done;  however,  our  review  of SARs
indicates  that  this  new  perception  is  not  yet  mirrored  in  Bank  project  work
or in  many  of the  developing  countries. The  same  is true  of rural  water
supply,  where  Bank thinking  has  shifted  strongly  in  favor  of cost  recovery.
Case  studies  or cross-country  comparisons  should  Se developed  and
disseminated  as examples  of  how  disaggregated  user  charges  can  be designed
and  applied. The  priority  in these  sectors  is  to apply  the  ideas  that  have
been developed  and  to  moritor  and  disseminate  their  results.
23.  Urban  water  supply  is  at a different  point  and  holds  lessons  of
its  own.  Economic  costing  has  become  routine  in SARs  and  is  widely  used
for  project  design. Tariff  studies  based  on  LRHC  are  often  financed
through  Bank  projects. However,  it is  clear  that  properly  designed  tariffs
are  not  a  sufficient  condition  for  an efficient  utility. Much  attention
has  been devoted  to  LRMC  estimation,  while  the  metering/billing/collection
systems  in  many countries  have  continued  to  deteriorate.  The result  is
often  higher  tariffs  yielding  little  additional  revenue. A better  balance
is  needed,  combining  rougher  estimates  of  LREC  with  more focus  on the  other
links  in  the  chain  of user  charge  implementation.i/
Sectors  with External  Economies  in  Production
24.  We include  seven  sectors  in  this  category: highways,  irrigation,
natural  gas,  ports,  power,  railways  and  telecomunications. These  are  the
sectors  where  decreasing  marginal  production  costs  lead  inherently  to
monopoly. The ownership  of  natural  monopolies  can  be left  in  the  private
nector,  as is the  case  in  some  industrial  countries,  but  even  then  they  are
zabject  to  price  regulation  by the  public  sector.
25.  The interpretation  of efficiency  prices  presents  difficulties  in
these  sectors  sintce  investment  lumpiness,  problems  in  projecting  demand  and
the importance  of  using  a "system"  rather  t_an  a project  framework  in
estimating  marginal  costs  are  common  to sectors  with  external  economies  in
production. In the  natural  gas,  power  and  telecommunications  sectors,
these  problems  have  received  considerable  attention  and  practical
guidelines  have  been  developed  for  implementing  the  recommended  approaches.
In general,  LRMC  is felt  to  be more  appropriate  as a representation  of
economic  cost  in these  sectors,  and  the  "average  incremental  cost"  formula
has  been developed  to  approximate  LRMC  under  certain  conditions._/  For
highways  and  ports,  shortrun  marginal  cost (SRKC)  is  advocated;  this  has
been  widely  applied  in the  former  sector,  but  discussed  only  at a general
level  in  the  latter. The  choice  between  LRMC  and  SRMC in  railways  depends
on the  circumstances  of the  country's  rail  system;  however,  this  has  not
been elaborated  in  any  detail. In  the  irrigation  sector,  little  attention
has  been given  to the  best  measure  of economic  costs  because  metering  has
generally  been considered  impractical.
26.  The  distincton  between  LRMC  and  SRMC  is less  relevant  where  a
rationing  or  congestion  price  should  be applied  during  those  times  of day
or in those  parts  of the  system  where  demand  at enisting  prices  cannot  be.7
satisfied  with existing  capacity. Congestion  pricing  is a4vocated  in
theory  for  all  of these  sectors,  with  the  exception  of irrlgation.  In
pr-ctice,  only  telecommunications  proju%.ts  have  attempted  it. On both
economic  ard fiscal  grounds,  the  use  of rationing  prices  deserves  fur._er
trial.
27.  Once  economic  prices  have  been  defined  and  estimated,  their
implementation  presents  major  problems  only  for  the  highways  and  irrigation
sectors. In  both  cases  the  obvious  metering  systems--road  tolls  and
volumetric  charges-  -have  been  rejected  as  being  too  costly,  cumbersome  or
inaccurate  to  be generally  recomended.  Fuel  taxes  and  licensing  fees  are
used for  roads,  but these  are  too  gross  to  reflect  congestion  costs  and
influence  drivers'  behavior  during  certain  times  of the  day  or on certain
roads. In irrigation,  it is  our  impression  that  in  many  cases  metering  has
been assuwnd  to  be uneconomic  without  a  quantitative  analysis. There  are
numerous  e*xminles  where,  with  hindsight,  metering  could  have improved  the
allocation  Af  water  among  users  and  postponed  or  prevented  the  need for
drainage  systems  caused  by overwatering.  We suggest  that  in  both  these
sectors  a  range  of  pricing  instruments,  such  as inner-city  parking  fees,
zonal  access  charges  and  transferable  water  rights,  should  be tried.
28.  Highways  and  irrigation  also  differ  from  the  other  five  sectors  in
this  set in  that  they  are  not  separately  constituted  public  enterprises.
In most  countries,  natural  gas,  ports,  power,  railways  and
telecovnunications  are  institutionally  separate  from  the  government
ministries,  with the  designated  authority  to levy  charges  on  users  and  to
retain  those  revenues  to  cover  operating  costs  and  finance  future
expansion. If congestion  changes  are  to  be more  widely  used,  appropriate
systems  of taxation  would  be needed  to ensure  that  excess  rents  accrue  to
the  general  fund  rather  than  weakening  incentives  for  cost  control  in  the
enterprise.
29.  Without  the  financial  legitimacy  of a  public  enterprise,  highways
and  irrigation  have  both  had difficulties  ensuring  funding  for  sainzenance
acti-ities,  even  where  the  total  revenues  from  user  charges  exceeded  such
costs. The  arguments  for  and  against  earmarked  funds  in  these  sectors  are
summarized  later  in this  paper;  on  balance,  we feel  that  an earmarked  fund
whose  revenues  are  clearly  from  sector  beneficiaries  and  whose  expenditures
are  subject  to the  sme  scrutiny  given  to  public.  enterprises  can  be
justified  on  both fiacal  and  X-efficiency  grounds.
30.  The  value  of  marginal  costs  as  benchmarks  in  refining  project
design  and  improving  operational  performance  has  been  recognized  for  many
years  in  the  power  sector,  even  where  second-best  or other  considerations
prevent  marginal  cost  pricing. This lesson  is  beginning  to  be applied  in
the  natural  gas  and  telecommunications  s-ctors,  although  empirical  work is
needed  in  both to develop  examples  that  in  guide  consultant  studies  and
developing  country  practitioners.  Of the  three  transport  sectors,  marginal
costing  techniques  have  only  been  widely  applied  in  highways. SARs  from
the  railways  and  ports  sectors,  as  well  as irrigation,  rarely  contain
disaggregated  cost  information  although  studies  to  de7elop  such  data  are
sometimes  firtanced.31.  In summary,  thess  seven  sectors  are  at different  stages  in
addressing  siollar  pricing  issues. Methodological  research  to develop
techniques  for  marginal  cost  estimation  is  probably  needed  in  the  ports  and
railways  sectors. Such  research  has  already  taken  place  for  natural  gas
and  telecommunications,  but the  methods  need to  be applied  in  trial  cases
to  generate  practical  guidelines  for  developing  countries. For irrigation
and  power,  such  guidelines  exist  although,  in the  former  case,  pricing
still  receives  inadequate  attention  in  SARs  perhaps  because  of pessimism
about  the  application  of volumetric  charges. In irrigation  and  highways,  a
wider  range  of pricing  instruments  should  be tried  with  the  emphasis  on
improving  allocz onal  efficiency.  Earmarking  should  also  be reexamined
for  these  sectors. Congestion  pricing  is  relevant  for  most of them  but  has
received  little  trial  despite  its  clear  fiscal  benefits. Finally,  only in
the  power  sector  is there  evidence  that  pricing  systems  based  on marginal
costs  are  being  widely  adopted  in the  developing  countries. The  gap
between  policy  and  practice  is  still  a  wide one.
Public  Sectors  without  Extarnal  Economies
32.  The  preceding  two  sections  dealt  with  sectors  whose  rationale  for
an  externally  imposed  pricing  policy  was  the  pres,nce  of external  economies
that  would  lead  to inefficient  private  market  solutions. There  are four
additional  sectors  covered  in  this  review  where  the  rationale  for  public
provision  is  not  primarily  externalities  in  consumption  or  production,  but
a  variety  of other  factors. These  are  coal,  fertilizers,  housing  and  oil.
33.  It  could  be argued  that  the  coal,  fertilizer  and  oil  sectors
exhibit  economies  of scale  and  therefore  should  be treated  together  with
power,  railways  and  the  other  sectors  in the  previous  section. However,
the  tendency  toward  natural  monopoly  with  prices  higher  than  marginal  costs
does  not  arise  for  these  sectors  in  an open  economy. All three  are  subject
to international  competition  and  face  a  clear  border  price. Yet even  in
many  industrial  countries  coal  and  oil  are  produced  in the  public  sector
and  sold  domestically  at  prices  above  import  parity.
34.  In the  developing  countries,  coal  and  oil  are  nea-ly  always
produced  by the  public  sector  (Colombian  coal  provides  an interesting
exception).  For  oil  products,  there  is  no question  that  border  prices
represent  economic  values  despite  considerable  market  imperfections  at the
international  level  with cartels,  extreme  volatility  during  certain
periods,  etc.  SARs  for  oil  projects  consistently  compare  domestic  prices
with  border  prices  and  discuss  the  aggregate  contribution  of the  sector  to
tax  revenues. A closer  examination  of alternative  means  of taxing  the
sector  to avoid  incentives  for  uneconomic  substitution  and  better  systems
of transfer  pricing  crude  oil  to  refineries  is  still  needed  (Annex  8).
35.  For  coal,  international  and internal  transport  costs  are  high,
often  leaving  a  wide  gap  between  import  and  export  parities. In addition,
many grades  of domestic  production  are  not suitable  for  export. This  means
that  the  c^nomic  value  of  coal in  many cases  is  the  LRMC  plus  an allowance
for  depletion  (Annex  1).  As in  oil,  SARs  for  coal  projects  were found  to
contain  a thorough  treatment  of pricing  issues  and  explicit  references  to
efficiency  price  calculations.  There  are  still  major  problems  at theproducer  price  level  in  the  largest  producing  countries  where  cost-plus
systeos  are  used. However,  improveoments  have  been  achieved  in the
allocat4onal  and  X-efficiency  incentives  of these  systems  through  Bank
participation.  Additional  attention  is  warranted  on the  potential  for
price  rationing  of coal  grades  in short  supply  and  of the  scope  for
increasing  the  fiscal  contrioution  of the  sector.
36.  The fertilizer  sector  presents  an interesting  paradox. On the  one
hand,  border  prices  are  easily  observed  and  would  be straightforward  to
administer.  As an intermediate  input,  there  would  seem  to  be compelling
arguments  against  price  distortions  on efficiency  grounds,  and  fewer
distributional  or fiscal  complications  than  one  has in the  pricing  of,  say,
gasoline,  kerosene  or coal. Yet in  every  c3untry  of our  sample,  fertilizer
prices  were set  without  reference  to  border  prices  and  there  were  sajor  X-
efficiency,  allocational  and  fiscal  problems.
37.  The  Bank's  then  Industry  Department  (IND)  recently  sponsored  an
international  seminar  on fertilizer  prices.  /  Its  proceedings  provide  a
good  survey  of the  theoretical  issues  involved  and  of the  exiting  pricing
systems  in a  number  of developing  countries. The  case  for  diverging  from
border  prices  for  fertilizer  at the  producer  price  level  rests  on two
factors. First,  international  prices  are  said  to  be  highly  volatile
because  of lengthy  periods  of over-  and  under-capacity  in the  industry,  as
well  as international  collusion. To reflect  this  volatility  in  domestic
prices  would  imply  alternating  periods  of excess  profits  and  major  losses
or perhaps  plant  closures. Second,  strategic  arguments  have  been  presented
to  justify  a domestic  production  capability.  Because  fertilizer  is  a key
agricultural  input,  and  because  its  application  is time-sensitive,
countries  have claimed  that  they  must  have  a  domestic  production  capability
to  insure  against  international  price  or  supply  disruptions.
38.  These  arguments  should  be subjected  to cost-benefit  analysis,
given  the  high administrative  costs  of existing  pricing  systems,  their
negative  effects  on  X-efficiency  and  the  large  fiscal  burdens  they impose
during  periods  of low  international  prices. The  costs  of mothballing  and
restart  operations  and  of  building  and  maintaining  domestic  buffer
stockpiles  of  fertilizer  should  be  explore4  as  alternatives  to  the  present
cost-plus  pricing  systems.
39.  At the  consumer  level  as  well  as reexamination  of the
justification  for  fertilizer  price  subsidies  is  needed. As with
irrigation,  there  has  been  a tendency  by sector  specialists  to neglect
consumer  pricing  on the  grounds  that  fertilizer  is  part  of a complex  system
of agricultural  input  and  output  prices  that  should  be reviewed  as a  whole.
Meanwhile,  on the  agricultural  side,  there  is  growing  concern  over  the
widespread  practice  of subsidizing  fertilizers  to farmers. First,  it  is
impossible  to  truly  delink  producer  and  consumer  prices  because  the
difference  between  the  two  hzs  direct  fiscal  implications.  In addition,
fertilizer  subsidies  are  rarely  efficient  from  the  overall  perspective  of
agricultural  policy. In  many  countries,  fertilizer  use is  unbalanced  and
inefficient  due, in  part,  to its  long  history  of low  prices. If there  are
more cost-effective  ways to  achieve  the  same  ends (including  distributional
and  fiscal,  as  well as efficiency  ones),  then  these  should  be identified  so
that  project  staff  in the  fertilizer  sector  can  propose  appropriate- 10  -
alternatives.  Now  approaches  are  needed  for  fertilizer  pricing  at  both
producer  and  consumer  levels  (Annex  3).
40.  The  housing  sector  is,  in  many  ways,  in  a class  by itself. It
contains  few  externalities  of consumption  or  production. Its  output  is
non-tradable  and  not subject  to  border  price  comparisons.  The  case  for
public  sector  intervention--and  World  Bank  support--rests  more  on social
than  on economic  considerations.  Those  considerations  clearly  apply  to
only  a  part  of the  housing  sector;  i.e.,  the  market  for  low-income  housing.
Thus  the  scope  for  cost  recovery  is inherently  lower  than  in  sectors  which
cater  to all  income  levels  such  as water  supply  or transport,  where  it is
possiblo  for  most  consumers  to  pay the  full  cost  of the  service.
41.  Efficiency  pricing  has  not  been  a  major  point  of reference  in  the
housing  sector. While  there  are  sometines  probleos  determining  the  value
of publicly  owned  land;  in  general,  the  calculation  of the  economic  price
of a  plot and  its  improvements  should  not  present  major  difficulties.  It
would  be useful  to  carry  out  this  calculation  for  prototype  projects  in
order  to develop  practical  techniques  for  estimating  efficiency  prices. At
the  same  time  the  meaning  of project  "replicabilityw  needs  to  be clarified
with  respect  to its  relation  to efficiency  objectives  and  financial
targets. Disaggr-gated  economic  costs  for  housing  projects  would  also  help
with  project  design;  e.g.,  for  examining  the  trade-offs  in  cost-
minimization  between  lower  standard  infrastructure  and  lower  valued  land.
In sum,  the  analytical  balance  in  the  housing  sector  needs  to  be shifted
from  financial  to economic  considerations  (Annex  6).
42.  This  cross-sectoral  review  of  pricing  issues  reveals  significant
differences  in  how they  are treated  both in  the  Bank  and in  the  developing
countries. Some  sectors  are  clearly  farther  along  than  others  in  applying
the  two-step  approach  outlined  in  OHS  2.25. It is  striking  how  much scope
for  improvement  there  is in the  developing  countries  across  almost  all
sectors. To effectively  target  that  improvement,  however,  it  is  necessary
for  sector  specialists  to  develop  practical  approaches  for  estimating  and
applying  efficiency  prices  as  benchmarks.  The  following  sections  of this
Chapter  compare  the  approaches  used  in  different  sectors  to  overcome  common
problems  of calculating  and implementing  efficiency  prices  and  of adjusting
those  prices  to  meet  other  objectives.
B.  The  Calculation  of Efficiency  Prices
43.  The  calculation  of efficiency  prices  for  public  sector  goods  is
likely  to  present  problems  for  the  same  reasons  that  the  goods  are  provided
by the  publc  sector. Some  type  of  market  failure  prevents  a smooth  build-
up of demand  and  supply. Barriers  to  entry  may  exist. There  may  be
divergences  between  private  and  social  costs  or  benefits. Related  economic
infrastructure,  such  as insurance  and  credit  markets,  may  be lacking.
Consl:mers  may  be ill-informed.  These  types  of market  failure  will  block
the  development  of  a  diverse  market--with  numerous  buyers  and  sellers-
-where  efficiency  prices  can  be  easily  observed.  The  most  common sources
of difficulty  in  estimating  efficiency  prices  are  discussed  below.Capital  Indivisibilities
44.  As  noted  above,  many  of  the  public  sector  producers  have
characteristics  of  natural  monopolies;  for  example,  electricity,  water,
irrigation,  telecommunications,  ports,  roads,  natural  gas  transmission  and
railways.  These  sectors  all  face  lumpy  investment  costs  due  to  economies
of  scale  over  at  least  a  portion  of  their  output.  All  produce  non-tradable
outputs,  so  no  border  price  reference  exists  to  which  efficiency  prices  can
be  pegged.  Over  time  their  short-run  marginal  costs  will  tend  to  rise  very
sharply  prior  to  each  new  investment  and  fall  precipitously  thereafter.
Such  price  instability  would  be  difficult  for  most  consumers  to  accept  or
interpret  as  they  prepare  to  make  long-term  consumption  decisions;  such  as
locating  a plant  near  a  railhead  or  port,  buying  an  electric  or  gas  boiler,
etc.
45.  In  the  electricity,  water,  telecoAmicatione  and  natural  gas
sectors,  the  lank  recoends  the  use  of  LR8C rather  than  SREC as  the
efficiency  price  (except  when  supplies  need  to  be  rationed  as  discussed
below).  In  the  roads  and  ports  sectors,  SRMC  pricing  is  recommended  with
congestion  charges  applied  to  those  facilities  that  are  congested.L/
However,  this  is  stated  to  be  a  theoretical  recommendation;  experience  with
its  implementation  is  not  yet  widely  enough  available  to  provide  the  basis
for  a firm  policy.  For  railways  both  SRHC  and  LRKC  have  been  recoimnded
depending  on  the  circumstances  of  the  system.2/  In  irrigation,  efficiency
pricing  is  thought  to  be  infeasible  due  t^  metering  probleos,  so  little
attention  has  been  given  to  its  appropriate  definition.
46.  Where  LRIC is considered  the  relevant  pricing  guideline,  a  method
must  be  determined  to  approximate  it.  In  the  water  supply  sector  in  1976,
the  Bank  compared  several  approximation  formulae  and  recouended  the  use  of
the  Average  Incremental  Cost  (AIC)  /  This  has  subsequently  been  applied
in  the  power,  telecoumunications,  gas  and  coal  sectors.  The  AIC  is
essentially  a  smoothing  formula  over  time  of  the  future  investment  stream.
The structure  of  marginal  costs  is  reflected  by  separating  capacity  costs
from  operating  costs  and  by  assigning  each  to  those  parts  of  the  system  or
times  of  the  day  when  they  are  incurred  at  the  margin.  Recently,  in  the
power  sector,  more  disaggregated  estimation  methods  have  been  recommended
where  the  data  pernit.2/  In  the  railway  sector,  guidelines  exist  for
calculating  long-run  marginal  costs  but  not  for  translating  those  costs
into  practicable  pricing  structures.
Project  versus  System  Costs
47.  An  estimation  problem  related  to  capital  indivisibilities  and
LRHCs is  the  need  in  some  sectors  to  base  prices  on  future  sXste  costs
rather  than  on  the  cost  of  the  project.  This  is  particularly  relevant  in
the  case  of  power,  railroads  and  telecommunications  where  technological
improvements  and  long  lived  equipment  mean that  a  new purchase  will  change
the  utilization  patterns  of  existing  stock.  For  example,  obtaining  more
energy  efficient  new  locomotives  allows  a  railroad  to  reduce  fuel  costs  by
shifting  some  old  locomotives  to  peak  use  only.  The  parallel  is  obvious  in
the  power  sector.- 12 -
48.  The long-run  marginal  system  cost is  a concept  that  has only  been
extensively  applied  in  the  power  sector. The  theory  has  been  developed  for
telecommunications  and  railways,  but there  are  few  available  applications.
In  power,  primarily  for  planning  purposes  rather  than  pricing,  computerized
least-cost  system  expansion  plans  over  10-20  year  periods  are  fairly
comon.  Where  such  models  exist  it is  possible  to  move from  general  AIC
estimates  for  efficiency  prices  toward  a more  precise  and  disaggregated  set
of cost-reflecting  prices  at  different  times  of the  day,  geographic  nodes
in the  system,  and  even  demand  patterns  of  major  consumers. The  benefits
from  calculating  such  LRMC-based  prices  extend  not only  downstream--toward
providing  the  consumer  with  correct  signals--but  also  upstream--as  a tool
to improve  the  efficiency  of system  operation. Disaggregated  marginal
c.sts  can  be a  handy  yardstick  to resolve  operational  planning  problems  at
the  margin  of the  least-cost  expansion  program  .1/
49.  Further  examples  of this  link  between  marginal  cost  estimation,
pricing  and  internal  operational  efficiency  are  found  in  the  health  and
education  sectors. In  health,  inefficient  operations  are  cited  as a  major
problem,  of  which  a large  part  of the  Llane  is  placed  on the  lack  of
pricing  incentives  to  minimize  costs. Doctors  are  rarely  provided  with
information  on the  costs  of the  tests  and  treatments  prescribed  for  their
patients,  hospital  administrators  are  given  a  budget  based  on the  previous
year's  expenses  thereby  encouraging  then  to inflate  rather  than  reduce
costs,  and fees  are  set  at the  national  level  without  regard  to local
differences  in  costs.f/  In  education,  the  inefficient  use  of resources  in
schools  is  traced  to the  separation  of education  revenues--generally  from
central  Sovernments--from  the  costs  paid  by  beneficiaries--_..hrough  general
taxes  and/or  fees. This  leads  to little  flexibility  at the  local  level,  no
competition  for  students,  a lack  of  accountability  to  parents  and  therefore
little  incentive  for  the  schools  to  be cost  effective.]1/
50.  In  both  health  and  education  it  has  also  been  suggested  that
private  sector  provision  should  play  a larger  role.  Scale  economies  are
not a  major  barrier  to  entry  and  there  is  often  excess  demand  for  public
services  indicating  an unta-,ped  willingness  to  pay.  The introduction  or
expansion  of the  private  sector  would  increase  the  total  supply  as  well  as
providing  a competitive  check  on  charges  and  service  levels.
51.  There  is still  a long  way to  go to apply  the  type  of system
costing  that  is  now routinely  done  in  the  power  sector  to  other  sectors.
An analytical  framework  along  those  lines  has  been  developed  (but  not  yet
applied)  in  natural  gas,  where  supply  alternatives  are  often  less  complex
than  in  power;  but chunky  demand  options  loom  large,  and trade-offs  over
time  must  be addressed  because  of  depletability.1I/  In telecommunications
and  railroads  there  is an  open  question  about  the  appropriate  level  of
disaggregation  for  system  LRMC  estimates.  In addition,  there  is  often  a
case  for  rationing  access  by charging  "what  the  traffic  will  bear." This
makes  cost  levels  less  relevant  to  pricing,  although  the  structure  of  LRMC
should  still  be reflected  in  the  structure  of  prices  by differentiating
Letween  those  parts  of the  system  with  capacity  constraints  and  those
without.- 13
Joint  Cost  Allocation
52.  Joint  cost  allocation  is  a universal  problem: it  arises  to  a
greater  or lesser  extent  in all  13  sectors  of our  review. How  easily  it
can  be handled  varies  from  sector  to  sector. In  most  of the  sectors  the
main joint  costs  are  for  different  products  or services  within  the  sector
itself. For  example,  oil  and  gas  are  often  produced  from  the  same  field,
and  dil  exploration  sometimnes  results  in the  discovery  of gas  reserves.
The  same  health  clinics  and  doctors  provide  both  curative  and  preventive
health  care.  Railroads  are  used  both  for  passenger  and  freight  transport.
The  basic infrastructure  in  housing  projects  serves  plots  of different
sizes  and  quality  characteristics.  For  such  intrasectoral  joint  costs,
comon  sense  and  a  knowledge  of the  cost  characteristics  of the  sector  are
generally  sufficient  to  allocate  the  costs  in a sensible  manner.
53.  In .- our  of the  sectors--power,  water,  irrigation  and  transport-
-there  are  occasional  instances  of intersectoral  joint  costs. These  arise
with dams  that  supply  electricity,  water  and  irrigation  benefits. They  are
prevalent  in  the  various  transport  sectors. Rail lines  are  built  to
connect  inland  production  vith  ports  (e.g.,  Carajas  in  Brazil). Gas
pipelines  are  built  to  supply  fertilizer  plants  located  near their  market
(e.g.,  the  KBJ  pipeline  in  India). Such  cases  present  few  problems  if  the
transport  facility  is  wholly  dedicated  to the  one  product;  where  it  also
serves  smaller,  unrelated  consumers,  however,  the  incremental  costs  they
impose  on  the  system  are  not  often  rtraightforward  to  determine.
54.  From  the  demand  side  as  well,  it  is  difficult  in  practice  to
estimate  derived  demand  curves  for  the  joint  products  and,  therefore,  to
set  prices  for  the  various  beneficiaries.  Although  joint  cost  problems
must  be  tackled  on  a  case-by-case  basis,  there  are  right  and  wrong  ways  to
approach  them.  A  coinon  mistake  is  to  confuse  the  economic  distinction
between  joint  and  separable  costs  with  the  accounting  distinction  between
fixed  and  recurrent  costs.  There  is  some  evidence  of  this  confusion  in  the
SARs  from  irrigation  and  housing  projects,  where  undue  emphasis  seems  to  be
placed  on  recovering  certain  percentages  of  financial  costs  as  a  pricing
target.
Information  Problems
55.  Three  types  of  information  problems  plague  marginal  cost
estimation:  (i)  lack  of  information  about  future  investment  and  operating
costs;  (ii)  existing  cost  information  based  on  sub-optimal  past  investments
or  operating  practices;  and  (iii)  difficulties  in  forecasting  demand  for
the  product  or  service  due  to  uncertainties  regarding  income  and  price
elasticities.  Problems  (i)  and  (ii)  are  most  acute  in  those  sectors  where
system,  rather  than  project,  costs  are  the  relevant  LRMC  measure. Problem
(iii)  arises  especially  in new  markets,  such  as  natural  gas,  and  where
there  are  close  substitutes,  such  as  for  railroads.
56.  A  common response  to  lack  of  information  about  future  investment
and  operating  costs  is  to commission  a consultant  study,  often  financed  as
part  of a  Bank loan  or credit. As shown  in  Table  1, during  our  sample
period  chis  technique  was  used fairly  often  in telecommunications,  ports- 14
and  roads;  less  often  in  oil/gaa,  health,  power,  housing  and  railroads;  and
relatively  seldom  in irrigation,  water,  education,  coal  and  fertilizers.
57.  Such  cross-sectoral  comparisong  reveal  little,  however,  about  the
type  or usefulness  of such  studies. In the  power,  roads  and  water  sectors
the  terms  of reference  seemed  to  be clearly  defined  and  similar  across
countries. These  are  cases  where  the  Bank  has  been  concerned  with  pricing
issues  for  many  years,  and  the  methodology  to  be used in  marginal  cost
calculations  is  well  known  by project  staff  and  consultants. In the
telecommunications  and  health  sectors,  the  Bank's  focus  on efficiency
pricing  is  relatively  new  and  study  approaches  appear  more  diverse. A
recent  review  of  pricing  initiatives  undertaken  as part  of
telecommunications  projects  (including  LRNC  studies,  tariff  changes  and
setting  up economic  cells  within  the  enterprises)  concluded  that  of the  22
examples  only  four  have  been completed  satisfactorily,  10  have  never  been
carried  out,  six  have  been  failures  and  the  remaining  two  studies  are  under
review.IA/ A major  work  pro-ram  has  been  proposed  to strengthen  the
supervision  of tariff  studies  now  underway  and  to develop  guidelines  for
tariff  analysis. A similar  approach  was used  in the  oil/gas  sector  where
the  initial  set  of gas  utilization  studies  was  provided  extra  supervision
and,  based  on that  experience,  a guideline  was  prepared  to  set  out  the
methodology  for  future  such  studies.
Table  1.  Proiects  with  pricing  studies
N%mber  of  %  with  Pricing  or
SARs  Reviewed  Costing  Studies
Telecommunications  6  100
Ports  8  62
Rtdads  2  50
Oil/Gas  10  40
Health  11  36
Power  20  30
Housing  7  29
Railroads  7  29
Irrigation  14  14
Water  14  14
Education  20  10
Coal  5  0
Fertilizer  5  0
58.  In the  ports,  education  and  housing  sectors,  approaches  varied
widely  and,  for  the  most  part,  seemed  geared  more to  financial  than  to
economic  definitions  of costs. Prototype  terms  of  reference  in  those
sectors  would  be usefu'..  In irrigation,  pricing  studies  have often  been
carried  out  by local  teams  who  were  part  of the  system  being  reviewed.
This  has generally  produced  poor  results. In addition,  Bank  supervision  of
the  studies  has  been lax  and  little  attention  given  to their  eventual
review  and  implementation.  Finally,  it  is striking  that  no cost  or pricing
studies  were financed  under  the  coal  or fertilizer  projects  reviewed. Our
sample  period  may  have  produced  a fluke  statistic;  however,  these  sectors- 1S  -
should  consider  making  use  of pricing  studies  in  those  cases  where
information  problems  prevent  concrete  recommendations  at the  project
appraisal  stage.
59.  Difficulties  in  forecasting  demand  have  arisen  primarily  in the
utility  and  transport  sectors. The  problems  in  power,  water  and  natural
gas  stem  mainly  from  the  difficulty  of estimating  the  consumption  of new
customers;  average  per  capita  consumption  tends  to fall  as  service  is
extended  into  poorer  areas  of the  city.  In addition,  in  the  pover  sector
demand  was  badly  overestimated  in  many  countries  during  the  1970s  due  to
the  failure  to recognize  the  major  price  and  income  effects  of  higher  oil
prices. Demand  estimation  has also  been  poor in the  transport  sectors. In
railroads,  the  1981  sectoral  review  showed  that  freight  volume  growth  had
been  consistently  overestimated,  vith 30-40%  shortfalls  by the  second  or
third  year  after  appraisal  in  some  cases. Xeanwhile,  passenger  traffic
exceeded  forecasts  in  t'  ee  quarters  of the  cses.  (Because  of the
widespread  subsidizatio.  of  passenger  traffic,  this  often  increased
losses).  Pc  t  traffic  projections  must  consider  competition  from
neighboring  %untries,  the  effect  of  shipping  cartels,  and  the  bouya ncy  of
export  markets,  as  well as  domestic  intermodal  choice.  Thus,  while  some  of
the  problems  of transport  demand  estimation  could  be alleviated  by taking  a
full  sectoral  approach  (i.e  ,  considering  roads,  rails  and  ports  together),
the  difficulties  will remain  substantial.
60.  In the  housing  sector  there  has  been  considerable  recent  research
into  the  determinants  of  housing  demand  by income  class  .1/  The
traditional  method  of demand  estimation  was to  use  a rule  of thumb  that
households  would  be willing  to  pay 20-25*  of their  income  for  shelter.
More sophisticated  analyses  show  a range  of 5%-400,  depending  on income
level  ard stage  of development.  In addition,  empirical  research  has shown
the  importance  of including  "unearned"  income,  such  as transfers,  in such
calculations.  Efficiency  prices  for  housing  must  reflect  the  full  value  of
land  and  mortgage  capital;  these  typically  exceed  the  willingness  to  pay of
low-income  target  beneficiaries.  Thus  the  pricing  implications  of this
research  are  that  either  lower  cost  design  standards  or  higher  subsidies
will be necessary  to reach  the  target  population.
61.  Regardless  of the  quality  and  quantity  of studies  on the
determinants  of demand  and  the  degree  of price  responsiveness,
uncertainties  will remain. These  should  be dealt  with  through  the  strategy
of implementing  the  recoAmended  price. Once  the  studies  and  estimations
have produced  a  price  target,  if it is  a  major  step  from  current  prices,
the  government  has two  choices. If  the  final  target  is  fairly  clear  (such
as  an import  equivalent  price  for  a  petroleum  product),  it is  often  best to
move in a single  large  leap,  thereby  fulfilling  expectations,  reducing
uncertainty  and  reaping  the  political  costs  only  once.  If the  target
itself  is  uncertain,  it  may  be better  to approach  it  gradually,  monitoring
the  demanoi  response  along  the  way,  and  making  mid-course  corrections  if the
original  assumptions  about  price  elasticities  are  not  borne  out  by
experience.
Externalities
62.  In the  health,  education,  water  and  telecommunications  sectors  the
gain that  accrues  to society  from incremental  consumption  is likely  to  be
larger  than  that  accruing  to the  individual  consumer. Vaccination16 -
campaigns  and  access  to  sanitation  reduce  the  risk  of disease  for  neighbors
as  well as for  those  served. Widespread  literacy  enhances  the  productivity
of all.  Every  new telephone  connection  increases  the  value  of access  to
those  already  connected. The  existence  of such  positive  externalities
means  that  the  efficiency  price  of the  good  or service  will  be less  than
its  private  marginal  cost. Negative  externalities  are  also  significant  in
some  sectors. Coal  production  can  affect  agricultural  land  and  its
consumption  in  congested  areas  can  cause  respiratory  problems. Forestry
and  irrigation  projects  have  a well-known  potential  for  environmental
degradation.  Less  well  understood  are  the  widespread  and  long-run
environmental  effects  of  policies  such  as  kerosene  taxation  on fuelwood
denand  or agricultural  pricing  on land  clearance.  Kethodologies  are  only
now  being  developed  to assess  these.1W/ The  problem  is that  where  positive
or negative  externalities  are  significant,  it  will  rarely  be possible  to
measure  efficiency  prices  directly  since  the  aggregate  social  demand  curve
cannot  be observed. This  does  not  negate  the  importance  of estimating
marginal  costs  but it  dies  mean that  indirect  routes  must often  be taken  to
arrive  at  pricing  recommendations.
63.  In the  telecommunications  sector  externalities  present  little
practical  problem  for  pricing. The  widespread  existence  of excess  demand
means  that  prices  should  generally  exceed  marginal  costs  in order  to
efficiently  ration  supplies. In  health,  education  and  village  water
supply,  prices  have traditionally  been set  close  to  zero,  both in  order  to
avoid  overshooting  the  efficiency  price  and  on income  distributional
grounds. Recently  this  policy  has come  under  question  in  all  three
sectors. Most of the  discussion  focuses  on the  interaction  between  fiscal
and  distributional  constraints,  which  is  reviewed  later  in  this  paper.
However,  in  both the  health  and  education  sectors,  part  of the  argument
centers  around  the  need to identify  which  particular  services  within  the
sector  have significant  externalities  and  which  do  not.  Such  distinctions
permit  the  design  of  a structure  of  prices  that  r;flects  efficiency
concerns  more  directly  while  also  reducing  sectoral  deficits.
64.  In the  health  sector,  a number  of different  distinctions  have  been
suggested: preventive  versus  curative;  communicable  versus  non-
communicable  diseases;  patient  related  versus  non-patient  related;  primary
versus  referral  care;  etc. These  categories  are  overlapping  and  none
exactly  coincides  with  the  presence  or absence  of externalities.  However,
given  a list  of particular  services  provided  by a  health  clinic  or
hospital,  sector  specialists  could  generally  agree  which  entail  significant
externalities  and  which  do  not.  For  example,  most  of the  benefits  from
curative  treatment  for  non-communicable  diseases  accrue  directly  to  the
patient,  while  immunization  against  communicable  diseases  benefits  the
entire  community.  User charges  are  more  justified  for  the  former  than  the
latter. Because  curative  care  often  accounts  for  70-80%  of  all  health
costs,  in  many  cases  efficiency  pricing  would  bring  major  fiscal  benefits.
As noted  below,  supply  elasticities  are  also  important  in the  health
sector,  and  may  justify  user fees  even  where  externalities  are significant.
65.  Similarly  in  the  educction  sector,  it is instructive  to
disaggregate  services  according  to the  size  of externalities.  These  are
generally  thought  to  decrease  as the  level  of education  rises.
Coincidently,  the  cost  per  pupil  also  rises  with  the  level  of schooling.
Thus  depending  on the  proportion  of the  education  budget  spent  on higher- 17  -
education,  a  policy  of  efficiency  pricing  (i.e.,  where  the  proportion  of
subsidy  was  highest  for  primary  school  and  lowest  for  university)  could
also  yield  a  major  reduction  in  the  sectoral  deficit.  (This  ignores
distributional  concerna,  which  are  discussed  below).
Shadow  Pricing
66.  In  an, economy  with  major  price  distortions,  the  efficiency  price
of  a  public  sector  good  &ust  be  calculated  on  the  basis  of  the  real
resource  cost,  or  shadow  price,  of  its  inputs  or  replacement.  This
calculation  is  needed  both  for  least-cost  evaluations  and  as a  benchmark
for  domestic  pricing  policy.  Of  course,  where  economy-wide  price
distortions  are  large,  second-best  considerations  may require  that  the
domestic  price  diverge  from  its  efficiency  level. Nonetheless,  the
efficiency  price  of  natural  gas  in  a  case  where  it  substitutes  for  imported
fuel  oil  at  the  margin,  is  the  border  price  of  the  fuel  oil,  not  its
domestic  market  price.  The  efficiency  price  of  electricity  produced  in
that  economy  with  fuel  oil  would  also  be  based  on  the  border  price  of  fuel
oil  even  though  the  power  company  actually  pays  the  domestic  market  price.
If  the  electricity  generators  are  imported,  their  cost  should  be  calculated
at  the  true  border  price  of  foreign  exchange  for  the  economy,  which  may  be
different  from  the  official  exchange  rate.
67.  These  principles  are  well  known,  and  about  45% of  the  SARs
reviewed  used  at  least  one  shadow  price  in  their  internal  rate  of  return
calculation.  Labor  was  shadow  priced  in  28% of  the  projects,  including
100t  of  the  irrigation  projects.  A foreign  exchange  conversion  factor  was
used  in  11% of  the  projects,  and  some  form  of  direct  border  price  was  used
in  a  further  29% of  projects.  However,  it  is  curious  that  none  of  the  31
health  and  education  projects  reviewed  mentioned  shadow  pricing.  This  may
be  because  rates  of  return  are  not  generally  calculated  in  these  sectors,
and  little  disaggregated  cost  data  were  available  in  the  SARs.  Table  2
sumarizes  the  results  of  shadow  pricing  by  sector.
Table  2.  Percent  of  grojects  using  shadow  Drices
for  foreign  exchange
in  IRR  for  border  conversion
calculation  labor  1Rdi  factor
Irrigation  100  100  100  0
Railways  86  43  43  28
Coal  80  80  80  0
Oil/gas  70  0  60  10
Power  65  40  55  5
Ports  62  25  12  38
Fertilizer  60  60  60  0
Roads  36  4  4  27
Telecommunications  33  17  0  17
Water/sewerage  29  29  0  7
Housing  14  14  0  14
Education  0  0  0  0
Health  0  0  0  0- 18  -
68.  The  opportunity  cost  of  capital  (OCC)  is  a  shadow  price  that
enters  efficiency  price  calculations  in  many  sectors;  including  power,
water,  telecommunications,  railroads,  housing,  oil/gas  and  coal.  The  OCC
is  generally  provided  to the  project  analyst  by the  country  economist.
Some  developing  countries  have  mandated  an OCC  to  be used in  all  project
analyses. In the  short-term,  some  countries  use  a high  OCC  as an effective
cut-off  for  allocating  scarce  capital,  irrespective  both  of the  long-term
prospects  for  reinvesting  that  return  at the  same  rate  and  of other
constraints  on the  actual  productivity  of that  capital. Problems  arise
when  such  an  OCC  is  used  for  long-run  decisions--.uch  as those  izvolving
depletable  resources  where  ex?loitation  today  affect  imports  15  years
hence. Even  for  near-term  choices,  a  shortage  of  managerial  talent  and
skilled  labor  often  means  that  labor-intensive  technologies  (selected  by a
high  OCC)  have actual  returns  far  lower  than  the  assumed  OCC.  This  is  not
directly  because  the  OCC is  too  high,  but  because  the  labor  element  has  not
been properly  shadow  priced  as  well. Although  there  is  already  a large
economic  literature  on the  theory  of the  OCC,  a  sumary for  practicing
economic  planners  in developing  countries  that  outlines  the  key  assumptions
and the  practical  consequences  of error  in  either  direction  would  be
useful.
Rationing  Prices
69.  In  cases  of excess  demand  at the  cost-reflecting  price,  the
efficiency  price  is a rationing  price  which,  given  the  elasticity  of demand
for  the  congested  facility,  equates  demand  to  supply. Depletable  resources
present  a special  case  where  intertempozal  price  rationing  is  necessary,
and  the  equilibrium  price  must  rise  over  time  to induce  producers  to  hold
stocks  for  future  consumption.lyJ  The  only  sectors  that  have tried  to
apply  this  principle  in  our  sample  are  natural  gas  and  telecommunications.
Yet instances  of excess  demand  were  cited  in  power,  education,  ports  and
housing. In the  roads  and  ports  sectors,  Bank  guidelines  support
congestion  charges  but  no references  to them  were  found  in the  projects'
discussions  of pricing,  even  where  problems  of excess  demand  were  mentioned
in the  same  SAR.
70.  A ma.jor  difficulty  with rationing  prices  is  deciding  how  high  they
should  be.  In  sectors  with close  substitutes,  there  will  be clues  about
the  appropriate  rationing  price. For  example,  in  the  power  sector  the
price  of centrally  supplied  electricity  should  consider  the  cost  of small
private  generation.  In coal  import  prices  can  be readily  observed. In
ports  a  practical  limit  is  provided  by the  cost  of using  neighboring  ports.
In railroads,  both  passengers  and  freight  customers  have alternative
transport  options. The  cost  of substitutes  does  not  provide  an  absolute
limit  since  it  may  not  be high  enough  to ration  existing  supply. However,
it does  provide  a  benchmark  that  should  be crossed  only  cautiously  in  case
demand  is  more  price  elastic  than  expected.
71.  In  other  sectors  private  providers  are  not  available  and  outputs
have few  substitutes;  for  example  health,  education  and  sometimes  housing.
While  it  may  be even  more  difficult  to  determine  a  market  clearing  price
(and,  where  externalities  are  large,  one  may  be reluctant  to overshoot),  it
is  usually  easy  to assess  the  presence  or otherwise  of excess  demand. An
interesting  paper  in the  education  sector  shows  that  in  cases  of excess- 19 -
demand,  when there  is a fiscal  constraint  to increasing  supply,  an increase
in  the  price  will result  in  an increase  in  net  economic  benefits,  as long
as the increased  revenues  are  used  to  expand  the  supply. This  is  true  even
where  the  efficiency  price  cannot  be directly  measured.  v  It  would  be
worthwhile  to examine  the  applicability  of this  argument  to  other  sectors.
Should  it  prove  valid,  it  provides  an elegant  link  between  the  efficiency
objectives  and  fiscal  constraints  to  public  sector  prices.
issues  of Price  Structure
72.  A theoe  running  through  several  sections  above  is the  importance
of carefully  designing  the  structure  of public  sector  prices  to reflect
efficiency  and  other  concerns. We discuss  below  how  adjustments  in  price
structures  have  been  used in  some  sectors  to reconcile  conflicting
objectives  at  minimal  cost.  From  the  efficiency  standpoint  alone,  however,
there  are  strong  arguments  for  a  disaggregated  pricing  analysis.
73.  In the  utility  and  railroad  sectors,  peak  and  off-peak  tariffs,
capacity  and  energy  charges,  access  and  usage  tariffs  are  essential  to
properly  reflect  LRNCs. While  this  is widely  recognized,  only  in the  power
sector  is it  routinely  applied  in  the  developing  countries. The tendency
in  most  sectors  seems  to  be to focus  first  on getting  average  tariff  or
cost  recovery  levels  up to an acceptable  standard,  and  only  then  to  worry
about  issues  of price  structure.  There  are  two  fallacies  in  this  view.
First,  it implies  a trade-off  between  financial  and  economic  objectives
that  is  often  absent. There  are  many  ways  to increase  average  revenues,  of
which  some  will reflect  margiial  costs  much  better  than  others. Where
major  tariff  revisions  are  needed,  it  would  seem  sensible  to focus  first  on
those  elements  of the  tariff  which  are  providing  the  most  misleading
signals  to consumers. By correcting  these,  consumption  patterns  as  well  as
revenues  would  start  to  move in  the  right  direction. Second,  an
unfortunate  degree  of  mystery  surrounds  the  idea  of marginal  cost,  making
it  appear  a  sophisticated  objective  that  can  only  be  approached  through
elaborate  tariff  studies. This  is  not the  case.  The  information
requirements  for  marginal  cost  calculations  are  generally  the  same  as those
required  for  project  design  and  least-cost  evaluations.  Marginal  costs  can
be calculated  on the  back  of an envelope  if  need  be,  and  are  generally
easier  to estimate  than  financial  requirements  because  they  do not  consider
inflation  rates,  debt  repayment  terms,  historical  asset  values,  and  so
forth.
74.  In  many sectors  there  seems  to  be an increased  focus  on aggregate
measures  of--and  covenants  on--project  or sectoral  cost  recovery. These
are  routinely  used  in irrigation,  roads  and  housing  projects. Power  and
water  projects  typically  include  only  financial  covenants  although  the  EARs
generally  provide  analyses  of the  adequacy  of tariff  structures.  Where
there  are  clear  problems  in the  structure  of prices  withir  a sector,  or
where  there  is a clear  price  candidate  to  shoulder  the  major  part  of a
needed  overall  increase,  more  closely  targeted  price  covenants  should  be
encouraged.- 20
C.  Constraints  to  Implementing  Efficiency  Prices
75.  The  previous  Section  examined  eight  of  the  most  common problems  of
efficiency  price  determination.  The  degree  of  effort  it  is  appropriate  to
spend  on  overcoming  such  problems  in  the  estimation  of  efficiency  prices
depends  in  part  on  the  ease  with  which  such  prices  can  be  implemented  in  a
particular  sector.  If  some  sectors  have  devoted  less  attention  than  others
to  the  calculation  of  efficiency  prices  (as  we found  in  the  previous
Section),  the  reason  may  be  that  characteristics  peculiar  to  the  sector
prevent  their  practical  application.  This  Section  discusses  the  major
constraints  to  efficiency  pricing  and  how  they  have  been  handled  in  the
vario  ts  sectors.
Metering  Problems
76.  An obvious  implemntation  constraint  in  sectors  such  as  irrigation
and  roads  is  the  difficulty  of  measuring  consumptiou.  Volumtric  metering
has  occasionally  been  advocated  in  Bank irrigation  projects  (it  was  used  in
two  of  the  14  cases  reviewed),  but  has  generally  been  considered  infeasible
or  uneconomic.  Cost  recovery  through  benefit  taxes  has  somtimes  been
designed  to  approximate  the  volumetric  charge  that  would  have  been
incurred,  but  much  of  the  efficiency  effect  is  lost  since  the  consumer  is
not  able  to  directly  affect  his  costs  by  varying  usage.  In  the  case  of
highways,  tolls  have  been  rejected  except  under  unusual  circumstances
because  of  their  administrative  cost  and  the  inconvenience  to  consumers.
Congestion  charges  have  been  advocated  in  theory,  but  none  of  the  projects
reviewed  us-d  them.
77.  Less  obvious  cases  of  metering  problema  exist  in  the  power,
natural  gas  and  water  sectors.  For  small  consumers  with  few  appliances  or
without  indoor  plumbing,  the  scope  for  wastage  may  be  so small  that
installing  and  reading  mters  is  not  cost-effective.  In  these  sectors
metering  studies  have  been  carried  out  to  determine  practical  cut-off
levels  and  consumption  surrogates  to  be  used  for  billing.  No references  to
similar  studies  were  found  in  the  irrigation  or  roads  SARs,  although  there
has  been  research  on  the  cost  of  highway  tolls.  In  the  roads  sector,  other
methods  for  cost  recovery  exist  which  correlate  reasonably  well  with  usage;
for  example,  fuel  taxes  (although  these  do  not  distinguish  between
congested  and  underutilized  roads). Parking  meters  and  zonal  access
charges  have  been  introduced  successfully  in  a  few  developing  countries.
In  the  irrigation  sector,  experience  with  and  without  volumetric  metering
should  be  reviewed  to  assess  its  cost-effectiveness  in  developing
countries.  In  addition,  other  instruments  such  as  transferable  water
rights  should  be  explored.  The  widespread  experience  with  wastage  of
irrigation  water  and  the  expense  of  drainage  systems  necessitated  by
overwatering  justifies  a  renewed  search  for  means  of  signaling  marginal
resource  costs  to  consumers.
78.  A different  type  of  metering  problem  arises  in  the  health  sector.
Certain  types  of  services  are  non-exclusive,  with  no  direct  link  between
provider  and  beneficiary.  Examples  include  disease  control  through
draining  swamps,  pest  eradication  programs,  and  health  education  through
radio  or  billboard  advertising.  Mass  literacy  campaigns,  in  the  education
sector,  may also  be  non-exclusive.  Benefit  taxes  may  be  the  only  practical
alternative  for  cost  recovery  in  such  cases.- 21  -
Lack of an  Efficient  Capital  Market
79.  Almost  by definition,  most  developing  countries  lack  efficient  and
mature  capital  markets. In the  absence  of risk-sharing  mechanisms  (or  loan
guarantees)  many  potentially  profitable  investoents  cannot  raise  the
initial  capital  they  require. In  addition,  interest  rates  are  often  fixed
at levels  that  do  not  reflect  market-clearing  conditions. Particularly  in
the  education,  housing  and irrigation  sectors,  the  lack  of an  efficient
capital  market  is a constraint  to  efficiency  pricing. Even  where  the
personal  financial  benefits  of such  projects  are  high,  low  income
beneficiaries  would  have  difficulty  borrowing  the  resources  needed  to  pay
cost-reflecting  entry  prices. This  problem  is  not easily  handled  at the
project  level;  it is  perhaps  not surprising  that  the  projects  reviewed  had
difficulties  in implementing  their  proposed  solutions.
80.  In the  urban  sector,  the  typical  approach  has  been to  set  up a
credit  system  dedicated  to  the  project. Five  of the  seven  projects
reviewed  included  components  for  providing  home improvement  loans,  and  all
specified  repayment  terms  for  plot  and  plot-plus-house  purchase. For  house
and/or  plot  purchase,  interest  rates  ranged  from  8-13%,  with  repayment  over
6-25  years. Although  the  SAR  did  not  generallv  provide  a comparison  of
the  terms  of project-assisted  finance  with  maarket'  rates,  it  is suggested
elsewhere  that  these  terms  incorporate  significant  subsidies  both  of
interest  rates  and  of  land  values.12/  A review  of  cost  recovery  experience
showed  that  even  these  payments  have  been  difficult  to  collect  regularly
from  many beneficiaries,  although  not  necessarily  because  of affordability.
Delayed  tenure,  weak administration  and  the  lack  of effective  sanctions  for
non-payment  were cited  as contributing  factors.2W/
81.  In  the  education  sector,  the  development  of a government-supported
credit  market  has  been  advocated,  but  was  not tried  in any  of the  projects
reviewed. In irrigation,  the  Bank's  focus  has  been  on recovering  operating
and  maintenance  costs  rather  than  on  providing  loans  and  charging  an
"enrollment"  fee.  The  latter  may be  impractical  in  many  cases  because  of
the  technical  constraints  on  inclusLon/exclusion  of individual  plots  in
gravity  fed  systems.
Lack  of  an  InMurance  Karket
82.  An impleentation  constraint  peculiar  to the  health  sector  is  the
lack  of  an  insurance  market  to  spread  the  small  but  expensive  risks  of
major  illness. Of the  projects  reviewed,  only  Brazil  and  China  had
contributery  insurance  schemes. Brazil  has over  100  insurance  institutions
that  operate  primarily  through  employer-related  payroll  financing. In
China  health  insurance  is  organized  at  the  brigade  level  with  both
individual  and  pooled  financing.  The  design  of risk-sharing  mechanisms
need  not  entail  formal  insurance  systems  and,  indeed,  may  not  be a priority
for  the  health  sectors  of most  African  countries. However,  in  many  other
countries  (including  developed  ones)  it is  a growing  problem. Seminars  on
this issue  have  been  held  in the  Bank  and  a  research  effort  is  underway  to
explore  alternative  means  to share  the  risks,  and  thus  the  costs,  of
medical  care  in an equitable  way.- 22  -
Uninformed  Consumers
83.  The  argumont  has  been  made  that  in  sectors  such  as  health,
education  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  water/sanitation,  charging  efficiency
prices  may  result  in  underutilization  of  the  service  because  consumers  are
not  sufficiently  well  informed  to  properly  value  its  benefits.  For
example,  if  the  connection  between  disease  and  immunization  or  sanitation
is  poorly  understood,  then  prices  may  need  to  be  low  or  zero  to  encourage
participation.  It  is  claimed  that  an  Asian  country  which  introduced  school
fees  found  that  its  enrollLwnt  of  girls  dropped  to  5.
84.  Despite  such  examoles,  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  this
constraint  to  efficiency  pricing  in  as  important  as  its  feequent  mention  in
the  literature  vould  imply.  Even  where  consumers  are  poorly  informed,  the
supply  costs  to  them  of  no  public  service  are  often  enormous;  e.g.,  many
hours  of  water  carrying,  long  distances  to  seek  medical  treatment.  In
addition,  aggregate  levels  of  demand  and  supply  for  a  service  should  be
considered  in  justifying  large  subsidies  for  the  sake  of  a  few  uninformd
users.  For  example,  it  may  be  true  that  some  parents  fail  to  recognize  the
benefits  from  sending  their  children  to  school,  but  if  school  facilities
are  choked  vith tudents  at  the  existing  fee  structure,  then  lowering  those
fees  to attract  )  X  more  students  will  not improve  s*ctoral  allocation  or
efficiency.  If  parents'  perceptions  of  the  differing  value  of  education  to
boys  and  girls  do  not  coincide  with  those  of  the  authorities,  then
compulsory  attendance  or  strict  selection  by  universal  examination  is
likely  to  be  more  effective  in  combating  the  parents'  preferences  than  is
lower  fees.
Second  Best  Considerations
85.  A final  implementation  constraint  to  efficiency  pricing  is  the
presence  of  distorted  prices  in  competing  or  comnlementary  sectors.  For
example,  passenger  rail  tariffs  may  need  to  compete  with  subsidized  bus
transport.  Such  Isecond  best"  adjustments  in  prices  are  most  prevalent  in
the  energy  and  transport  sectors  where  there  are  many  intrasectoral
substitutes.  The  Bank  has  had  particular  difficulty  implementing
efficiency  prices  for  natural  gas  in  a  number  of  countries,  because
domestic  fuel  oil  prices  are  subsidized.  Second  best  pricing  issues
received  greatest  attention  in  the  SARs  for  natural  gas  and  railway
projects.
D. Adjustments  for  Distributional  Objectives
86.  OMS  2.25  foresaw  that  the  desire  of  governments  to  provide  for  the
needs  of  their  poorest  citizens  could  introduce  a  significant,  but
justifiable,  constraint  on  prices  of  public  sector  goods  and  services.  A
certain  set  of  goods--which  cuts  across  several  sectors--is  considered  by
many  governments  to  be  basic  human  needs,  which  society  should  ensure  are
provided  to  all. This  category  often  includes  basic  health  care,  primary
education,  safe  drinking  water,  adequate  shelter  and,  in  some  countries,
basic  foodstuff,.  In  the  absence  of  a  direct  income  transfer  mechanism,
these  goods  and  services  are  often  supplied  at  greatly  subsidized  prices  or
even  free. For  the  pricing  analyst,  the  focus  should  be  on  designing  the
least-cost  method  of  subsidy;  i.e.,  that  with  the  smallest  efficiency
losses.- 23 -
87,  In the  SARs  *nd  sectoral  gui4elines  reviewed,  distributional
objectives  were  given  prominent  focus. These  were  naturally  defined
differently  in the  different  sectors;  and  various  approaches  were  developed
to incorporate  then  into  the  pricing  analysis. The  main  ones  are  discussed
below.
Explicit  Distributional  Weights
88.  In  the  Bank's  basic  text  on shadow  pricing  and  the  economic
evaluation  of  projects,  a technique  is  developed  for  the  differential
weighting  of  project  benefits  according  to the  income  level  of the
beneficiaries.  In the  pricing  context,  this  would  imply  inflating  the
willingress  to  pay  of poorer  consumers  by that  weighting  factor  to
determine  the  intersection  of demand  and  supply  (and  thus  the  allocation  of
the  good),  then  setting  differential  prices  to  different  consumer  groups  in
order  to  achieve  tnat  allocation.
89.  So far  as  we are  aware,  explicit  distributional  weights  have  not
been  used in  any  sector  to incorporate  distributional  objectives  into
pricing  analyses. Nor  did  we observe  their  use  in the  economic  evaluation
section  of  the  SARs  reviewed. The  difficulty  of 'guesstimating"
distributional  weights,  and  the  somewhat  spurious  accuracy  of the  resulting
prices  or  net  present  values  have  worked  against  their  practical
incorporation  into  project  and  pricing  analysis.
Percent  of Proiect  Beneficiaries  Below  Income  Target
90.  The  closest  approach  to  the  use  of distributional  weights  is
probably  in the  irrigation  sector,  although  the  link  with  pricing  is  not  a
direct  one. Cost  recovery  objectives  take  into  account  the  proportion  of
project  beneficiaries  below  certain  poverty  thresholds.  The "Critical
Consumption  Level,"  below  which  the  social  value  of  a unit  of extra
consumption  is  greater  than  the  social  value  of a  unit  of extra  public
revenue,  is the  most  frequently  used  cut-off. The level  of absolute
poverty,  defined  in terms  of a "basic  needs"  consomption  basket  of food,
clothing  and  shelter,  is  also  sometimes  used. Nearly  80%  of the  SARs
reviewed  specified  an index  of ability  to  pay  along  with  the  proportion  of
project  beneficiaries  falling  below  the  threshold.  That  proportion  ranged
from  10-100%  of  beneficiaries,  so it is  not  surprising  that  cost  recovery
targets  varied  widely. As discussed  below,  irrigation  is  also  a sector
with  one  of the  lowest  levels  of  overall  cost  recovery. Its  economic  rates
of return  are  quite  high (relative  to  other  sectors),  so it is  clearly  the
perception  of distributional  constraints  that  is  holding  down  user  charges.
Because  other  sectors  use  different  approaches  to  adjust  for  distributional
concerns,  it is  not  possible  to  directly  compare  the  stringency  of those
constraints  across  sectors.
Rules  of Thumb  on Prices  as Percent  of Income
91.  The  most  cormonly  used  approach  across  sectors  was to  compare
efficiency  prices  with income  levels,  using  a rule  of thumb  for  the
proportion  of income  that  a  poor  family  could  devote  to that  item. The  two
main  variations  on this  approach  are illustrated  by the  water  and  housing
sectors. In  water  supply,  the  figure  of 5%  of income  is frequently  cited-24 -
as the  maximum  that  a family  should  pay  for  its  minimum  water  requirements
(about  25 liters  per  capita  per  day). Over  90%  of the  SARs  reviewed
specified  an affordability  measure. The  basic  needs  water  requirement
averaged  2.7%  of income  for  the  poorest  households  in the  project  areas.
Because  water  projects  tend  to  benefit  entire  communities,  and  because  the
consumption  of poorer  households  is  a  small  percentage  of total
consumption,  distributional  concerns  can  often  be accommodated  wtihin  the
framework  of efficiency  pricing.
92.  The  housing  sector  faces  a  different  set  of circumstances.  Its
projects  are  often  designed  specifically  to  address  a distributional
problem  and  thus  are  exclusively  targeted  to  low  income  populations.  This
is  especially  true  of slum  upgrading  projects,  although  it is  also  true  of
many sites  and  service  projects. Families  that  have the  ability  to pay  for
adequate  shelter  can  generally  find  it in  the  private  housing  market. Thus
the  scope  for  intrasectoral  cross-subsidy  is  more  limited  than  it is in
water.
93.  For  housing  projects,  the  design  phase  typically  includes
collecting  information  on income  levels  of the  target  population. Project
costs  are  estimated,  sales  prices  and  loan  terma  are  worked  out,  and  the
latter  are  compared  with incomes,  using  a rule  of thunb  that  poor families
cannot  spend'more  than  20-25%  of their  income  on shelter. If the
comparison  excludes  too  large  a portion  of the  target  population,  then
plots  are  downsized  or standards  are  reduced. The  overriding  concern  is
that  the  project  be "replicable,"  in  the  sense  that  cost  recovery  should  be
high enough  that  financial  costs  are  covered  over  the  long  term.  This
pattern  was followed,  and  quantification  was  provided,  in  all  of the  SARs
reviewed  in  this  sector.
94.  While  this  approach  has the  advantage  of  being  easily  applied  and
easily  explained  to government  policy  makers,  it suffers  from  several
drawbacks.  The  overriding  attention  to distributional  objectives  has  meant
that  efficiency  prices  are  not  explicitly  estimated. Costs  are  calculated
in financial  terms,  often  with  both  land  and  interest  rates  below  economic
levels. The  objective  of replicability  focuses  attention  on aggregate
levels  of cost  recovery  rather  than  on the  structure  of marginal  costs  for
the  different  project  components;  e.g.,  land,  location,  water,  electricity,
communal  service  facilities,  house  construction,  etc. Follow-up  studies  on
existing  projects  have shown  that  there  is  often  a relatively  broad  mix  of
income  levels  represented  among  beneficiaries,  so the  scope  for  efficiency
pricing  may  be larger  than  supposed.
Differential  Prices
95.  If  low  income  consumers  are  to  be assisted  through  price
subsidies,  then  it  would  be cost-effective  to limit  those  subsidies  to the
poor  through  a  differential  price  system. In  many  sectors  this  is
infeasible  because  the  poor  cannot  be readily  identified.  However,  in the
power,  water  and  education  sectors,  techniques  have  been devised  to  achieve
this.- 25 -
96.  Electricity  and  water  consumption  tend  to correlate  with  income.
Richer  consumers  have  more electrical  appliances  and larger  gardeni  to
water.  Since  power  and  water  utilities  routinely-collect  information  on
consumption,  it is  easy  for  them  to target  subsidies  to their  smaller
consumers. Many  do this  through  tariff  structures  with  a Olifeline  rate"
which  charges  a  lower  unit  price  for  the  initial  consumption  block. A more
focused  subsidy  would  be to  charge  each  consumer's  full  consumption  at a
unit rate  that  escalates  with the  total  quantity  consumed,  at least  up to
the  limit  of LRMC. While  none  of our  sample  utilities  used  this  system,
25%  of power  projects  and  64%  of  water  projects  incorporated  some  type  of
increasing  block  tariff  structure.
97.  Systems  of price  discrimination  based  on  consumption  quantities  do
not  always  achieve  their  intended  objectives.  Poor  families  may  not  be
able to  afford  an individual  connection;  they  may  share  a  jointly  financed
one  which  moters  the  consumption  of several  households  and  therefore
charges  them  at a  higher  rate.  In  England  it is  claimod  that  lifeline
electricity  rates  benefit  predominantly  the  wealthy  owners  of  vacation
homes,  whose  seasonal  consumption  is averaged  over  the  entire  year  and
billed  at the  lowest  rate. This  type  of slippage  in  targeting  subsidies  is
avoided  in  the  education  sector  where  means-tested  scholarships,  coupled
with  stringent  entrance  exams,  are  provided  for  successful  university
entrants. Because  the  population  of successful  entrants  is  already
limited,  it  is feasible  to individually  assess  eligibility  on the  grounds
of family  income.
Access  versus  Affordability
98.  The  previous  sub-sections  discussed  different  approaches  to
determining  affordability  and  designing  subsidies  in order  to  create  an
effective  demand  for  the  good  or service. Recently,  however,  increased
attention  has  been given  to the  question  of  access  to service--the  supply
side. The  majority  of the  target  population  may  be bypassed  by the  best
subsidy  scheme  because  the  service  itself  is  unavailable  where  they  live.
In the  absence  of fiscal  constraints,  lack  of access  would  represent  an
implementation  problem. It  becomes  a  pricing  issue  when fiscal  resources
available  to the  sector  are  limited.
99.  When  budgetary  transfers  to the  sector  cannot  be expanded,  both
fiscal  and  distributional  objectives  point  to the  need  to generate  greater
revenues  within  the  sector. As mentioned  in  para.  71,  recent  work in  the
education  sector  shows  that  under  conditions  of a fixed  fiscal  transfer  and
excess  demand,  user  fees  should  be raised  even  though  the  efficiency  price
cannot  be directly  measured. Higher  sector  revenues  can  be used to  expand
coverage  and/or  to fund  a loan  or scholarship  program  directed  at low
income  consumers. The  housing  sector's  emphasis  on replicability  stems
from  the  same  concern. When sup;ly  elasticities  are  considered  along  with
demand  conditions,  there  is often  a congruence  between  efficiency,  fiscal,
distributional  and  financial  objectives.- 26 -
E.  Aduxtaent  for  Fiscal  Objectives
100.  OMS 2.25  gave  at least  as much  attention  to fiscal  objectives  as
to  distributional  ones.  It  recognized  that  fiscal  resources  are  scarce  in
many  countries,  and the  mechanisms  for  increasing  tax  revenues  are  often
underdeveloped.  Pricing  public  sector  goods  higher  than  their  efficiency
prices  will  often  be warranted,  as  will  be discriminatory  taxes  on  project
beneficiaries.  The  job  of the  pricing  analyst  is  to  minimize  the
efficiency  losses  from  such  taxes.
101.  Our review  of SARs  indicates  that  fiscal  objectives  are  rarely
given  explicit  attention.  The  exceptions  are telecommunications  and  a
minority  of irrigation  projects,  and indirect  mention  in  most education  and
health  projects. Fiscal  objectives  are  implicitly  apparent  where  projects
incorporate  covenants  that  require  the  government  to  make  annual
contributions  to the  operating  budget  of the  public  enterprise  or
department.  However,  such  covenants  were  rarely  accompanied  by an
evaluation  of the  general  fiscal  position  of the  country  or of the  relative
importance  of alternative  sectoral  claims  on government  resources. It
could  be argued  that  such  covenants  are  the  antithesis  of the  approach
recomended in OMS  2.25:  instead  of adjusting  public  sector  prices  to
accommodate  fiscal  resources,  the  latter  are  arbitrarily  earmarked  for
sectoral  priorities. (Earmarking  is  discussed  more  generally  later  in  this
Section).
102.  Because  there  is so  little  discussion  in the  SARs  of the  net
fiscal  contribution  of the  sector,  the  following  analysis  is  based  on the
fiscal  impact  of the  Bank  projects. Comparative  figures  should  therefore
be used  with caution.
Taxes  o.i  Public  Enterorises
103.  Taxes  on the  income  or  output  of  public  enterprises  were  mentioned
in  eight  sectors: coal,  fertilizers,  oil/gas,  ports,  power,  railways,
telecomunications  and  water/sewerage.  In  addition,  in the  roads  sector
indirect  user charges  such  as  fuel  taxes  often  contribute  to general
government  revenues. Except  in  oil/gas  and  sometimes  roads,  it  was  unusual
for  the  Bank to  make  any  recommendations  or negotiate  covenants  about  these
taxes,  despite  considerable  intrasectoral  variation  in size  and  incidence.
104.  In the  Igj 1 sector,  two  of the  four  sample  countries  levy  a tax  on
output. In India  a tax  of  about  14%  of minehead  prices  is  paid  by
consumers,  of which  about  one-sixth  is  returned  to the  producers  to  pay  for
workers'  housing  and  medical  facilities.  The  resainder  is  presumably
retained  by government. In  Colombia,  where  most  mines  are  small  and
privately  owned,  a 5% tax  is levied  on the  minehead  price. The  National
Coal  Fund  receives  60%  of the  tax  revenues  for  financing  coal  exploration
and  assisting  small  and  medium  scale  mining  operations;  the  remainder
apparently  rest3  with central  government.  Neither  SAR  gav,  an analysis  of
the  amount  of revenue  generated  or  whether  the taxes  were set  at an
appropriate  level.
105.  In the  f  rtilizer  sector,  two  of the  five  cases  reviewed  were
subject  to  corporate  income  tax  on their  earnings  of 55-58%. The incidence27  -
of  these  taxes  is  unclear,  however,  since  producer  prices  were set  on a
cost-plus  basis  and  consumer  prices  were  heavily  subsidized  in  both  cases.
In thLe.  of the  five  cases  the  inputs  into  the  fertilizer  plants  were
exempt  from  duties  and  taxes,  in  one  case  they  were subject  to duty  and in
one  case  such information  was  not reported.
106.  In the  oil/gas  sector,  both income  and  sales  taxes  are  common
although  the  bulk  of profit  remitted  to  government  is  collected  through  the
latter. Income  taxes  in the  sample  projects  ranged  from  25-55%,  whire
taxes  on the  petroleum  products  sold  were  often  in excess  of 100%  of their
ex-refinery  prices. These  taxes  accounted  for  8-15%  of total  government
receipts  in the  countries  reporting.  There  were  numerous  distortions  in
both  ex-refinery  and  consumer  prices,  some  of  which  were tackled  in  project
covenants. Only  one  project,  however,  included  a recommendation  on
restructuring  government  taxation  of the  oil  company. In  view  of the
importance  of oil  product  taxation  to governrent  revenues,  and  the  variety
of taxation  devices  applied  to  the  sector,  a cross-country  review  of the
relative  productivity  of different  types  of energy  taxes  and  their  effects
on incentives  would  be useful.
107.  In the  grts  sector,  income  taxes  ranging  from  50-100%  were  paid
in six  of the  eight  projects  reviewed;  taxes  were  not reported  in the  other
two.  Inputs  were subject  to  duty  in seven  cases  and  exempt  in  one. The
Bank  made  no recomendations  about  the  level  or structure  of these  taxes.
108.  In the  ower  sector,  tax  treatment  also  varies  widely. Of the  16
sample  countries,  eight  are  subject  to  income  taxes  (ranging  from  32-53%).
The  other  eight  are  exempt  from  income  taxes. Five  of the  countries  levy
sales  tax  on electricity,  sometimes  at several  levels  of government.  Two-
thirds  of the  power  utilities  are  exempt  from  paying  import  dutiea,  while
one-third  benefits  from  subsidized  fuel  prices. The  only  tax
recommendation  made  by  the  Bank  was  for  earmarking  the  proceeds  of  one  of
the  sales  taxes  for  reinvestment  in  the  power  sector.
109.  In  the  railw_y  sector,  six  of  the  seven  projects  concerned  loss-
making  enterprises,  and  income  tax  treatment  was  not  reported.  In  China,
income  tax  is  at  least  55%  of  net  profits  and  there  is  also  a  15% sales  tax
on gross  operating  revenue. The  Bank  made  no recommendations  about  taxes.
110.  In  telecommalctLons,  three  projects  reported  corporate  income
taxes  were  paid,  at rates  ranging  from  45-58%. In  two  projects  income  tax
was  not  levied,  and  one  project  did  not  report  on income  taxes. Customs
duties,  ranging  from  1-70%,  were  paid  in four  of the  projects;  the  other
two  were  exempt. Despite  this  enormous  variation  of tax  treatment  across
countries,  the  Bank  made  no  recommendations  in  these  projects  about  taxes.
111.  In  the  water/sewerap  sector,  of  the  11  countries  represented  in
the  sample,  two  utilities  paid income  tax (at  11  and  37.5%  of  profits)  and
two  paid  a  tax  on gross  revenues  (3  and  4%).  Five  utilities  were  subject
to taxes  and  duties  on their  inputs,  while  six  were  exempt  or  did  not
report. No comments  or recommendations  were  made  about  these  taxes.- 28 -
112.  Indirect  user  charges  in the  roads  sector  are  typically  collected
in the  form  of fuel  taxes,  import  duties  on  vehicles  and  tires,  and
licensing  and  registration  fees. The  total  revenues  from  these  sources
amounted  to  more than  100%  of total  road  expenditures  (but  excluding
congestion  costs)  in  eight  of the  22  sample  countries.  As noted  above,
many  governments  regard  fuel  taxes  primarily  as a  direct  revenue  source
rather  than  as a type  of  road  user  charge. Because  such  taxes  are  paid
mainly  by road  users,  it is  not incorrect  for  the  Bank  to  assess  their
adequacy  partly  in terms  of the  SRMC  of road  transport. However,  they  also
need  to be analyzed  from  a general  revenue  perspective. It is  possible
that  the  transport  sector  is  being  overtaxed  in  some  countries  while  other
sectors  are  undertaxed.  Two  of the  22  projects  reviewed  included  fuel
pricing  covenants;  in  both  cases  the  arguments  were  made in terms  of
sectoral  rather  than  fiscal  objectives.
Recurrent  Cost  Financing  by Governments
113.  In  four  of the  sectors  there  is significant  government  financing
of recurrent  costs: education,  health,  irrigation  and  railways. In the
ducation sector,  of the  50%  of the  SARs  that  reported  on  cost  recovery,
the  government  financed  80-100%  of recurrent  costs. These  amounted  to  an
average  of 14%  of total  government  recurrent  expenditures  (ranging  from
7-23%). The  education  sector  was the  only  one  that  routinely  reported  the
relative  significance  of sectoral  expenditures  in-terms  of the  overall
government  budget.
114.  In  health,  recurrent  expenditures  accounted  for  an average  40%  of
total  sectoral  expenditures  (ranging  from  31-95%). While  a  breakdown  of
financing  sources  for  recurrent  costs  alone  was  not  provided,  such  figures
are  available  for  total  health  costs. The  central  government  contributed
an average  54%  of total  costs  (ranging  from  10-100%),  while  user  charges
accounted  for  28% (ranging  from  0-85%)  and  state,  local  and  other  sources
made  up the  rest. Thus  if one  were to  assign  all  user  charges  to  recurrent
costs,  they  would  cover  an average  of 70%.
115.  In the  j  irriatD  sector,  of the  80%  of  projects  reporting  on cost
recovery,  the  government  financed  an  average  of about  50%  of recurrent
costs. This  average  covered  a  wide  variation,  with 36%  of  projects  needing
no government  support  for  recurrent  costs,  36%  needing  full  government
subsidy  and  27%  requiring  levels  of government  subsidy  ranging  from  40-60%.
Irrigation  was the  only  sector  to  define  a  'cost  recovery  index"  (based  on
both investment  and  recurrent  costs)  which  was reported  by 57%  of the  SARs
reviewed. It ranged  from  6-42%,  with  a mean  value  of 24%.
116.  Six  of the  seven  raily= projects  reviewed  needed  government
financing  of recurrent  costs. The levels  ranged  from  3-51%,  with a  mean
value  of 19%.  In some  cases  government  subsidies  are  explicitly  tied  to
the  running  of  unremunerative  branch  lines  or losses  on passenger  train
service  due  to government  tariff  policy.
117.  It is difficult  to  analyze  the  extent  to  which  shortfalls  in
recurrent  cost  financing  in  these  four  sectors  are  consistent  with
efficiency  pricing  objectives.  The importance  of externalities  in the
education  and  health  sectors  makes  it  infeasible  to  estimate  economic- 29 -
prices,  and thus  to compare  then  with  average  recurrent  costs. In the
irrigation  and  railways  sectors,  economic  prices  will  probably  be close  to
recurrent  costs  except  where  price  rationing  is appropriate.  However,  in
none  of these  sectors'  SARs  was there  explicit  consideration  of the
relative  importance  of fiscal  objectives  and  the  trade-offs  in  pricing
policy  these  might  imply.  Prices  which  do  not  enable  a  sector  to  finance
even  its  operating  costs  clearly  constitute  a  claim  on  revenues  generated
outside  the  sector. To  what  extent  this  is  appropriate  depends  both on the
sector  and  on  the  fiscal  options  available  to  the  country.
Investment  Cost  Financing
118.  Information  was  rarely  available  on a  sector-wide  basis  about  the
role  of government  equity  contributions  to investmnt.  Table  3 shows  such
figures  for  the  149  sample  projects. Not surprisingly,  government  equity
contributions  were highest  in  the  health  and  education  sectors. The  high
figure  for  roads  is  misleading  since  non-earmarked  revenues  from  user
charges  are  not  taken  into  account.
119.  It is  more  surprising  that  teleco_unications  is the  only  sector
in  which  government  equity  was  not  used.  Its  level  of internal  cash
generation  (39%  on average;  ranged  from  15  to 69%)  was  significantly  higher
than  that  in  any  other  sector  except  oil/gas  (at  32%),  and  the  proportion
of project  costs  financed  by the  World  Bank  was correspondingly  lower.
While  these  project  financing  figures  cannot  be assumed  to  mirror  the
percentages  for  overall  sector  finance,  the  low  levels  of internal  cash
generation  from  our  sample  across  so  many  sectors  indicate  a significant
scope  for  relaxing  fiscal  constraints  through  better  public  sector  pricing
policies.
Table  3.  Sources  of Project  Funds  in  SARs (percent)
No.  of  internal  IBRD/ Other  Govt.  Govt.
Proiects  Cash  Gen  IDA  Dnonr  Loans  EZuMi&  Other
Health  11  0  57  7  0  35  0
(5-74)
Education  20  0  60  6  0  35  0
(7-88)
Roads  22  0  55  10  0  35  0
(6-72)
Irrigation  14  1  53  18  0  28  1
(0-10)  (3-50)
Housing  7  10  57  5  9  19  0
(4-40)  (0-29)
Fertilizer  5  10  54  10  1  22  3
(0-35)  (0-70)
Water  14  10  53  9  2  23  3
(0-49)  (0-54)
Railways  7  16  32  16  24  12  0
(0-72)  (0-74)
Ports  8  14  48  13  13  9  3
(0-35)  (0-25)- 30  -
Power  20  14  38  26  7  6  10
(5-40)  (2-47)
Coal  5  24  39  6  4  26  0
(0-52)  (0-62)
Oil/Gas  10  32  30  23  4  7  4
(0-69y  (0-34)
Telecoms  6  39  28  30  4  0  0
(15-69)
120.  Only in the  irrigation  and telecommunications  sectors  was  an
attempt  made to  calculate  the  net impact  of the  project  on the  government
budget. Four  of the  14 irrigation  projects  reviewed  made such
calculations,  two  of which  relied  on the  additional  income  and  sales  taxes
to  be paid  out  of the  incremental  income  of  beneficiaries.  The  latter
approach  is  questionable  unless  the  funds  for  the  project  were  not
fungible. Net fiscal  impacts  were  calculated  in  five  of the  six  telecons
projects  reviewed. Calculations  of the  net  project  impact  on fiscal
aggregates  would  also  be useful  in  other  sectors--such  as  ports  and
oil/gas--where  investments  may  be partly  government  financed  but  means
exist  to transfer  a portion  of  profits  and  rents  back  to government.
Inter-project  comparisons  (within  a sector)  could  help  to develop  norms  of
tax  contributions  as well  as  highlight  tax  inconsistencies  or  unintended
consequences  within  a project.
Earmarkin
121.  The  earmarking  of project  revenues  for  reinvestment  in  the  sector
is  a controversial  subject,  and  one  on which  Bank  practice  varies  across
sectors. Earmarking  has  been  defined  as "the  practice  of designating  or
dedicating  specific  revenues  to the  financing  of  specific  public
services...  Normally,  earmarking  (means)  the  dedication  of a single  tax
source  to a single  public  service  within  a  multitax,  multiservice  fiscal
unit,  but the  identical  effects  are  produced  by the  creation  of special-
purpose  fiscal  units,  such  as  school  districts,  fire  districts,  and
sanitation  districts,  each  of  which  is  granted  independent,  but restricted,
taxing  powers."21/ Public  finance  experts  have  called  earmarking  "probably
the  worst  danger  to  good  budget  practice."Z/  Yet in  many industrialized
countries  it is  a widespread  practice  with  strong-taxpayer  support.
122.  Using  the  broad  definition  quoted  above,  the  revenues  of  public
enterprises--power,  water,  telecommunications,  railways,  fertilizer,  coal
and  sometimes  ports--are  examples  of a type  of earmarking.  All the  tests
of financial  viability  for  such  enterprises  hinge  on an  explicit  link
between  revenues  from  beneficiaries  and  the  costs  incurred  in  providing  the
service. In the  housing  sector,  earmarking  is  routinely  required  in order
to institutionalize  replicability.  In the  case  of roads,  covenants  to
earmark  funds  for  road  maintenance  were included  in  45%  of the  projects
reviewed. Many of the  other  projects  included  assurances  that  the
government  would  allocate  specific  sums  to  maintenance  in  future  years.
123.  The  disadvantages  of earmarking  are  well-known. It places
constraints  on the  budget  authority  to  transfer  resources  in response  to
changing  priorities. It distorts  the  picture  of  a government's  finances
and  makes  it  harder  to exert  macroeconomic  controls. The  administrative- 31
costs  of  maintaining  nuserous  smaller  funds  are  probably  higher  than  those
associated  with  one  general  fund.  Sometimes  an  earmarked  revenue  expands
far  beyond  original  expectations  and  provides  extravagant  support  for  the
function  it finances  thus  weakening  incentives  for  cost  ntrol. On the
other  hand,  having  once  earmarked  revenues  for  a function,  officials  may
feel  that  they  have  made full  provision  for  it  and  be reluctant  to  approve
additional  funds  even  when  justified.
124.  In favor  of earmarking  are  one  theoretical  and  two  essentially
practical  arguments. The  theoretical  case,  as made  by Buchanan  in 1963,2/
asserts  that  the  standard  arguments  against  earmarking  hinge  on adopting
the  reference  system  of the  budgetary  authority,  which  is,  by presumption,
divorced  from  the  citizenry  in the  political  community. His  alternative
hypothesis  of the  political  order  is  an individualistic  one in  which  the
reference  system  becomes  that  of the  individual  citizen. In this  model,
the  *tate  or the  collectivity  exists  only  as  a means  through  which
individuals  combine  to accomplish  collective  or jointly  desired  objectives.
Thus  the  restrictions  that  such  practices  as  earmarking  may impose  on the
independence  of  a budgetary  authority  need  not  produce  "inefficiency"  in
the  fiscal  process. Segregation  of revenues  may  provide  on  means  of
ensuring  more rational  individual  choice,  and  thus  be a  desirable  feature
of a fiscal  structure.
125.  A practical  advantage  of earmarking  is that,  in  the  absence  of
rational  means  of  budget  allocations  and/or  expeditious  transfers  of funds
within  the  government  bureaucracy,  earmarking  can  provide  a  way of  ensuring
that  certaih  high  priority  tasks  are  adequately  funded. A  second  advantage
is that  earmarking  provides  a certainty  and  continuity  of funding  that  is
conducive  to  better  internal  sector  management. Particularly  for
activities  that  require  long-range  planning  or a  build-up  of trained  staff,
efficient  organization  and  management  may  require  a longer  planning  horizon
than  the  budgetary  process  provides.
126.  Another  aspect  of the  sector  management  argument  has  been advanced
in  both the  health  and  education  sectors. The  incentive  for improving  cost
recovery  in  those  portions  of the  sector  where  it is  warranted  (e.g.,
curative  health  care,  university  education)  will  be greatly  enhanced  if  at
least  a portion  of the  revenues  generated  can  be reallocated  within  the
sector. At an even  more  disaggregated  level,  a  health  clinic  or school
district  is  likely  to  make  better  use  of its  budgetary  resources  if there
is a  direct  link  between  the  fees  it  collects  and  the  funds  it  has
available  to spend. To the  extent  that  these  arguments  are  valid,  the
practice  of earmarking  could  actually  increase  available  fiscal  resources.
This  will  only  be the  case,  however,  when the  earmarked  revenues  are
generated  within  the  sector.
127.  In  view of the  widespread  weaknesses  both in  methods  of  budgetary
allocation  and  in sector  management,  a fresh  look  at earmarking  seems
warranted. To minimize  the  number  of extraneous  variables,  this  should
probably  be done  within--rather  than  across--sectors.  Transport  would  be a
good  initial  candidate  becau  e of its  project  experience  with  and  without
earmarking  covenants. In  view of the  arguments  above,  two  caveats  to
earmarking  hhould  be observed: first,  funds  earmarked  should  be only  those
which  come  from  sector  beneficiaries  as  user  charges  or benefit  taxes;  and- 32
second,  whenever  the  earmarked  revenues  account  for  a larg proportion  of
sector  expenditures,  an authority  outside  the  sector  should  be appointed  to
review  the  generation  and  use  of such  funds.
Link to  Public  Exgenditure  Reviews
128.  The slight  consideration  given  to fiscal  constraints  in SARs  is
surprising  in  view  of the  increased  attention  devoted  in  country  economic
work to  public  expenditure  reviews. Many  country  economists  consider  the
scarcity  of public  sector  funds  the  dominant  medium-term  constraint  to
growth. When  economies  are  only  partially  monetized,  the  scope  for
expanding  tax  revenues  in an  efficient  way is limited. At the  same  time,
the  demand  for  public  sector  services  is  growing  rapidly,  while  the
productivity  of public  investment  is often  low.
129.  The  analytical  linkages  between  public  sector  investment
strategies  and  public  sector  pricing  policies  have long  been recognized.
Under  uncomplicated  conditions,  setting  prices  at economically  efficient
levels  and  aiming  for  full  (marginal)  cost  recovery  will  ensure  that  the
right  level  of investment  is  demanded  and  that  the  beneficiaries--rather
than  government  revenues--foot  the  bulk of the  bill.  Thus  proper  pricing
of public  sector  services  can  go  a long  way toward  relaxing  fiscal
constraints  to development,  as well  as improving  macroeconomic  and
budgetary  balances.
130.  In  practice,  however,  the  link  between  sectoral  pricing  policies
and  macroeconomic  investment  objectives  seens  rarely  to  be the  focus  of
Bank  policy  advice  at either  the  country  or the  project  level. This  may  be
because  better  pricing  in  a single  sector--or  project--does  not  have  a
large  enough  fiscal  impact  to  be important. It  may  also  be that  country
economists  generally  have  neither  the  time  nor the  mandate  to delve  into
"micro"  issues  such  as pricing. The  widespread  economic  distinction-
-mirrored  in the  Bank's  organization--between  macroeconomic  and  project
issues  seems  to  have  obscured  the  fiscal/public  sector  pricing  link.
131.  To see  how  public  sector  pricing  policies  are  treated  from  the
macroeconomic  side,  we reviewed  a set  of eight  Public  Investment  Review
(PIR)  reports  produced  recently  by Bank  economists.2A/  A shortage  of
domestic  savings  was  identified  as a  major  constraint  to growth  in  five  of
the  eight  cases,  and  the  implementation  capabilities  of the  public  sector
were  singled  out  in four. Five  of the  PIRs  made  some  mention  of the  need
to  change  tariff  policies  in  at least  one  public  sector. Agricultural
prices  were mentioned  in two  cases,  public  enterprise  prices  generally  in
two  and  port  tariffs  in  one.  The  PIR  for  Ghana  contained  uhe  most  far-
reaching  set  of tariff  recommendations,  including  changes  in  health,
education,  roads,  communications  and  water  prices.
132.  None  of the  PIRs  attempted  a quantitative  analysis  of the  impact
that  efficiency  pricing  (or  the  recommended,  but generally  unspecified,
price  increases)  would  have  on the  fiscal  or monetary  aggregates  or on
growth  prospects. This  is  an important  next  step.  In order  to  make  a
convvincing  case  for  a change  in  the  philosophy  of-public  sector  pricing--or
even  for  changes  that  extend  beyond  project  boundaries  in  a few  key
sectors--it  is  necessary  to  quantify  the  expected  fiscal  and  macroeconomic- 33 -
impacts. Without  such  estimates  of the  benefit  side,  policy  makers  will
continu,  to  be heavily  influenced  by those  consumers  who  are  negatively
affected  by price  increases.
F.  Adjustments  for  Financial  Objectives  in  Public  Sector  EnterDrises
133.  From  the  standpoint  of public  sector  pricing,  the  financial
objectives  of most  relevance  are  the  revenue  covenants: rates  of return  on
assets,  internal  cash  generation,  operating  ratiog  and  break-even
covenants. (Additional  financial  covenants  deal  with the  capital  structure
of the  enterprise  and its  liquidity  requirements,  but these  are  not
reviewed  here). Basically,  revenue  covenants  require  public  sector
entities  to take  the  necessary  actions,  including  price  increases,  to
ensure  that  their  total  revenues  are  sufficient  to  cover  a specified  set  of
costs  and,  in  most  cases,  contribute  to future  investments.1/ A  key
difference  between  the  financial  and  economic  objectives  for  public  sector
pricing  is that  the  former  are  unconcerned  with the  &=Cau  of tariffs  so
long  as  the  average  level  is  high enough,  while  the  latter  are  focused  on
individual  tariff  elements  rather  than  their  averages. There  is often  no
conflict  in the  two  sets  of objectives,  but at  the  same  time  th-e
achiever 4 i.t  of one  does  not  guarantee  the  satisfaction  of the  other.
134.  Financial  objectives  are  given  considerable  attention  in the  SARs
of  most loans  to  public  sector  enterprises;  i.e.,  power,  water,  oil/gas,
telecommunications,  fertilizer,  coal,  ports  and  railways. Of the  75
projects  reviewed  in these  sectors,  only  eight  lacked  revenue  covenants.
Both  rates  of return  on revalued  assets  and  internal  cash  generation
covenants  were  widely  used  in all  sectors  except  fertilizer  and  coal  where
general  price  covenants  were  prevalent. In general,  the  range  of target
rates  of return  or percentage  cash  generation  was  larger  within  sectors
than  across  sectors  (see  Table  4; ranges  are  shown  in  parentheses).
Table  4.  Use of  Revenue  Covenants
Rate of  Return  Internal  Cash  No  Revenue
on  Reval.  Assets  Generation  Others  Covenant
t  Proi] Ave,  RetuXn t  Pro].  Ave,  t  t  Pro].  Tve  Proj.
Telecoms  100  11.4  50  41  0  0
(4-13)  (23-50)
Oil/gas  20  10.5  40  56  0  40
(6-15)  (26-80)
Water  36  4.2  57  12  36  Break-even  0
(1.5-7)  (5-54)
Power  40  7.1  40  23  20  Return  on  0
Historic
(4-10)  (8-40)  Assets
Ports  38  6.5  50  30  38  Break-even  0
(6-7.5)  (10-40)
Railways  28  3.5  28  34  28  Break-even  28
(3-5)  (20-48)
Fertilizer  0  --  0  --  20  Break-even  20
60  Price  policy
Coal  0  --  0  --  - 80  Price  policy  2034 -
135.  There  was  little  indication  in the  projects  reviewed  that
financial  objectives  for  pricing  conflicted  with economic  ones.  In
general,  sectors  with declining  LRMCs  would  be expected  to show  financial
losses  if  prices  were set  on economic  grounds. While  there  are  occasional
instances  of this  in the  power  sector,  telecommunications  is  the  only
sector  where  it is  widespread. In telecoms,  however,  the  economic  price  is
often  that  which  rations  available  supply,  which  is generally  higher  than
both the  LRKC  and  the  average  financial  cost.
136.  In  most of the  SARs  reviewed,  prices  were thought  to  be too  low  on
both financial  and  economic  grounds. The  text  supporting  financial
covenants  nearly  always  stated  that  they  represented  iiDzRa&  objectives.
It is striking  that  target  rates  of return  are  as low  as they  are in  these
sectors--generally  below  the  opportunity  cost  of capital,  even in  sectors
such  as ports  and  power  where  the  scope  for  revenue  generation  should  be
relatively  high.
137.  Our  review  of revenue  covenants  addresses  only  a  small  part  of the
treatment  of financial  objectives  in SARs. We have  not  dealt  with  perhaps
the  most important  issue  of all:  the  extent  to  wftich  the  financial
objectives  of the  entity  are  adequately  reflected  in the  financial
covenants  of the  project. A thorough  review  of financial  objectives  across
sectors  is  beyond  the  scope  of this  paper. However,  the  wide  sectoral
diversity  shown  in  our  surface  data  indicates  that  such  a review  could
produce  useful  insights  into  the  reasons  for  cross-sectoral  differences  and
the  degree  to  which  various  sectors  have  been successful  in  promoting
financial  viability  through  different  means.
IV.  CONCLUSIONS  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS
138.  Inappropriate  prices  for  goods  and  services  provided  by the  public
sector  are  a problem  in  many  developing  countries. Loss-making  public
enterprises  constitute  a  major  drain  on fiscal  resources. Incentives  are
lacking  for  cost-conscious  sector  management.  Meanwhile,  the  quality  of
supply  deteriorates  for  those  with  access,  while  fiscal  constraints  prevent
expansion  of coverage  to  those  without. Proper  pricing  policies  alone
would  not remedy  all  these  problems,  but they  are  a key  ingredient  and  one
on  which  the  Bank  is  often  asked  to  advise.
139.  The  basic  philosophy  of the  Bank  on public  sector  prining  was  set
out  a decade  ago  in  OHS  2.25.  It  emphasized  the  importance  of  using  the
efficiency  price  of the  good  or service  as a  benchmark,  but recognized  the
equal  claims  of distributional,  fiscal  and  financial  considerations  in
arriving  at a price  recommendation.  Our  review  of 149  appraisal  reports
across  13 sectors  indicates  that  this  two-step  approach  to pricing  is
followed  fairly  closely  in  seven  of the  sectors  (coal,  irrigation,  oil/gas,
power,  roads,  telecommaunications  and  water/sewerage),  but in  the  other  six
the  focus  is  heavily  on either  distributional  (health,  education,  housing)
or financial  (fertilizer,  ports,  railways)  objectives,  with  little  attempt
to  estimate  efficiency  prices  or to  explicitly  incorporate  economic  pricing
principles. Our  review  suggests  that  efficiency  pricing  is  not irrelevant
or impossible  in these  sectors  and,  even if  used  only  as a  benchmark,  could
bring improvements  in  sector  management  and  project  selection  and  design.
In some  of these  sectors  research  is  already  well  advanced  to incorporate- 35 -
explicit  consideration  of  efficiency  prices  into  Bank  projects  and  sector
advice. In others,  basic  definitions  and  costing  methodologies  have still
to  be developed. In the  Annexes  we have  made  specific  recommendations  for
further  work,  sector  by sector,  to address  the  major  gaps  in  pricing
analysis.
140.  Where  it  has  been  used,  the  two-step  approach  has  proven  effective
in incorporating  economic  and  distributional  analyses,  primarily  through
careful  design  of the  structure  of fees  or tariffs  within  sectors. The
financial  dimension  has  also  received  much attention,  but generally  as an
isolated  topic  with  few  references,  even  in the  revenue  discussions,  to
economic  or other  pricing  objectives.  In some  cases,  the  financial
analysis  has tended  to  undermine  other  objectives  by its  focus  on defining
MinigM  percentage  increases  in  average  revenues  over the  short  and  medium
term,  rather  than  casting  those  in the  light  of  ultimate  targets  for
financial  viability  and  fiscal  contributions  from  the  sector. In general,
financial  targets  seemed  to  be low  and  often  entailed  average  output  prices
that  were  below  those  implied  by efficiency  pricing  objectives.  However,  a
more detailed  look  at financial  covenants  and  intersectoral  differences
would  be necessary  to  reach  specific  conclusions  and  provide
recomendations.
141.  The fiscal  objectives  for  public  sector  prices  have received
little  attention  in  most  sectors. This  is a  major  gap,  in  view  of the
serious  constraint  to growth  that  many countries  face  because  of the
shortage  of public  sector  revenues. Public  Investment  Reviews  sometimes
mention  the  need for  pri.ce  adjustments,  but  only  it a general  level;  their
focus  is  mostly  on the  expenditure  side  of the  accounts. Yet it is
difficult  for  project  analysts  to  address  issues  such  as the  tax  structure
facing  a particular  public  enterprise  or the  target  Eiscal  contribution  (or
maximum  loss)  that  a sector  should  make,  since  those  issues  are  broader
than  any  one  sector. The  next  step  should  be one  or  more  case  studies-
-involving  both  macroeconomic  and  sectoral  expertise--to  assess  the
expected  fiscal  and  sectoral  impacts  of economic  pricing  across  the  major
public  sectors.
142.  The  role  of efficiency  prices  as tools  to improve  internal
operations,  or  X-efficiency,  deserves  more attention. This  role  has  been
well demonstrated  in the  power  sector,  and  is increasingly  referred  to in
the  health,  education,  ports,  oil/gas  and  fertilizer  sectors. The impetus
that  economic  pricing  gives  to  managerial  efficiency  may  provide
justification  for  reexamining  the  OMS's  rejection  of sectoral  budgeting  and
the  Bank's  long-standing  opposition  to earmarking.
143.  Finally,  ten  years  of experience  with the  two-step  approach  to
integrating  economic,  distributional,  financial  and  fiscal  objectives  for
public  sector  pricing  has generated  a  body of empirical  evidence  that  there
is  more congruence  than  conflict  among  these  concerns. The  tone  of OMS
2.25  was one  of balancing  trade-offs.  Instead,  under  conditions  of fiscal
stringency  and  when  supply  elasticities  and  X-efficiency  impacts  are
considered,  setting  prices  to  clear  the  markets  is  a strategy  that  often
furthers  all  objectives. On the  distributional  side,  access  to service  is
the  key.  A  financially  viable  public  enterprise  or an adequately  funded
government  department  that  can  expand  its  coverage  to  rural  and  poorer- 36 -
urban  areas  is  a  more effective  means  to  reach  the  poor  than  are  subsidized
prices  and  constralned  supply. During  a  period  of service  expansion,
econoLic  prices  are  often  higher  than  marginal  costs  in  order  to ration
supply;  such  prices  are  also  necessary  from  a financial  viewpoint  to fund
new investment  and  suppout  additional  debt. If economic  prices  prevailed,
many  public  services  could  greatly  reduce  their  requirements  for  general
tax  revenue,  leaving  those  sources  for  sectors  with less  ability  to
generate  internal  funds.
144.  Actual  practice  in the  developing  countries  is far  from  this
ideal. In  most sectors  the  Bank's  recommendations  have approached  it only
marginally,  because  the  fiscal  dimension  of  public  sector  pricing  has  been
largely  ignored. Firding  a  practical  way to  resurrect  that  missing  element
and  incorporate  it into  pricing  advice  at all  levels  is  a clear  priority.
Suimarv  of Maior  RecoMMendations
1.  Research  based  on  case  studies  should  be undertaken  to quantify  the
expected  fiscal  and  sectoral  benefits  from  an  across-the-board  policy
of efficiency  pricing  for  public  sector  goods  and  services. In
addition  to quantifying  potential  benefits,  the  research  should  aim  to
develop  a  widely  applicable  methodology  for  integrating  fiscal
objectives  into  project  and  sectoral  pricing  analyses. Such  a
methodology  must  be robust  from  the  macroeconomic  perspective,  and
must bridge  the  gap  between  fiscal  considerations  (e.g.,  the  choice  of
tax instruments,  budgetary  allocation  devices  )  and  project/sectoral
objectives  (e.g.,  allocational  efficiency,  X-efficiency,  financial
vLability).
2.  A review  of financial  covenants  across  sectors  should  be undertaken  to
identify  which  approaches  have  been  most successful  in  promoting
financial  viability. In addition,  ways should  be sought  to  more
closely  integrate  the  economic  and  financial_analyses  with  respect  to
prilcing  issues.
3.  Several  cross-sectoral  issues  have  been identified  where  additional
research  or  policy  work is  needed. These  include:
(i)  application  of congestion  pricing  (paras.  26,  69+)
(ii) earmarking  and  sectoral  budgeting  (29,  121+)
(iii) link  between  economic  costing  and  X-officiency  (49)
(iv) better  supervision  and  use  of pricing/costing  studies  (57+)
(v)  sunuary  of issues  affecting  the  opportunity  cost  of capital  (68)
(vi) survey  of  systems  of  public  enterprise  taxation  (103+)
4.  In  addition,  a  number  of recommendations  have  been  made  in the  Annexes
for  sector-specific  work.  These  include,  with  their  text  references:
(i)  coal  - price  rationing  for  scarce  domestic  coal  grades
(para.  35)
- incorporation  of  environmental  costs
- scope  for  increased  taxation
(ii)  education  - widespread  dissemination  of  existing  research
- empirical  trial  of  economic  costing  (22)- 37 -
- case  studies  of  user  charge  effects  (22)
(iii) fertilizer  - cost/benefit  of  mothballing  and  restart  operations
- cost/benefit  of buffer  storage  ve.sus  new  plant  (38)
- develop  workable  system  of  border  price  linkage
- economic  effects  of consumer  price  subsidies  (39)
(iv) health  - risk  sharing  mechanisms  (82)
- guideline  on  economic  costing  (22)
(v) highways  - experi6nce  with  and  without  earmarking  (127)
- estimation  of  deadweight  losses  from  fuel  taxos
(vi) housing  - clarify  meaning  of replicability  (41)
- example  of disaggregated  economic  costing  (41)
(vii) irrigation  - retrospective  on  volumetric  metering  (27,  7/)
- potential  use  of transferable  water  rights  (27)
(viii) oil/gas  - transfer  pricing  for  crude  oil to  domestic
refineries
- alternative  oil  company  tax  mechanisms  (34)
- guideline  on  natural  gas  pricing
(ix) ports  - empirical  trial  of economic  costing
- prototype  terms  of reference  for  costing  studies
(58)
- scope  for  revenue  generation
(x) power  - improving  incentives  for  cost-minimization
- improving  the  metering/billing/collection  system
(xi) railways  - differential  and  peak  pricing  based  on economic
costs
- guideline  for  marginal  cost  tariff  design
(xii) telecons  - increased  use  of congestion  pricing
- guideline  for  tariff  analysis  (57)
(xiii) water  - improve  metering/billing/collection  system  (23)
- reexamine  cost  recovery  targets  for  rural  water
supply
- research  on the  determinants  of water  demand*  38 -
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ANNEX  1.  Review  of Pricing  and  Cost  Recovery  in  SARa:
COAL  SECTOR
A.  THE  POLICY
A.l. Interpretation  and  Calculation  of Efficiency  Pri  sl
1.  In the  coal  sector,  the  definition  and  calculation  of efficiency
prices  are  complicated  by the  heterogeneous  nature  of coal  and  the  wide
range  of circumstances  under  which  it is  found  and  used.  It  may  be scarce
or abundant  relative  to domestic  demand,  exported  or  not  depending  on
quality  and  accessibility,  subject  to  deplet:.on  over  a short  or long  period,
and  used  to  replace  other  fuels  ranging  from  petroleum  to  imported  coal  to
natural  gas  to  nuclear  or  hydroelectric  resources.
2.  An algorithm  has  been  developed  to  summarize  the  parameters
involved  in  determining  the  efficiency  price  of coal  in a  particular  case
(Energy  Paper  23).  The  first  step  is  to  assess  the  potential  tradability  of
domestic  coal  by comparing  the  relative  magnitudes  of the  export  equivalent
price  netted  back to  the  mineoouth,  the  i.port  equivalent  price  similarly
netted  back and  the  long  run  marginal  cost (LRMC)  of  production. If the
LRMC is  less  than  the  export  price,  and  if  exports  are  not limited  by market
.or,siderations,  then  the  efficiency  price  for  domestic  coal  is its  export
equivalent  value.  If  the  LRKC is  greater  than  the  import  price,  then  the
efficiency  price  is  equal  to  the  import  price  and-only  those  mines  which  are
competitive  with imports  will  produce. Because  of the  bigh transport  costs
of coal,  however,  in the  majority  of  cases  the  LRHC  will  lie  between  the
export  and import  equivalent  prices.
3.  When the  LRNC is  between  export  and import  prices,  then  the
efficiency  price  will  be  equal  to  the  LRMC  plus  a  depletion  premium.  The
size  of that  premium  depends  on the  time  path to  economic  depletion  (i.e.,
the  point  at  which  coal  starts  to  be replaced  by an  alternative  fuel). If
that  point  has  already  been  reached,  then  the  price  of coal  will  equal  that
of the  replacement  fuel  (probably  imported  coal). If  economic  depletion  is
far  into  the  future,  then  the  depletion  premium  will fade  into
insignifi4Xnce  and the  efficiency  price  will  be  the  LRMC.  In  intermediate
cases,  an  *pproximation  of the  depletion  premiua  must  be  made.  Annexs to
Energy  Paper  23  discuss  methods  for  calculating  both the  depletion  premium
and  the  LRMC.
4.  An issue  which  has  not  been  widely  addressed  in  developing
countries  is the  environmental  damage  that  both  coal  production  (surface
mining)  and  consumption  (burning  unscrubbed  coal  near  urban  areas)  can
cause. This is,  of course,  difficult  to quantify,  but techniques  of
estia=ting  marginal  social  opportunity  costs  in industrial  countries  and  of
applying  then  to  price/tax  formulation  have  been  developed.  Their
applicability  to  certain  developing  countries  where  environmental  concerns
are important  would  be  worth  exploring.- 41 -
A.2  Constraint  o Implementin; Efficiency Prices
5.  There  are  few  technical  constraints  to implementing  efficiency
prices  in  the  sector.  Production  is  always  measured  and charged  by  the  ton.
Quality  considerations  may sometimes  present  a  problem,  in that  differential
prices  must  be set  to  reflect  domand  as  well as  supply  variations. For
example,  it  will  be inappropriate  to  base  quality  differentials  only  on
calorific  value  if the  demand  for  the  higher  grades  of coal  is  much larger
than  that  for  lower  grades. To clear  the  market  for  both grades,
differentials  may  need  to  be much  larger  than  would  be implied  by relative
calorific  values.
6.  In some  countries  the  monopolistic  position  of the  railroads
presents  problems  for  officiency  coal  pricing.  Because  rail  transport  of
coal  is  generally  so  much  cheaper  than  any  alternative  transport  mode,
railroads  sometimes  charge  fees  to  coal  producers  that  far  exceed  their
incremental  costs.  This  may  drive  up  the  coal  price  to  consumers  and  stifle
demand even  where  minesouth  prices  are  appropriate.  Where  this  occurs,  it
is  generally  better  for  the  goverment  to  intervene  directly  with  the
railroads  rather  than  to  try  to  fix  consumer  coal  prices.
A.3  Adjustments to EfficiencX Prices
7.  Despite  the  theoretical  ease  of  calculating  and  implementing
efficiency  prices  in  the  coal  sector,  actual  prices  tend  to  vary  widely.  In
industrial  countries  and  a few  developing  ones  such  as  India,  the  major
reason  for  divergence  is  concern  about  the  social  and  employmnt  implica-
tions  of  closing  uneconomic  pits. This  has  led  to  a  system  of  financially
determined  prices  for  producers  (i.e.,  cost-plus  formula)  which  often  amount
to  cross-subsidy  within  the  sector  from  the  lower  cost  to  the  higher  cost
mines.  Coal  prices  to  domestic  consumers  are  sometimes  subsidized,  but  they
generally  represent  only  a  small  part  of  total  consumption.  Few  countries
have  tried  to  exploit  the  potential  fiscal  contribution  that  an  efficient
and  internationally  competitive  coil  sector  could-make.
B.  THE  PRACTICE
B.l.  Project  S-mnle
8.  Our  sample  in  the  coal  sector  consisted  of  all  five  projects  (in  4
countries:  Morocco,  China,  India  and  Colombia)  approved  by the  Bank  during
FY84  and  FY85. One  project  was  for  coking  coal  production,  one  was for  coal
exploration,  and  the  others  were  for  steam  coal  production.  Coverage  of
pricing  issues  was  extensive,  except  in  the  exploration  project  for  which
only  a  President's  Report  was available.- 42 -
B.2  Calculation  and  Discussion  of  Efficien  Prices
9.  All  of the  projects  with SARs  contained  a  discussion  of efficiency
prices  and  detailed  information  on the  actual  price  structure  in the
country. Across  the  sample,  the  average  domestic  price  over  all  coal
qualities  was  $29  per ton,  compared  to  an average  LRHC  of $28  per ton.
ImpQrt  parity  averaged  $64  per  ton,  while  (quality  adjusted)  export  parity
was about  $20/ton  in the  one  case  where  it  was relevant.
10.  In  one  country  efficiency  prices  were  represented  by import  parity,
in  one  by export  parity  and  in two  by LRMC. On this  basis,  domestic  prices
ranged  from  50%  to 104%  of their  respective  efficiency  prices.
11.  Questions  of price  structure  (mostly  reflecting  quality  differen-
tials)  were  handled  well in  most  of the  reports. In  addition,  there  was
often  comprehensive  coverage  of the  institutional  mechanism  by  which  prices
are  set  and  changed. This  is important  when the  Bank  argues  for  a  major
revision  in the  basis  for  setting  prices,  as it  has in several  coal  proj-
ects. Project  covenants  then  need  to address  the  system  for  price
determination,  rather  than  requiring  specific  changes  in  price  levels  or
structures.
3.3  Discussion  of Adjustments  to  Efficiency  Prices
12.  SARs in  the  coal  sector  contain  full  discussions  of the  financial
strength  of the  companies  and  the  impact  of the  recomended coal  prices  on
financial  viability. Distributional  concerns  are  not  a major  factor  in  the
sector,  and  little  mention  is  made  of fiscal  considerations  except  insofar
as they  coincide  with financial  ones  (i.e.,  to reduce  the  drain  on govern-
ment  resources  by raising  prices  above  average  costs). The  sector  in
Colombia  is  an exception  to  this;  there  the  government  has  levied  a 5%  tax
on coal  production  valued  at the  minehead. Sixty  percent  of the  proceeds  of
this  tax  are  used  to finance  coal  exploration,  with the  rest  becoming
general  government  revenues.
13.  Producer  prices  receive  the  bulk  of the  emphasis  in  SARs.  It is
difficult  to  judge  to  what  extent  second  best  considerations  have  been  re-
flected  in  the  coal  projects  reviewed. In  view of the  wide  scope  for  fuel
substitution  in  the  energy  sector,  it  would  be useful  to  see  an analysis  of
the  full  chain  of  prices  to  the  consumer  and  how end-user  prices  compare
with those  of substitute  fuels.
B.4  Discussion  of Cost  Recovery  Issues
14.  Neither  rates  of return  nor  cash  generation  covenants  were  used in
any  of the  projects  reviewed. Debt  coverage  or  debt/equity  ratios  were
specified  in four  of the  projects,  and  current  ratios  in  three.
15.  The  financing  plans  for  the  Bank  projects  tell  a  mixed  story. The
table  below  su  arizes  the  average  percent  accounted  for  by each  source  of
funds. Internal  cash  generation  averages  almost  30%  if  China  is  excluded
from  the  saaple. However,  government  equity  contributions  are  also  high,
averaging  26%.  In  such  a small  sample,  averages  can  be misleading. In the- 43 -
two  large  countries,  India  and  China,  it  appears  that  the  coal  sector
constitutes  a net  drain  on government  resources;  while  in  the  two  smaller
countries,  Colombia  and  Morocco,  the  Bank  projects  were financed  without  any
government  loan  or equity  contribution.
Average
Percent  UMn  Coma  ntg
Internal  cash  generation  24  0  - 52  0  in  1  case  (China)
IBRD/IDA  39  35  - 48
Other  external  loans  6  0  - 28  0  in  2  cases
Government  loans  4  0 - 12  0  in  3  cases
Government  equity  26  0 - 62  0  in  2 cases;  31-62  in
-other  3  cases
B.5  Use  of  Pricin;  Covenants
16.  Four  of  the  five  projects  included  specific  price  covenants.  In
both  Morocco  and  China,  agreement  was reached  on  a  new  principle  for  price
determination:  an  import  parity  link  and  LRMC, respectively.  In  India
extensive  discussions  on  coal  pricing  were  held  (partly  in  connection  with  a
sector  report),  and  agreement  was reached  to review  prices  periodically  in
order  to  ensure  the  financial  viability  of  the  producing  enterprise  and
provide  "adequate"  resource  mobilization  in  the  sector.
C.  THE MAJOR  GAPS
17.  Efficiency  pricing  is clearly  relevant  to the  coal  sector  and  is
relatively  straightforward  to  apply  and  implement.  A guideline  has  been
prepared  by the  Industry  Department,  and is  being  followed  in the  SARa. In
the  developing  countries  experience  is  mixed,  but it  appears  that  major
changes  in the  way  coal  prices  are set  are  being  made in  several  countries.
Compared  to other  sectors,  the  coal  sector  is  particularly  advanced  in its
handling  of  the  institutional  issues  of  price  determination.
18.  The areas  wher,  more analysis  would  be useful  at the  project  level
include:
the  relationship  of  consumer  coal  prices  to  those  of  competing
energy  products;
the  scope  for  using  "rationing  prices"  (e.g.,  import  parity)  for
some  grades  of  coal that  are  in  an  excess  demand  situation  in
countries  where  coal  production  or  transport  capacity  cannot  be
expanded  in the  short-run;- 44  -
the  rationalization  of  producer  prices  in the  two  large  coal-
producing  LDCs to  promote  efficient  operations  and  inter-mine
expansion  plans;
the  incorporation  of ewrironmental  costs  in  efficiency  prices,
where  relevant;  and
the  scope  and  methods  for  increasing  the  fiscal  contribution  of the
coal  sector,  perhaps  using  the  Colombia  tax  as  a  model.
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ANNEX  2:  Review  of  Pricing  and  Cost  Recoverv  in SARse
EDUCATION  SECTOR
A.  THE  POLICY
A.1  Interpretation  of Efficiency  Pricing
1.  There  are  no sector-specific  guidelines  within  the  Bank  for
pricing  "outputs*  in education  projects. OHS  2.25  suggests  the  desirability
of examining  the  scope  for  efficiency  pricing  of educaton  services,  and
acknowledges  the  fact  that  neither  marginal  cost  pricing  nor  benefit
taxation  has  been traditionally  used  in the  education  sector. The  practical
limitations  of these  pricing  approaches  in this  matter  seen  to rest  on the
contention  that  due  to  market  failures  (e.g.,  poor  consumer  knowledge  of
benefits;  imperfect  capital  markets)  and  positive  externalities  in the
consumption  of  education  services,  then  pricing  on the  basis  of the  private
demand  would  inadequately  reflect  the  true  social  value  of such  services.
Thus  education  is  usually  regarded  as  a  public  good,  whose  provision  should
be  heavily  subsidized  by  the  government  to  induce  wide  participation.
2.  More  recent  studies  on  the  financing  of  the  public  education
system  particularly  in  the  LDCs,  however,  have  questioned  the  justification
for  subsidizing  almost  all  types  of  education  services  and  identified  the
prospects  for  improving  cost  recovery  in  the  sector.1  The  main  scope  for
improvement  is  the  introduction  of  higher  user  charges  at  the  post-primary
education  levels.  Specifically,  policy  recommendations  include  the  recovery
of  costs  for  higher  education  and  reallocation  of  fiscal  resources  toward
primary  education;  implementation  of  loan  schemes  for  higher  education  and
selective  scholarships;  and  encouraging  private  provision  of  schooling.
This  set  of  policies  would  in  the  longrun  help  mitigate  inefficiencies  in
the  supply  of  services  through  increased  competition  in  the  sector,
alleviate  public  budget  problems,  and  improve  the  equitability  of  access  to
education.
A.2  Adjustments  to  Efficiency  Prices
3.  Efficiency  pricing  of  education  services  has  generally  been
dismissed  on  account  of the  issues  cited  above. As  is  true  with  health  (see
Annex  4),  no specific  range  of cost  recovery  levels  to  be used as a rule  of
thumb  exists  for  education  projects,  and  Bank  policies  have focused  mainly
on  the  importance  of  taking  into  consideration  equity  and  fiscal  criteria.
In practice,  nonetheless,  a tradeoff  between  these  two  criteria  is
unavoidable,  and  appears  to  have  been  tilted  in  favor  of  equity  issues.  It
has  been argued  that  levying  charges  on  users  could  affect  the  extent  to
which  the  poor  consume  education  services;  thus  the  institution  of low  or
zero  price  for  education  at large  expense  to governments.  But  recent
studies  on pricing/cost  recovery  in  education  have  pointed  out  that  low  user
1/  See  especially  "Financing  Education  in  Developing  Countries:  A  Policy
Paper"  by E. Jimenez;  and "Cost  Recovery  in  Health  and  Education: Bank
Policy  and  Operationsa  by N. Birdsall.- 46 -
charges  coupled  with scarce  fiscal  budgets  eventually  result  in  poor quality
services  and  inequitable  access  to education.  Moving  toward  lower
subsidies,  with governments  exercising  major  efforts  in the  support  of rural
primary  schools--or  in the  design  of selective  loan/scholarship  programs-
-that  largely  serve  the  poor,  is  therefore  becoming  an increasingly  popular
view.
B.  THE  PRACTICE
B.1  Project  Sample
4.  Twenty  projects  (in  12  countries: Sudan,  Jordan,  Oman,  PDRY,
Bangladesh,  Nepal,  Papua  New  Guinea,  Indonesia,  China,  Peru,  Brazil  and
Haiti)  were selected  for  this  review. The  sample  accounted  for  50  percent
of the  total  number  of education  projects  approved  by the  Bank  during  FY84
and  FY85.
B.2  Discussion  of Cost  Recovery  Issues
5.  Government  recurrent  expenditures  on education  ranged  from
US$28,000  for  Djibouti  in 1983/84  to $159  million  for  Oman in  1982,  with  a
sample  mean of a little  over  $41  million. Expressed  as a proportion  of
total  government  recurrent  expenditures,  the  education  bill  amounted  from  9
to 23  percent  in the  African  countries  (or  averaged  about  17  percent);  7-19
percent  (11  percent)  in the  other  countries  reviewed. Despite  the  notable
differences  among  countries  in  the  size  of education  expenditures,  budgetary
allocations  generally  declined  with increases  in  education  levels. Thus
primary  education  usually  received  the  largest  portion  of the  budget,
followed  by secondary  education,  and  then  by universities  and  colleges  as
shown  below:
LEVEL  OF EDUCATION  AVERAGE  RANGE  COMMENTS
(8  of Education  Expenditures)
Primary  47.5  19-71  Less  than  40%
in  5 cases
Secondary  25.9  7-44
Higher  Education  17.2  0-36  0 in  2 cases
Teachers'  Training  & Other  9.4  0-25  0 in  9 cases
Nevertheless,  annual  expenditures  per student  rose  sharply  from  primary  to
higher  education  in all  the  countries  with  relevant  data,  due  mainly  to the
fact  that  higher  education  entailed  much smaller  student  enrollments  and
more  expensive  type  of services  required. Thus  per-student  subsidy  levels
are  consistently  higher  for  higher  levels  of education.
6.  Information  on cost  recovery  through  user  charges  was scanty,  and
was  made available  only  in 10  out  of the  20  SARs  used  for  this  review.
Recovery  of costs  was  nil in  Djibouti  and  Sudan. Slightly  over 3  percent  of
the  recurrent  education  expenditures  in  Togo  was recouped  through  parents'
contributions  for  textbooks  and  participation  by cousunities  in the
maintenance  of school  facilities;  about  20  percent  in Lesotho  through
student  fees.  Student  fees  levied  at selected  levels  of  education  enabled  a
partial  recovery  of 13  percent  of the  expenditures  for  post-primary- 47
educatlao  in Indonesia,  and  27  percent  of thLose  for  lower  secondary  schools
in Papua  New  Guinea. Primary  education  by tradition  i5  free  in  Bangladesh,
Peru  and  Brazil  so recovery  of costs  should  be very a:  st or  zero  at this
level;  however,  as was  true  with  Indonesia  and  Papua  hew  Guinea,  no
information  was  reported  for  these  countries  on the  proportion  of the  entire
recurrent  expenses  for  education  that  was  recouped  via  user  charges.
Revenues  from  user  charges  as  a percent  of expenditues  by education  levels
are  summarized  below  based  on the  foregoing  countries  with  available  data:
LELEL  OF EDUCATION  RANGE  - NO  REPORTING
(%)
Primary  0  6
Secondary  & Higher  Education  0 - 27  4; 0 in  2 cases
Overall  0 - 20  4; 0 in  2 cases
7.  Non-user  fees  were important  to the  financing  of public  education
in a few  of the  sample  countries. In  Brazil,  fiscal  resources  spent  for
education  were raised  partly  through  the  so-called  "education  salary  tax";
that  is,  a 2.5  percent ax applied  on the  wage  bill of firms  employing  more
than  100  workers. In  Togo,  Mali  and  Sudan  foreign  aid  became  an important
source  of financing  recurrent  expenses,  versus  the  usual  practice  of  using
such  funds  largely  for  investment  expenditures.  Salaries  of expatriate
teachers  and/or  fellowships  granted  to  students  at the  post-primary  levels
in  Togo  and  Mali  were  financed  partly  through  foreign  aid,  while  in  Sudan
grants  from  abroad  augmented  fiscal  resources  spent  for  universities  and
technical  institutes.
8.  Pricing  policies  for  public  education  vary  markedly  in the  sample
countries. Policies  whereby  tuition  fees  are  charged  among  students  at the
primary,  secondary  and  higher  education  were  observed  in  Lesotho  and  Haiti.
Djibouti  and  Sudan  by contrast  have free  tuition  at all  levels  of education.
In  between  these  two  extremes  were the  cases  of Bangladesh,  Indonesia,  Peru
and  Brazil  with  practices  of free  tuition  for  primary  education  only;  and
Papua  New  Guinea  where  fees  are  levied  only  among  students  in  the  primary
and  lower  secondary  schools. Books  are  supplied  free  of charge  to  all
students  in Djibouti  and  Sudan,  and  to  all  primary  pupils  in  Lesotho,
Bangladesh  and  Nepal.  Such  practices  do not  exist  in  Burkina,  Togo,  Peru,
Brazil  and  Haiti  where  all  students  have  to  purchase  their  own  textbooks.
In Sudan  and  Papua  New  Guinea  free  boarding  is  provided  among  students  in
upper  secondary  schools  and  universities,  on top  of free  tuition  and  books.
Cash  allowances  are  paid to students  in  Sudan. Provisions  for  free  boarding
are  also  found  in  Oman  on account  of inadequate  transportation  in  that
country.  The  distribution  of  the  sample  according  to  the  above-mentioned
policies  is  as  follows:
Free  at  All  Free  at Selected  Not  Free  at  Not
SERVICES  Levyls  Levels  Only  Al  Levels  Reorting
------------------------ (No.  of Cases)------------------------
Tuition  2  6  2  10
Books  2  3  5  10
Boarding  0  3  4  13
(no  boarding
provision)48 -
9.  Scarcity  of fiscal  resources  has led  to increased  concerns  to
improve  both cost  recovery  and  cost-efficiency  in the  education  sector.
Governmonts  have indicated  the  need to  increase  student-teacher  ratios  in
public  schools  (found  in  7 cases)  to reduce  recurrent  costs. Increasing
student  fees  or soliciting  financial  contributions  from  parents  for
textbooks  has  been  recorded  in 6  cases. Two cases  encouraged  community
participation  in the  maintenance  of schools. Drastic  curtailment  of
subsidies  to religious  private  institutions,  reduction  in  budgetary
allocations  for  scholarships,  and/or  gradual  elimination  of cash  allowances
for  students  are  important  cost-saving  devises  being  considered  for
implementation  in 3  countries. In Indonesia  where  the  government  has  been
reluctant  to increase  tuition  fees  especially  among  university  students,
attention  is  now  paid to the  feasibility  of expanding  the  student  loan
program. Such  an expansion  may  facilitate  efforts  to raise  fees  in the
future;  consequently,  improving  the  level  of cost  recovery  at  higher
education  while  granting  loans  to  needy  students. The Indonesian  Govrnment.
is  also  studying  the  possibilities  of assisting  the  private  education
systen,  which  operates  on a full  cost  recovery  basis,  in order  to  accelerate
its  growth  and  ultimately  relieve  the  government  of its  heavy  recurrent
budgetary  burden.
B.3  Uags  of Priclg/Cost  Recovery  Covenants
10.  Except  for  one  case,  no covenants  for  cost  recovery  were found  in
the  20  education  projects  used for  this  review. It is  only  in the  case  of
Bangladesh  wherein  an agreement  was reached  with  direct  implications  for
cost  recovery;  specifically,  the  conduct  of studies  which  relate  to  the
financing  and  pricing  aspects  of a proposed  textbook  program. As suggested
in the  SARs  the  Bank is  very supportive  of the  governments'  plans  to improve
cost  recovery  and  cost-efficiency  in  the  provision  of education  services.
However,  pricing/cost  recovery  covenants  appear  to  be very rarely  used.
B.4.  Sources  of Project  Financing
11.  The financing  plans  for  the  education  projects  reviewed  are
summarized  below. On average,  IBRD/IDA  loans  and_contributions  from
governments  financed  94  percent  of  project  costs.
SOURCE  AVERAGE  RANGE  CgMMENT
(%  of Project  Costs)
IBRD/IDA  Loans  60.2  12  - 93  93%  in  Burkina
Other  External  Loans  5.9  0 - 68  0 in 14  cases
Government  Budgetary  33.9  7 - 88  88%  in  China
Contributions- 49  -
C.  THE  MAJOR  GAPS
12.  Efficiency  pricing  RnoA*  is  not  particularly  relevant  in  the
education  sector  due  to the  importance  of externalities,  poor  capital
markets  and inadeq.tate  consumer  knowledge. However,  a strong  case  for
increased  attention  to cost  recovery  can  be made on the  grounds  of equity
and  better  resource  allocation  within  the  sector,  as  well  as the  obvious
fiscal  benefits. The  Bank  has  undertaken  and  supported  a great  deal  of
research  on the  financing  of education. Its  results  clearly  indicate  that
major  banefits  can  be achieved  by a  combination  of  user  charges  for  higher
education  and  wider  access  to loan/scholarship  programs  based  on  both
ability  and  financial  need. A guideline  su_marizing  the  research  and
providing  practical  policy  options  is  available  in  draft  from  ETD.
13.  Following  publication  of that  guideline,  the  main gap  will  be
between  the  policy  and  its  application  in  Bank  projects  (including
covenants)  and in  the  developing  countries. There  are  indications  that  some
countries  are  already  starting  to implement  higher  cost-recovery  schems for
education. Plans  vary  by country,  and  it is interesting  tha:  in  only  one
case (Indonesia)  is  there  yet  a  recognition  of the  linkage  between  an
expanded  student  loan  program  and  the  acceptance  of future  tuition
increases. The  role  of the  Bank  should  be (i)  to dissesinate  the  results  of
its  research  showing  the  benefits  of greater  self-financing  to those
governments  which  are  not  yet  persuaded;  and  (iU)  for  those  governments
which  are  already  moving  in  that  direction,  to  assist  in  designing
pricing/cost  recovery  instruments  that  are  attuned  to the  particular
circumstances  of  each  country.
14.  In  addition  to  cost  recovery  issues,  economic  costing  can  be  an
important  tool  for  optimizing  project  design  and  checking  sectoral
priorities. Total  costs  per  student  per  year  are  not  routinely  reported  in
SARs,  nor  are  such  cost  comparisons  between  types  of educational
expenditure.  A draft  note  from  ETD  suggesting  a format  for  calculating
economic  costs  is  under  review.50 -
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ANNEX  3.  Review  of Pricing  and  Cost  Recovery  in SARs:
FERTILIZEa SECTOR
A.  THE  POLICY
A.1  InterDretation  and  Calculation  of Efficiency  Prices
1.  Fertilizer  is  a conmodity  that  is  widely  traded  internationally.
Its  efficiency  price  is thus  clearly  represented  by the  prevailing  border
price. Nonetheless,  there  are  major  difficulties  in  applying  this  border
price  directly  as  a  guide  for  domestic  prices  because  of  the  high  degree  of
volatility  it  has  exhibited  in  recent  years.
2.  Fertilizer  price  volatility  is  partly  the  result  of technical  and
institutional  imperfections  in the  international  marketplace.  On the  tech-
nical  side,  economies  of scale  result  in  sany  plants  having  high fixed  cocts
and  relatively  low  marginal  costs. This  provides  incentive  to cut  prices
sharply  on the  export  market  in order  to  keep  capacity  utilization  high  when
there  is  excess  international  supply. Conversely,  when  there  is excess
demand,  long  lead  times  in  the  construction  of  new  plant  mean that  prices
move sharply  higher  and  can  be sustained  far  above  long-run  margiual  costs
for  extended  periods. On the  institutional  side,  as in the  energy  market,
there  has  beer  collusion  among  the  major  producers  of fertilizers  in the
past.  In  addition,  much  of the  traded  fertilizer  is in the  hands  of a few
large  buyers  who attempt  to stockpile  supplies  during  periods  of low  prices
and  sell  them  when  prices  are  at their  seasonal  peaks (see  Reference  1).
3.  To protect  themselves  from  the  extremes  of international  prices,
and  to  ensure  supply  availability  during  the  critical  planting  period,  most
developing  countries  have  chosen  to shield  domestic  producers  from  interna-
tional  prices  through  some  form  of  administered  ex-factory  price.  In
addition,  farmgate  fertilizer  prices  are  subsidized  in  many developing
countries  as  part of the  overall  agricultural  pricing  policy. The  fiscal
impact  of this  divergence  between  producer  and  consumer  prices  has  become  a
major  macroeconomic  problem  in a  number  of countries  which,  in turn,  is
leading  to a reexamination  of fertilizer  pricing  policies.
A.2  Constraints  to  Inlementing Efficiency  Prices
4.  There  are  few  implementation  constraints  to  efficiency  pricing  in
the  technical  sense. Production  is  always  "metered*  and  charged  for  on a
weight  basis. Quality  can  be easily  measured,  and  international  spot  price
information  is  readily  available. If imports  were  unrestricted  and  consu-
mers  could  choose  their  source  of supply,  no administrative  system  for
prices  would  be necessary. Where  administered  prices  are  used (i.e.,  in
nearly  all  developing  countries),  the  main  costs  are involved  in setting  the
prices  based  on whatever  system  is  used  rather  than  in  charging  and
collecting  them. Fertilizer  plants  are  large  and  therefore  few  in  number  to
monitor.- 52 -
5.  There  are  major  implementation  problems  with  some  of the  existing
systems  of fertilizer  prices  --  but these  are  in large  part due  to their
lack  of reference  to  efficiency  prices  and  to their  role in  furthering  non-
efficiency  objectives. Implementation  costs  have  proved  to  be substantial
in some  of the  cost-plus  systems  of  administered  prices.
A.3  Adjustments  to Efficiency  Prices
6.  Reference  1 lists  five  objectives  for  producer  pricing  of
fertilizer:
- X-efficiency  and  rationalization  of firms;
- Allocative  efficiency;
- Financial  health  of enterprises  and  management  evaluation;
- Fiscal  impact;  and
- Ease  and  cost  of administration.
All  but the  third  would  be well satisfied  by allowing  prices  to follow  bor-
der  values  and  mothballing  domestic  plants  during  periods  when imports  are
cheaper  than  domestic  production. (This  is roughly  the  approach  in  Japan
ard the  US.)  However,  only  one  of the  ten  developing  countries  surveyed  in
Reference  1 attempted  a  link  to  border  prices,  and  even  in that  case  the
linkage  has  been loosened  to  permit  continued  operation  of domestic  plant
during  periods  of cheap  imports. Thus it  appears  that  the  financial  objec-
tive  has  been  paramount  in  developing  countries.
7.  Strategic  arguments  have  been  presented  in support  of the  financial
objective. Because  fertilizer  is  a  key  agricultural  input,  and  because  its
application  is  time-sensitive,  countries  have  claimed  that  they  must  have  a
domestic  production  capability  to insure  against  international  price  or
supply  disruptions.  However,  these  arguments  would  equally  support  domestic
storage  arrangements  which,  in  many  cases,  would  be far  cheaper  than
expanding  domestic  production. (Even  with  domestic  production,  storage
facilities  must  be built  to  accooodate demand  seasonality.)
8.  The  arguments  for  non-efficiency  objectives  in setting  fertilizer
producer  prices  do not  seem  compelling  enough  to  justify  the  widespread
divergence  from  efficiency  pricing  that  is  observed  in  developing  countries.
The  high  administrative  costs  of other  pricing  systems,  their  demonstrated
negative  effects  on  X-efficiency  and  the  significant  fiscal  burdens  they
impose  during  periods  of low  international  prices  indicate  that  non-price
instruments  should  be explored  for  serving  non-efficiency  objectives. For
example,  it  would  be useful  to  assess  the  cost-effectiveness  of  mothballing
and  restart  operations  and  of building  and  maintaining  domestic  buffer
stockpiles.
9.  There  has  been  a tendency  in the  Bank  to separate  the  issues
affecting  the  producer  and  consumer  prices  of fertilizers.  Income
distributional  concerns  and  second-best  issues  are  clearly  important  for  the
latter. Without  an effective  agricultural  credit  market,  it  may  be
necessary  to subsidize  inputs  such  as fertilizer  for  small  farmers. In
addition,  in  cases  where  farmgate  prices  for  agriculture  output  are  held
below  efficiency  levels,  then  input  may  also  need  to  be subsidized.- 53  -
10.  There  is  growing  concern,  however,  over  the  widespread  practice  of
subsidizing  consumer  prices  of  fertilizer.  First,  it  is impossible  to  truly
delink  producer  and  consumer  prices  because  the  difference  between  the  two
has  direct  fiscal  implications.  In  addition,  it  is  not  clear  that
fertilizer  subsidies  are  efficient  from  the  overall  perspective  of  agricul-
tural  policy.  In  many  countries,  fertilizer  use  is  unbalanced  and  ineffi-
cient  duo,  in  part,  to  its  long  history  of  low  prices  to  farmers.  There  may
be  better  methods  to  improve  agricultural  productivity;  e.g.,  through  a
package  of  improved  farming  practices  rather  than  through  large-scale  sub-
sidies  on  one  input  --  or  random  subsidies  on  several.  Further,  non-price
factors  such  as  the  transportation  and  distribution  system  for  getting
fertilizer  to  farmers  often  play  an  important  role  in  its  efficient  appli-
cation  and  use.  Improvements  in  the  distribution  infrastructure,  perhaps
financed  by  an  increase  in  fertilizer  prices,  could  bring  major  gains  iA
agricultural  production.  Even  on  the  income  distributional  side,  it  is  not
clear  that  fertilizer  subsidies  benefit  primarily  poor  farmers. They  are
cumbersome  to  target,  and  generally  apply  equally  to  all  users,  with  pro-
portionately  more  of  the  subsidy  accruing  to  the  larger  ones.
B.  THE PRACTICE
B.1  Project  Sa=le
11.  Our  sample  consisted  of  all  five  fertilizer  projects  (in  India,
Yugoslavia,  China,  Burkina  and  Nigeria)  approved  by  the  Bank  during  FY84 and
FY85. Three  were  for  new  production  capacity  and  two  were  for  rehabi-
litation  or  energy  savings  at existing  plants.  All  contained  good  coverage
of  the  fertilizer  pricing  systems  of  the  countries,  at  both  producer  and
consumer  levels.
B.2  Calculation  and  Discussion  of  EfficiencX  Prices
12.  All  SARs contained  information  on  current  borde;  prices,  which  were
compared  with  some  or  all  of  domestic  production  costs,  ex-factory  prices
and  farmgate  prices.  For  the  three  cases  reporting  produetion  costs,  they
were  97%  and  88%  of  cif  prices  for  urea,  and  150% and  158% of  cif  ammonia  or
compound  fertilizer  prices.  All  SARs took  the  view  that  current  cif  prices
are  below  the  long-run  equilibrium  levels  that  should  be  considered  when
making  long  duration  investments.
13.  Ex-factory  prices  were  higher  than  production  costs  in  four  of  the
five  cases,  where  they  were  set  on  cost-plus  basis.  In  the  fifth  case,
Yugoslavia,  ex-factory  prices  are  set  based  on  a  number  of  factors  including
production  costs,  international  prices  and  domestic  prices  in  neighboring
countries.  This  has  resulted  in  financial  losses  for  the  fertilizer
industry,  but  a  50%  increase  in  ex-factory  prices  was  planned  to  remedy
this.
14.  Most  SARs provided  a  thorough  analysis  of  the  problems  of  the
existing  fertilizer  pricing  system  --  and  all  five  cases  had  major  problems
on  efficiency  grounds.  The  general  solutions  proposed  were  (i)  to  ensure
the  financial  viability  of  fertilizer  production  by  adhering  to  certain- 54 -
financial  covenants;  and (ii)  to  raise  consumer  prices  by certain  amounts  in
order  to  decrease  the  overall  fertilizer  subsidy. No covenants  proposed  a
link  with international  prices.
B.3  Discussion  of  Adjustments  to  Efficiency  Prices
15.  At the  producer  price  level  there  is  only  one  relevant  non-
efficiency  objective: financial  viability. However,  this  has  a somewhat
broader  interpretation  in the  fertilizer  sector  than  it does  in  others. The
argument  is  made that  current  international  prices  do  not reflect  long-run
equilibrium  for  the industry. This  implies  that  existing  firms  would
alternate  between  periods  of large  profits  and  periods  of losses  or  possibly
even  closure  in  favor  of imports. In  order  to ensure  continued  financial
viability  for  the industry  most  countries  have  developed  cost-plus  pricing
systems  for  fertilizer  at the  factory  gate.
16.  The  problems  of cost-plus  pricing  are  well recognized:  a lack  of
incentiv,  to minimlze  costs,  a  tendency  to  build  'gold  plated"  plants,  the
difficulty  of  measuring  managemnt performance,  etc.  Examples  of  many  of
these  problems  are  cited  in the  SARs  reviewed. However,  the  general
tendency  has  been to tinker  with  the  cost-plus  systems  (e.g.,  to  base  prices
on normative  rather  than  actual  costs  for  each  plant,  to target  capacity
utilization  rates  with  bonuses  for  exceeding  them,  etc.)  rather  than  to
devise  a system  based  on estimates  of long-run  efficiency  prices  or to
compare  the  inefficiencies  and  administrative  costs  of the  existing  system
with the  costs  of closing  and  reopening  plant  as the  international  market
dictates.
17.  At the  consumer  price  level,  both income  distributional  and  fiscal
objectives  are  important. In  all  five  countries  farmgate  prices  were  below
border  prices,  and in  three  countries  they  were  below  ex-factory  prices.
All three  of the  latter  had  major  fiscal  problems  created  by fertilizer
subsidies,  and  two  mentioned  allocative  inefficiencies  resulting  from
inappropriate  price  differentials  between  different  types  of fertilizer.
Two  projects  included  covenants  requiring  increases  in  consumer  prices  in
order  to reduce  fertilizer  subsidies.
B.4  Discussion  of  Cost  Recovery  Issues
18.  Because  of the  cost-plus  systems  for  ex-factory  fertilizer  prices,
cost  recovery  at the  plant  level  was  good  in four  of the  five  cases
reviewed. Three  of the  SARs  did  not include  financial  covenants. The  other
two included  covenants  on debt  equity  (60:40  in  both  cases),  current  ratio
(1.2  and  1.4)  and  debt  coverage  (1.2  and  1.3).- 55 -
19.  Project  financing  plans  were  quite  diverse,  as shown  in  the  table
below:
Average
Percent  RanUe  Comments
Internal  cash  generation  10  0 - 35  0 in 3  cases
IBRD/IDA  54  30 -100
Other  loans  13  0 - 37  0 in 2  cases
Government  loans  1  0  5_  0 in  4 cases
Government  equity  21  0 - 70  0  in 2  cases
Internal  cash  generation  is  relatively  low,  although  this  is  presusably  a
function  of  the  type  of  cost-plus  formula  used  for  pricing.  The  usefulness
of  financial  covenants  and  traditional  indicators  such  as  internal  cash
generation  is  clearly  reduced  under  such  a  pricing  regime.
C.  THE MAJOR  GAPS
20.  Efficiency  pricing  is  clearly  relevant  to  the  fertilizer  sector;
border  prices  are  easily  observed  and  the  metering/charging/collection  pro-
cess  is straightforward  compared  with  many  other  sectors. Yet  no country  in
our  small  sample,  and  only  one  of  the  10  discussed  in  Reference  1,  attempted
an  ex-factory  system  based  on  efficiency  prices.  The  general  result  is  that
a  type  of  financial  viability  has  been  achieved  in  most  cases,  but  at  the
cost  of  production  inefficiencies,  cumbersonm  administrative  systems  and
fiscal  drains  during  periods  of low  import  prices. In addition,  subsidized
consumer  prices  are  widespread  and  have resulted  in  serious  fiscal  problems
as  well as inefficient  use  by  farmers.  New approaches  are  needed  for
fertilizer  pricing  at  both producer  and  consumer  levels.
21.  The  recent  fertilizer  pricing  seminar  held  by the  Bank  and  reported
in  Reference  1  provides  a good  survey  of the  theoretical  issues  involved  and
of the  existing  pricing  systems  in  a number  of developing  countries. It
also  contains  a list  of recomendations  for  further  research  into  certain
areas. In our  view,  however,  these  do not  go far  enough. What is  needed  is
(i)  a coordinated  program  of research/policy  work aimed  at developing  a
workable  system  of border  price  linkage  for  fertilizer  producer  prices
coupled  with (ii)  an  economic  assessment  of the  cost-effectiveness  of
fertilizer  subsidies  at the  faragate  level.  (The  latter  is  mentioned  in
Reference  1  but  not included  in the  recomendations  presumably  because  it
does  not relate  to  producer  prices.)
22.  Part (i)  would  include  an  economic  analysis  of the  feasibility  of
mothballing  and  reopening  plants  to  take  advantage  of  market  conditions  and
of building  additional  storage  facilities  to  provide  strategic  back-up. It
would  also include  a review  of international  prices  and their  historical- 56  -
volatility. (Aside  from  the  short  and  extreme  peak  at the  end  of 1974 --
probably  caused  more  by factors  in  the  energy  and  grain  markets  than  those
in  the  fertilizer  industry  --  it is  not  clear  from  the  graphs  that  fertil-
izer  export  prices  have  exhibited  particular  volatility  during  the  last
decade.)
23.  Part (ii)  should  focus  on the  effects  of  consumer  price  subsidies
within  the  context  of  overall  agricultural  policy. If there  are  more  cost-
effective  ways  to achieve  the  same  ends (including  distributional  and
fiscal,  as  well as efficiency,  ones),  then  these  should  be identified  so
that  project  staff  in the  fertilizer  sector  can  propose  appropriate
alternatives.  The  separation  of  producer  from  consumer  prices,  while
elegant  in theory,  in  practice  serves  to sidestep  the  fiscal  effects  of
fertilizer  pricing  policies,  which  have  reached  critical  proportions  in  a
number  of countries.
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ANNEX  4.  Review  of Pricing  and  Cost  Recovery  in SARS:
HEALTH  SECTOR
A.  THE  POLICY
A.1  Interpretation  of Efficiency  Prii
1.  OHS  2.25  suggests  a limited  scope  for  applying  marginal  cost
pricing  principles  to  public  health  services.  Both  because  of  the
difficulty  of  measuring  true  economic  costs  and  because  of  distributional
objectives,  in  practice  health  care  has  generally  been  provided  free  and
financed  out  of  general  taxation.
2.  Very  recently,  however,  arguments  have  been  set  forth  for  a
dramatic  change  in  health  financing  policies  by  borrowing  countries,  with
the  emphasis  on  users  bearing  a  larger  share  of  health  care  costs. 1 The
proposed  pricing  reforms  are  tailored  within  the  context  of  different  types
of  health  services,  and  are  sumarized  as  follows:  preventive  services
which  are  not  patient-related  (e.g.,  disease  control  programs,  sanitation,
education  on  health  and  hygiene)  should  be  provided  at  zero,  or  even
negative,  cost  to  users  since  these  services  have  strong  "public  good"
attributes.  Patient-related  preventive  services  (e.g.,  i_  unization,
maternal  and  child  health  care,  visits  by  village  health  promoters),  on  the
other  hand,  should  not  be  provided  free  of  charge.  User  charges  for  these
services  aro  feasible;  but  they  should  be below  marginal  cost  because  of
externalities  and  users'  lack  of information. (Inmunization  is  a good
example.)  These  issues  justify  the  provision  of such  services  at
subsidized  costs  to  users  in  order  to encourage  demnd.
3.  For  curative  care  (e.g.,  sale  of  medicine,  outpatient  and
inpatient  care),  efficiency  pricing  should  be  applied  as  a  benchmark,  and
any  departures  from  it  should  be explicitly  justified. Curative  services
typically  account  for  at least  70  percent  of a country's  annual  health
expenditures,  and  the  underlying  issues  on  externalities  and  users'
knowledge  are  less  vague  on  this  side.  Increased  recovery  of  costs  fron
users  can  be  implemented  in  combination  with  risk-sharing  arrangements  such
as  insurance  schems;  increased  privatization  in  the  supply  and  finance  of
certain  health  services;  and  structuring  public  subsidies  to  the  health
sector  to  strengthen  incentives  for  cost  control.
1/  This  section  draws  heavily  from  SWP  No.  721,  Paying  for  Health  Services
in  Developini  Countries: An Overview,  by David  de Ferranti.- 58  -
A.2  Adjustments to Efficiency Prices
4.  Both  fiscal  and  equity  objectives  are  important  in  the  health
sector. Bank  policies  have  defined  no specific  range  of cost  recovery
levels  to  be used  as a rule  of thumb  for  health  projects,  but  pointed  out
the  suitability  of a  pricing  approach  which  weighs  the  social  value  of
additional  public  revenues  against  additional  income  to  project
beneficiaries.  Health  financing  practices  in the  LDCs which  permit
insignificant  participation  by users  have  led  to  chronic  funding  problems,
poor quality  services,  and  failure  in impleoenting  health  improvement
programs. While  existing  practices  have  been  based  partly  on equity
considerations,  paradoxically  they  have  contrituted  to inequities  in the
distribution  of health  resources.  There  is  a  clear  need to reorient  health
financing  policies  to  accommodate  some  reasonable  balance  between  the
fiscal  and  equity  impacts  of  health  projects.
B.  THE PRACTICE
o.1  Proiect  S-m  nl-
S.  This review is based on 11 projects (in Burkina,  Nigeria, Lesotho,
Mali,  Botswana,  Jordan,  Morocco,  Brazil,  Colombia,  Indonesia  and  China).
The sample  represents  slightly  over  61  percent  of the  total  number  of
health  projects  approved  by the  Bank  during  FY84  and  FY85.
5.2  Discussion  of  Cost  Recovery  I-sues
6.  The SARs  revealed  no detailed  information  on  pricing  practices  in
health  care,  according  to the  different  types  of services  discussed  above.
There  were  no references  to  efficiency  pricing  or the  extent  to  which  user
fees  were related  to the  economic  cost  of  providing  curative  care.
Nonetheless,  the  SARs  provided  an interesting  description  of the
expenditures  and  financing  of  aggregate ykulsea«ctor  health  services  in
the  sample  countries. Total  public  sector  expenditures  for  health  ranged
from  US$7.2  million  in  Lesotho  in  1983  to $7,560  oillion  in  China  in  1981.
The sample  mean  was  nearly  $761  million  (about  $81  million  if  China  were
excluded). Recurrent  expenditures  made  up from  31 to 95  percent  of total
expenses,  and  averaged  39  percent.
7.  Budgetary  allocations  were  the  primary  source  of  health  finance  in
six  cases: Nigeria,  Lesotho,  Botswana,  Jordan,  Morocco  and Indonesia,
accounting  for  81 to 100  percent  of total  expenditures.  The  relatively
insignificant  recovery  of costs  from  users  in  these  countries  (ranging  from
almost  0 to  19 percent)  was  due  to an explicit  policy  that  health  services
should  be provided  at  minimal  expense  to  citizens. This  was  augmented  by a
failure  to  raise  fees  in line  with  inflation,  inefficient  collection,  and
poor  quality  of service  which  in turn  affected  people's  willingness  to  pay.
The  reverse,  however,  was  observed  in  Mali,  Brazil  and  China  where
expenditures  for  health  were  largely  financed  via  user  charges,  with
respective  levels  of 54,  85 and  70  percent  of total  expenditures.  Revenues
from  user fees  were  principally  from  the  sales  of  drugs  in  Mali; insurance
contributions  in  Brazil;  and  a combination  of the  two  in  China.- 59  -
8.  No precise  estimate  of  health  expenditures  was reported  for
Colombia,  but  in  1981  the  provision  of  public  and  private  health  services
represented  about  5  percent  of  the  country's  GDP.  Health  expenditures  were
then  covered  by  the  fiscal  budget  (33  percent)  and  user  charges  (40
percent).  Other  sources  of  finance  included  returns  on  investments,
credit,  and  leasing  of  property  especially  by  private  health  institutions.
Only  about  one-sixth  of  the  user  fees  were  collected  in  the  public  sector.
Governmental  budgetary  allocations  and  foreign  aid  were  almost  equally
important  sources  for  funding  health  expenditures  in  Burkina.
9.  Taking  the  sample  as  a  whole,  contributions  from  the  governments
were  the  principal  source  of  funds.  User  fees  played  a  comparatively  minor
role  in  financing  public  health  services,  as  demonstrated  in  the  table
below:
Source  of  Funds  Umz  9  I1
(% of  Total  Expenditures)
Government  62.7  15 - 100  100% in  2  cases
User  Fees  28.4  0  - 85  0  in  2  cases
Foreign  Aid  & Other  8.9  0  - 31  0  in  6  cases
10.  The  exceptionally  high  cost  recovery  levels  in  Brazil  and  China
deserve  a  further  focus.  The Brazilian  experience  could  be  attributed
almost  solely  to  the  performance  of  the  National  Social  Security  Institute
for  Medical  Assistance  (INAMPS).  INAMPS  wa  formed  by  a  merger  of  several
social  security  programs  for  various  groups  of  workers  under  the
supervision  of  the  Ministry  of  Social  Insurance  and  Assistance.  It  is
financed  by  a  payroll  tax  for  wage  earners  and  equivalent  taxes  for  the
self-employed.  Its  subscribers  include  about  90 percent  of  Brazil's
population.  The  impressive  recovery  of  costs  from  users  in  China  is  also
associated  with  the  manner  in  which  the  health  system  is  structured.  The
users  are  actively  involved  in  the  management of  health  services.  Health
services  at  the  brigade  level  are  mostly  fi:anced  by  cooperative  uedical
care  insurance  schemes,  which  are  in  turn  funded  jointly  by  annual
prepayments  of  individual  members  and  by  annual  appropriations  from  the
brigade's  welfare  funds.  A certain  proportion  of  the  brigade's  collective
income,  largely  from  sales  of  agricultural  produce,  is  set  aside  as
'welfare  funds"  to  be  used  for  educational,  health,  cultural  and  other
public  functions.  At  the  coimune  level,  health  centers  are  mostly
established  by  the  coomunes themselves,  and  operations  are  financed  through
user  fees  and  governmental  subsidies.  It  is  the  "collectivity"  aspect  of
health  care  provision  and  finance  that  allows  members  to  closely  monitor
the  performance  and  viability  of  the  system.
11.  The expenditures  and  financing  of  urivate  sector  health  services
were  available  only  in  6  cases.  Private  sector  spending  for  health  care
ranged  from  negligible  levels  (e.g.,  China  and  Burkina)  to  nearly  US$80
million  per  year  (e  g.,  Indonesia).  On average,  about  40  percent  of  total
expenditures  (slightly  over  59 percent  excluding  China  and  Burkina)  were
recovered  through  user  fees.  A comparison  of  the  contribution  of  user
charges  in  financing  health  services  by  sector,  based  on  the  six  cases,  is
shown below:- 60  -
User  Fees  as  % of  Total  Exnenditures
SECTOR  AVERAGE  LANGEQ
Private  39.5  0-80
Public  17.4  0-70
Overall  35.7  20-70
12.  The  private  health  sector  in the  African  countries  is  comprised
mainly  of missionary  societies  and  practitioners  of traditional  medicine.
Apart  from  being  an important  provider  of  basic  health  services,  the
private  sector  participates  in  the  distribution  of  drugs. By  contrast,  in
such  countries  as  Brazil,  Jordan,  Morocco,  Colombia  and  Indonesia,  the
private  health  sector  is  made  up largely  of modern  profit-seeking
enterprises  which  are  concentrated  in the  cities  or main  urban  areas.
Those  enterprises  are  the  major  suppliers  of  health  services  in  some  of
these  countries--accounting  for  about  59  percent  of total  health  care  in
Indonesia;  and  around  one-half  of  health  facilities  and  85  percent  of
specialty  care  units  in  Brazil. In  Morocco  and  Colombia  the  private  sector
has  a  sore limited  role  in  health  care  provision. Of the  77 percent  of the
Colombian  population  having  an access  to  health  services,  only  about  10
percent  use  private  health  facilities.  Private  health  services  in  Norocco
are  offered  almost  exclusively  to  high-income  groups;  nonetheless,  nearly
95  percent  of drugs  used in  the  country  are  distributed  via this  sector.
For  the  rest  of the  sample,  the  private  sector  is  virtually  non-existent.
Private  practice  of  medicine  in  China  has  been  exceptionally  minimal,  and
accounts  for  less  than  3  percent  of  total  health  services.  Private  health
institutions  are  not  allowed  to  operate  under  the  current  laws in  Burkina.
B.3  Use of Pricing/Cost  Recovery  Covenants
13.  Agreements  with implications  for  cost  recovery  in the  provision  of
public  sector  health  services  were reached  only  in five  projects. They
include  revision  of the  existing  fee  structure  at government  facilities
(found  in  one  case);  evaluation  of the  possibility  of establishing  a
national  health  insurance  scheme  (1);  testing  a drug  cost  recovery  plan
(1);  and  the  conduct  of studies  dealing  with  health  financing  issues  (4).
Such  studies  were aimed  to  assess  the  efficiency/equity  aspects  of
alternative  financing  schemes  (e.g.,  budgetary  allocations  and  user fees)
or broadly  to determine  the  feasibility  of increased  cost  recovery  in  the
health  system. None  of these  covenants  elaborated  on developing  pricing
policies  with distinctions  based  on the  types  of  health  services  as
discussed  in  RAxa.raL. There  were  no covenants  for  cost  recovery  in six
projects.  In one  of these  cases  'Botswana),  however,  the  government  had
indicated  interest  in improving  cost  recovery  in  public  health  services
possibly  through  increases  in  fees  for  private  patients,  development  of  a
national  health  insurance  plan  for  government  employees,  and  formulation  of
a  feo  schedule  for  outpatient  care.- 61  -
84  Sources of Prjiect Fi[ancl 1
14.  Project  funds  came  largely  from  IBRD/IDA  loans  and  government
contributions.  Very  little  reliance  was  placed  on fees  from  users  as  shown
below:
SOURCES  AVERAGE  RANGE  COHzES
(%  of Project  Cost)
IBRD/IDA  56.9  26-95  95% in  Burkina
Other  External  Loans  7.3  0.36  0 in  8 cases
Government  Budgetary
Contributions  34.6  5-74  74% in  China
User  Fees  & Other  1.2  0-13  0 in  10 cases
C.  THE  MAJOR  GAPS
15.  Considerable  research  has  been  done  in  the  Bank  with  regard  to
pricing  of  health  services. Of foremost  inportange  are  the  studies  by de
Ferranti;  Jimenez;  and  Birdsall  which  emphasized  a  methodology  for
selective  pricing  of  public  sector  health  services  and  identified  certain
complementary  measures  (e.g.,  risk-sharing  arrangements)  that  can  assist  in
institutionalizing  recoimended  pricing  reforms.
16.  While  efficiency  pricing sr&._-  is  generally  infeasible  in  health
because  of  the  problems  of  measuring  externalities;  as  in  the  education
sector,  there  are  important  X-efficiency,  fiscal,  and  even  distributional
benefits  to  be  obtained  through  a  systematic  analysis  of  marginal  costs  and
selective  application  of  user  fees. Examples  exist  in  the  private  health
sector  in  some  developing  countries  and  in  the  public  sector  in  China.  A
number  of the  projects  reviewed  contain  funds  for  costing  or  pricing
studies,  through  which  a good  empirical  basis  should  be gained. Recent
sector  work in  countries  such  as  Zambia,  Uganda  and  Zimbabwe  has focused  on
cost  recovery  issues. However,  our  SAR  review  shows  that  disaggregated
cost  analysis  is still  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule in  Bank  projects.
17.  A useful  next step  would  be to  conbine  the  results  of recent
research  with the  country  analyses  to  produce  a  practical  guideline  on  how
to categorize  marginal  costs  and  how  such  costs  compare  across  countries.
The  X-efficiency,  fiscal  and  distributional  consequences  of  various  levels
and  structures  of'  uer  charges  should  be explored  at  an empirical  level.
The  role  and  cost  of the  private  sector  in  providing  certain  kinds  of
services  should  be compared  across  countries. Finally,  ongoing  health  care
costing  studies  should  be closely  monitored  and  used to  produce  practical
recomendations  for  user  charges  that  can  be  incorporated  into  future  Bank
operations  in  those  countries.- 62 *
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ANNEX  5.  Review of Pricing  and  Cost  Recoverv  in  SARs:
HIGHWAYS  SECTOR
A.  THE  POLICY
A.1  Interoretation  of Efficiency  Pricing
1.  Efficiency  pricing  of  road  services  requirex  that  user  charges  are
set at  a level  that  would  reflect  the  opportunity  costs  of providing  the
service. 1 These  costs  consist  of the  variable  maintenance  costs  and
congestion  costs  (those  that  arise  when  an additional  vehicle  increases  the
costs  of travel  for  all  other  vehicles). A congestion  levy  is  appropriate
to apply  only  on those  roads  (and,  strictly  speaking,  during  those  hours)
when  congestion  exists;  it  would  be inefficient  to charge  a  price  higher
than the  variable  maintenance  costs  in the  absence  of  congestion  as  this
would  result  in  roads  being  underutilized.
A.2  Constrainta  to Implementing  Efficiency  Prices
2.  Maintenance  costs  vary  according  to types  of road (e.g.,  paved
versus  earth  or gravel  roads)  and  vehicle  weights;  thus  ideally  road  user
charges  should  adequately  reflect  the  differences  in  maintenance  costs  due
to these  factors. "Ideal"  prices  are,  however,  difficult  and  costly  to
administer  as they  would  require  information  on the  damage  caused  by
different  types  of vehicles  to  paved  and  unpaved  roads. In  addition,
studies  have shown  that  the  use  of tolls  or other  means  to directly  relate
road  use to  charges  is  rarely  cost-effective.  Thus,  in  practice  indirect
assessments  such  as fuel  taxes  are  often  used  even  though  these  do not
clearly  reflect  different  costs  imposed  by users. This  issue  is  often
handled  through  differing  tax  rates  on diesel  and  gasoline. Charging  for
traffic  congestion  is  generally  done  via differential  annual  license  duties,
purchase  taxes  and/or  import  duties  on  vehicles. These  levies  are
differentiated  according  to  categories  of  vehicles  which  are  used  almost
exclusively  in the  urban  areas;  for  example,  higher  license  fees  are  charged
to  vehicle  owners  living  in the  cities  than  to those  in  rural  areas. In a
study  conducted  by Churchill  in  Central  America,  it  was  concluded  that  the
fuel  tax  would  be the  appropriate  means  of approximating  the  variable
maintenance  costs  in  rural  areas  and  license  duties  would  be the  primary
means  of reflecting  the  congestion  costs  in  urban  areas.
A.3  Adjustments  to Efficiency  Prices
3.  Efficiency  pricing  as defined  above  can  gnsure  an optimum
consumption  of road  services  by users,  but  may fall  short  of attaining
fiscal  objectives.  Most  governments  in  LDCs have inadequate  fiscal
resources  for  development;  consequently,  it is  often  desirable  to  set  prices
above  efficiency  levels. Achieving  a  balanced  road  budget  is a  modest
1/  This  section  draws  largely  from  Road  User Char  a  in  Central  America  by
A. Churchill,  and  The  Economics  of  ad  Usr  Qarg2s by A  Walters- 64 -
fiscal  objective,  but one  that  would  necessitate  the  recovery  of  11a  costs
incurred  in  the  construction,  expansion  and  maintenance  of roads. Setting  a
price  for  road services  equal  to the  variable  maintenance  costs  and
congestion  costs  may  not  be compatible  with such  a  fiscal  objective. The
Bank  has  no guidelines  specific  to road  transport  which  define  the
appropriate  level  of cost  recovery  from  users. However,  fiscal  issues  have
been  accorded  much importance  in identifying  criteria  that  would  justify  a
departure  from  efficiency  pricing. Relatively  little  emphasis  seems  to  be
placed  on equity  issues  in setting  road  user fees.
B.  THE  PRACTICE
B.1  Project  SalRle
4.  This  review  is  based  ov a sample  of 22  projects. Our  sample
accounts  for  about  67 percent  of  the  total  number  of road  transport  projects
approved  by  the  Bank  during  tY84  and  FY85.
B.2  Discussion  of  Cost  Recoverv  Issues
5.  Although  efficiency  prices  are  rarely  explicitly  calculated  in  the
SARs,  current  pricing  practices  for  road  services  in the  sample  countries
are  adequately  discussed,  including  their  efficiency  and  fiscal
implications.  Annual  expenditures  on roads  and  revenues  collected  through
user  charges  are  summarized  below  by country  group:
COMMTY  TOA  XCDTRS  pINTERANE  maXPENITUZS TOTAL  REVENUE
AVZRAGZ  RAMSC  AVZRAOC  RANGE  AVZRAG  RANTGE
(in  USS  million)  ----- (As  Pareant  of  Total  Expenditure)-----
African  21.0  10-64  29.3  10-90  69.6  18-252
South  & East  Asian  384.2  15-714  24.0  3-70  75.0  16-163
ZMZUA  161.1  35-354  31.0  25-42  141.6  101-163
Latin  AmDricon  731.2  454-1,008  33.0  30-36  54.5  30-79
Whole  Sample  203.  -7  ral  AU65 -
6.  Total  road  expenditures  includs  all  costs  incurred  with  regard  to
investments  for  new  construction  or extension  of the  road  system,  periodic
maintenance  of existing  infrastructure,  and  routine  maintenance  operations.
Given  the  diverse  nature  of the  sample  countries,  total  annual  expenditures
on roads  varied  markedly  from  an average  of  US$21  million  in the  African
countries  reviewed  to as  high  as $731  million  in  the  Latin  American
countries. The  average  composition  of expenditures  nevertheless  is  very
similar  across  country  groups,  with  outlays  for  road  maintenance  accounting
for  no more than  one-third  of total  expenses. Cost  recovery  levels,  i.e.,
total  revenues  expressed  as a fraction  of total  road  expenditures,  ranged
from  an average  of about  55  percent  in  the  Latin  American  countries  to 142
percent  in the  EMENA  group. Thus  revenues  from  road  user  charges  greatly
exceeded  expenditures  on road  maintenance  in all  groups  on average. This
suggests  that  if traffic  congestion  is  generally  an insignificant  problem,
then  road  servic!es  on the  aggregate  are  overpriced.  Moreover,  net fiscal
contributions  of the  road  transport  sector  should  be significant  for  many
countries. Ovejr  the  sample,  cost  recovery  levels  varied  sharply  from  16 to
262  percent;  the  sample  man  was 83  percent. Poad  user  revenues  were  more
than  sufficient  to cover  both annual  construction  and  maintenance  costs  in
eight  countries.
7.  Road  revenues  are  categorized  into  fuel  taxes;  import  duties  on
vehicle,  spare  parts  and  tires;  vehicle  registration  and  licensing  fees;  and
other  (e.g.,  tolls,  border  transit  vehicle  tax,  and  road  transport  tax).
The  road  transport  tax  as defined  in the  case  of Brazil  is  a levy  on inter-
state  and inter-municipal  freight  and  passenger  movements;  the  border
transit  vehicle  tax  is  a system  component  unique  to  Burundi. Of the  various
types  of road  user charges,  fuel  taxes  and import  duties  on  vehicles  are  the
most important  sources  of road  user  revenues  as described  below:
USER  CHARGES  AVEM9E  RANGE  CONMENT
(As  Percent  of Total  Road  Revenues)
Fuel  taxes  58.7  16 - 93  -
Import  duties  on  28.9  0 - 75  0 in  4 cases
vehicles,  spare
parts,  etc.
Registration  and  10.4  0 - 44  0 in 1  case
licensing  fees
Other  2.0  0 - 15  0 in  8 cases
Thus  nearly  59 and  29  percent  of total  revenues  were  attributed  to
collections  via fuel  taxes  and  duties  on imported  vehicles,  respectively;
leaving  only  around  12 percent  of revenues  accountable  to  vehicle
registration,  licensing  fees  and  other  road-related  levies. These  estimates
are  based  only  on 14  cases,  with 8  countries  not reporting  a  breakdown  of
revenues  by type  of user  charges.
8.  Pricing  and  taxation  of fuel  was  reported  in  only  15  countries.
Retail  prices  of gasoline  and  diesel  oil  were  mostly  set  well  above  c.i.f.
prices. Exceptions  are  Ghana  where  fuel  prices  were  only  slightly  higher
than  c.i.f.  prices;  Sudan  and  Yemen  Arab  Republic  where  diesel  was locally- 66 -
priced  below  import  costs. Taxes  on fuels  varied  sharply  across  countries:
gasoline  taxes  ranged  from  2 to  56  percent  of its  retail  price,  and  averaged
33  percent  over  the  15  countries;  taxes  on diesel  oil  ranged  from  0 to 55
percent  of retail  price (zero  in  one  case),  and  averaged  22  percent.
Gasoline-diesel  tax  differentials  of 19  to 46  percent  are  found  in  4
countries;  0 to 2  percent  in  6 cases;  and  an average  of 7 percent  in the
rest  of the  sample.
9.  Three  important  points  can  be deduced  from  the  fuel  price  and  tax
data.  First,  fuel  taxes  expressed  as a proportion  of their  corresponding
retail  prices  varied  markedly  among  countries. Since  these  taxes  were  a
major  component  of road  user  revenues,  the  observed  differences  in tax  rates
should  account  in  part  for  the  diverse  cost  recovery  levels  seen  earlier
across  sample  cases. Second,  there  is  no doubt  that  in  those  countries  with
large  tax  differentials  (e.g.,  Korea,  Senegal,  Uganda  and  YAR),  gasoline
taxation  was  being  used  primarily  to generate  fiscal  resources. Third,  a
cross-subsidization  from  gasoline  to  diesei  users  was evident  in  several
countries  reviewed,  varying  only  in  degree  as suggested  by the  differences
in  the  gasoline-diesel  tax  margins.
10.  Most road  user  charge  systems  have  fallen  short  of the  objzctive  of
relating  levies  to the  costs  that  different  types  of vehicles  are  imposing
upon  the  road  network. Heavy  vehicles  in  particular  are  reportedly  not
taxed  appropriately  to  cover  the  eamage  they  inflict  on the  roads. Such  a
shortcoming  is  manifested  through  taxation  policies  on different  types  of
fuel,  import  duties  and licensing  fees,  and  regulations  concerning  vehicle
dimensions  and  axle-load  limits. Relatively  lower  taxation  of diesel  oil,
which  results  in  heavy  vehicles  making  insufficient  contributions  to the
costs  of developing  and  maintaining  roads,  was acknowledged  in  at least  half
of the  sample;  the  Yemen  Arab  Republic  is  the  worse  case in  point,  with  no
taxation  applied  to  diesel  fuel. Indonesia  is  another  extreme  case  wiith
heavy  vehicles  contributing  only  2  percent  to  road  costs  while  accounting
for  nearly  80  percent  of road  traffic. In 7  countries  heavy  vehicles  are
trceated  preferentially  via lower  charges  or exemptions  from  custom  duties  or
licensing  fees.
11.  The  axle-load  limit  is  one  form  of  road  transport  regulation
devised  to  control  road  damage  that  arises  through  overloading  of  vehicles.
Regulations  of this  nature  exist  in  most  of the  sample  countries;  however,
they  are  often  poorly  enforced. Axle-load  taxes  were  not found  in  any
sample  countries. Thus in instances  where  the  axle-load  limit  is  not
effectively  enforced,  the  lack  of an axle-load  tax  manifests  a
discrimination  in favor  of heavy  trucks  and  buses;  and  hence,  a
subsidization  of their  use  of road  services  by light  vehicles.
B.3  Use of Pricing  Covenants
12.  Of the  22  projects  reviewed,  13  have  some  form  of covenant  with
implications  for  pricing/cost  recovery. They include  agreemetnts  to increase
fuel  taxes  or maintain  the  domestic  prices  of fuel  at levels  appropriate  to
enhance  road  user  revenues  (found  in  2 cases);  to conduct  a road  user  study,
or  prepare  an action  plan for  revising  user  charges,  with the  objective  of
relating  charges  to the  costs  that  different  types  of  vehicles  are imposing
on the  road  network  (9);  to  cover  a specified  proportion  of annual- 67 -
maintenance  expenditures  (1);  and  to analyze  the  consequences  of
establishing  a toll  system  on a country-wide  basis (1). Other  agreements
include  measures  to ensure  an  effective  enforcement  of vehicle  dimensions
and  axle-load  limits  (6)  and  to  earmark  funds  for  road  maintenance
operations  (10).
13.  Earmarking  is a  major  issue  in the  roads  sector. Despite  user
charges  that  frequently  exceed  marginal  costs  (and  sometimes  total  financial
costs),  funds  in the  road  maintenance  budget  are  often  insufficient.  Fuel
tax  revenues  accrue  to the  general  government  budget  and  are  often  regarded
by officials  as an important  general  revenue  source  rather  than  as  a user
charge  from  the  transport  sector. The  link  between  consumer  willingness-to-
pay  and  the  investment  signal  is thus  lost. On the  other  hand,  where
earmarking  has  been  used it  has sometimes  led  to  overinvestuent,  lack  of
cost  control  and  misuse  of funds. A  review  of the  benefits  and  costs  of
earmarking  s  underway  in  TRP.
BA4  Sources  of  Project  FinancinG
14.  Project  financing  plans  are  shown  below:
SOURCE  AVERAGE  RANGE  COMMENTS
(As  % of Project  Costs)
IBRD/IDA  Loans  54.8  22 - 94
Other  External  Donors  10.2  0 - 44  0 in 11 cases
Government  Budgetary  35.0  6 - 72
Contributions
C.  THE HAJOR GAPS
15.  Efficiency  pricing  has  been  given  much  attention  in  the  roads
sector,  and  road  user  charges  in  nearly  all  sample  countries  exceed  road
maintenance  costs.  The  main  pricing  issues  concern  the  structure  and
incidence  of charges  (i.e  ,  the  need  to  better  relate  charges  to individual
costs  imposed)  and  their  fiscal.  and  X-efficiency  dimensions.
16.  On  the  fiscal  side,  it  would  be  conceptually  possible  to  separate
the  pure  tax  element  from  the  benefit  tax  element  in  fuel  taxes.  This  would
clarify  the  discussion  on  whether  the  transport  sector  is  being  "overtaxed."
However,  a  full  analysis  of  this  issue  would  require  a  comparison  of  the
administrative  as  well  as  deadweight  losses  itnvolved  in raising  a tax  dollar
from  transport  versus  other  types  of  taxes.  This  would  be  a  worthwhile
issue  to  address  in  several  country  case  studies.
17.  Earmarking  and  the  allocation  of  congestion  charges  (or  other  user
fees  in  excess  of  SRMCs)  have  important  supply-side  implications.  Improving
the  efficiency  of  maintenance  and  construction  activities  may  require  new
institutional  and  budgeting  arrangements  for  the  sector.  This  is  an  issue
on  which  work  has  already  begun  in  TRP;  its  results  should  prove  useful  to
other  sectors  as  well.68 -
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ANNEX  6.  Review  of  Pricing  and  Cost  Recovery  in  SARs:
HOUSING  SECTOR
A.  THE POLICY
1.  Urban  projects  typically  include  several  components:  land,
access  to  services  such  as  water  and  electricity,  finance  for  housing
construction  or  upgrading,  cosuunal  site  improvements  such  as  roads  and
drainage  and  the  house  (or  sanitary  core)  itself.  Pricing  and  cost
recovery  policies  for  power  and  water  are  discussed  in  separate  arnexes;
this  Annex  covers  only  the  housing-related  portion  of  urban  projects.
A.1  InteRretation  and  Calculation  of Efficiency  Prices
2.  Although  little  has  been  formally  written  about  the  efficiency
price  of  housing,  it  is  not  a  conceptually  difficult  issue.  For  a  given
plot  plus  improvements,  the  efficiency  price  would  be  the  sun  of  the
opportunity  value  of  the  land  and  the  economic  cost  of  the  improvements.
The  latter  can  generally  be  calculated  in  a  straightforward  way,  including
shadow  pricing  of  labor  and  foreign-purchased  materials  where  relevant.
The  value  of  land  will  be  more  difficult  to  assess  since,  in  a  free
market,  it  would  reflect  location  characteristics,  expected  capital  gains
and  the  general  demand/supply  balance  in  the  housing  market  (which  is  a
function  partly  of  past  investment  policies  and  population  growth/age
distribution).  It  will  usually  be  necessary  for  the  project  analyst  to
use  an  indirect  approach  to  land  valuation  by  working  from  actual  prices
paid  for  land  of  similar  locational  characteristics.
3.  Once the  economic  cost  of  the  land  plus  improvements  has  been
estimated,  the  next  step  is  to  determine  the  appropriate  interest  rate  and
other  loan  terms  to  use  in  calculating  the  corresponding  "economic"
monthly  payment.  Where there  is  an  efficiently  functioning  domestic
credit  market,  market-clearing  loan  terms  can  be  observed.  However,  in
many cases  it  will  be  necessary  to  make  an  independent  judgement  about  the
opportunity  cost  of  capital,  the  expected  inflation  rate  and  the  degree  of
risk  associated  with  the  borrower.
A.2 Constraints  to  Imolementing  Efficiency  Prices
4.  The  lack  of  an  efficient  credit  market  has  already  been  mentioned
as  one  of  the  constraints  to  implementing  efficiency  prices  in  the  housing
sector.  Property  markets  may  also  be  imperfect  where  the  tenure  situation
is  irregular  or  where  much land  is  publicly  owned.  In  these  circumstances
it  is  difficult  to  determine  the  efficiency  value  of  land  through
comparisons  with  similar  market  transactions.  The  other  major  constraint
is  the  difficulty  of  enforcing  sanctions  for  non-paymnt.  Eviction  is  the
obvious  sanction,  but  it  is  so  extrem  --  particularly  in  upgrading
projects  --  as  to  be  impractical  in  many cases.- 70
A.3  Adiustments  to  EfficiencX  Prices
5.  Income  distributional  objectives  loom  large  in the  housing
sector. Indeed,  in  many  cases,  the  project  justification  re3ts  on the
failure  of the  private  housing  market  to address  the  needs  of the  low
income  urban  population.  Thus  projects  are  clearly  targeted  to low  income
groups,  and  there  is  often  little  scope  for  cross-subsidy  within  the
project,  in contrast  to  water  or power  projects  which  serve  the  entire
consunity.
6.  A great  deal  of attention  has  been given  to  developing  service
standards  and  payment  arrangements  that  make  the  project  output  affordable
to the  target  population. There  has  been  considerable  research  into
housing  demand  by low  income  families,  and  affordability  assumptions
(initially  20-25S  of income)  have generally  been lowered. At the  same
time,  little  attention  has  been given  to the  rental  housing  market,
although  in  many  countries  the  poorest  households  are  more likely  to rent
than  to own.  Increasing  the  supply  of inexpensive  rental  units  may  be a
less  costly  way  of reaching  the  target  population  than  providing  large
land  and  interest  rate  subsidies. Empirical  research  in this  area  would
be  helpful.
7.  In addition  to distributional  objectives,  the  housing  sector  aims
at  project  ureplicabilityO.  This  term  has  been  used  to mean  both  economic
replicability --  in  the sense of recovering full economic costs --  and
financial  replicability  --  in the  usual  sense  of  cost  recovery. Generally
it seems  to  mean the  latter. As such  it  stems  from  the  fiscal  objective
of  minimizing  long-run  drains  on the  (usually  municipal)  budget. However,
the  concept  of financial  replicability  has limited  meaning  when land  is
provided  by government  and is  grossly  undervalued,  or when  subsidized
housing  finance  is  offered. If replicability  is to  remain  a  key  objective
of  housing  projects,  it  needs  to  be clearly  defined. If it is  meant  to  be
an economic  (rather  than  a  financial)  measure,  then  such  more  emphasis
will  be needed  on  calculating  economic  costs  per  plot  and  on the  division
of those  costs  between  land  and  improvements.  In the  past,  the  focus  on
replicability  for  the  project  as  a  whole  has tended  to  obscure  pricing
issues. A clear  mandate  for  economic  costing  would  lay  the  groundwork  for
proper  pricing,  as  well  as  enable  a  reexamination  of whether  full  economic
replicability  Is a  viable  objective  in  a  public  sector  such  as  housing
with limited  scope  for  intrasectoral  cross-subsidization.
B.  THE  PRACTICE
B.1  Project  SaDple
8.  Our sample  consisted  of seven  projects  (in  Djibouti,  Malawi,
Gambia,  Chile,  Mexico,  Madagascar,  and  India)  approved  by the  Bank  during
FY84 and  FY8S.  Six  of then  included  components  for  selling  serviced  plots
and  houses,  two  had components  for  selling  serviced  plots  without  houses
and five  included  upgrading  loans. Excluded  from  the  sample  was  a multi-
purpose  project  with  housing,  tourism  and  transportation  components.- 71 -
B.2  Calculatlon  and  Discussion  of Efficiency  Prices
9.  There  was  virtually  no discussion  of efficiency  prices  in the
SARs  reviewed  in this  sector. LAnd  was owned  by government  in  all  but one
case.  In  half  of the  government  owned  cases,  the  basis  for  calculating
the  sales  price  of the  land  was  not  specified. In the  other  three  cases,
it  was stated  to  be based  on market  values. Generally  no breakdown  of the
total  sales  price  was  provided  between  the  cost  of the  land  and  that  of
the  house  or improvements.  Cost  minimization  was often  discussed,  but
only in terms  of the  size  of plot  and  type  of improvements,  not in  land
values  due  to location.
10.  Economic  rates  of return  in six  of the  seven  cases  were  based  on
the  difference  between  project  infrastructure  costs  and the  incremental
rental  value  of the  land. This calculation  does  not take  into  account  the
economic  cost  of the  land  itself.
11.  Interest  charges  to  beneficiaries  ranged  from  8 to 15  percent.
Two  of the  projects  provided  no comparative  information  on the  cost  of
those  funds  or the  inflation  rate.  In four  other  cases,  such  information
seemed  to  be contradictory.  In  Malawi,  both  the  cost  of funds  and  the
inflation  rate  were said  to  be 10%,  while  the  onlending  rate  to
beneficiaries  was 13%.  Similarly  in  Madagascar,  the  cost  of funds  and
inflation  rate  were stated  to  be the  same  while  the  onlending  rate  was two
percentage  points  higher. In  the  Ganbia  the  cost  of funds  was  given  as 7%
while the  inflation  rate  was  8  and  fund were  onlent  at  9%.  In  Mexico,
the  cost  of funds  was given  as 52%,  the  average  inflation  rate  was 60%  and
the  onlending  rate  was 9 to 15%. An explicit  discussion  of the  interest
subsidy  incorporated  in  housing  projects  would  help  to clarify  the  real
costs  incurred.
B.3  Discussion  of  Adiustments  to Efficiency  Prices
12.  Although  the  discussion  is  not  couched  in terms  of adjustments  to
efficiency  prices,  SARs  contain  extensive  information  on the  income  levels
of target  beneficiaries  and  the  proportion  of their  incomes  expected  to  be
devoted  to  housing. Five  of the  seven  projects  reviewed  reported  the  per-
centile  of the income  distribution  curve  above  which  the  project  output
would  be affordable.  This  went  as low  as 7% in the  case  of  home
improvement  loans,  and  generally  fell  within  the  20-30%  range  for  site  and
service  components.  The fraction  of total  household  income  spent  on
housing  generally  ranged  from  10-30%.
13.  Such figures  appear  to  be treated  as targets  rather  than  as the
result  of  housing  demand  studies  in the  target  areas. Clearly  by raising
the  proportion  of income  assumed  to  be spent  on  housing,  the  qualifying
income  level  will fall. At the  same  time,  due  to-extreme  housing
shortages  in  many  of these  cities,  the  demand  for  low  cost  housing  far
exceeds  what the  project  is  able  to supply. Price  rationing  is  not  used
because  that  would  presumably  exclude  the  target  population. Instead
criteria  are  generally  developed  for  beneficiary  selection  and
restrictions  are introduced  on the  sale  of property  within  the  first  few
years  of  ownership. The  efficacy  of such  measures  in  restricting  project
benefits  to the  target  population  should  be explored  through  income
surveys  during  project  supervision.- 72 -
14.  Fiscal  objectives  in the  housing  sector  generally  relate  to  auni-
cipal  finances  rather  than  the  central  government  budget. As was  true  in
other  sectors,  insufficielt  attention  is  paid  to the  fiscal  impact  of
pricing  recommendations  in  housing.
B.4  Discussion  of Cost  Recovery  Issues
15.  Cost  recovery  has  been  a major  problem  in  the  housing  s6ctor  --
both in  setting  reasonable  targets  and  in  achieving  them. Four  of the
seven  projects  reviewed  calculated  an 'expected  cost  recovery  level".
This  was  not  precisely  defined  but  probably  reflects  the  ratio  of total
discounted  revenues  to total  discounted  project  costs. Cost  recovery
levels  averaged  30%  from  direct  payments  and  an additional  20%  from
indirect  channels  such  as increases  in  property  taxes. This  would  imply  a
total  financial  cost  recovery  of about  50%.
16.  An excellent  review  of cost  recovery  experience  in  projects  under
supervision  was  carried  out  several  years  ago  in the  East  Africa  region.
It found  that  about  one-third  of  householci  in sites  and  services  projects
were  not  paying  their  mortgages,  and  nearly  two-thirds  of  households  in
upgrading  projects  were  not  paying. It  attributed  this  poor  collection
rate  to a  number  of factors  including  the  lack  of political  commitment  to
the  principle  of cost  recovery  for  low  income  housing,  inadequate
legislation  for  transferring  titles  and  granting  tenure,  weak
administration  and  collection  infrastructure,  and  the  absence  of effective
sanctions. However,  collection  rates  were improving  in 'older'  projects,
and  it  was felt  that  many  of these  problems  could  be overcome  as lessons
were learned  and  transferred.
17.  The  financing  of  housing  projects  is  shown  in the  summary  table
below. Internal  cash  generation,  mainly  in  the  form  of  down  payments,
provided  an average  of 10%  of investment  costs,  external  loans  62%,
government  loans  9% and  government  equity  19%.
Average
Percent  Rane  Comments
Internal  cash  generation  10  0 - 40  0 in 4 cases
IBRD/IDA  57  14 - 93
Other  external  loans  5  0 - 36  0 in  6 cases
Government  loans  9  0 - 37  0 in  4 cases
Government  equity  19  3 - 46
TOTAL  100- 73 -
B.5  Use  of  Pricing  Covenants
18.  Some  form  of pricing  or  cost  recovery  covenant  was included  in
all  SARs  of the  sample. In three  cases  there  was  a requirement  to  set
prices  so  as to achieve  specific  cost  recovery  targets: 100%,  50%  and
100%  of "chargeable  coets'. In cwo  cases  a study  to determine  appropriate
levels  of  charges  was  to  be undertaken. In one  case  specific  percentage
increases  were  required  in existing  rental  rates  for  public  housing. In
one  case  decreases  in  the  government  subsidy  to the  sector  were  agreed,
with the  shortfall  to  be  met  by increased  beneficiary  charges. In  one
case  the  government  was required  to  assume  liability  for  any  funding
shortfall,  and in  another  project  revenues  were  earmarked  for  use in
preparing  follow-on  project  areas. Finally,  a floor  on interest  rates
charged  to  beneficiaries  was agreed  in  one  case.
19.  These  differences  in  approach  reflect  the  widely  differing
project  components  and  historical  policies  toward  cost  recovery  in the
public  housing  sector. However,  it is  significant  that  all are  aimd  at
financial  cost  recovery  rather  than  efficiency  price  considerations.
C.  THE  MUJOR  GAPS
20.  Efficiency  pricing  has  not  been a  major  point  of reference  in  the
housing  sector. While  there  are  sometimes  problems  associated  with deter-
mining  the  value  of  publicly  owned  land;  in  general,  the  calculation  of
the  efficiency  price  of a plot  and  its  improvements  should  not  present
major  difficulties.  It  would  be useful  to  carry  out  this  calculation  for
several  prototype  projects  as an example. Based  on those,  a  written
guideline  on the  practical  techniques  for  estimating  efficiency  prices
could  be prepared  for  staff  in  the  sector.
21.  A pricing  guideline  should  also  clarify  the  meaning  of replicabi-
lity  and  its  relation  to  efficiency  objectives  and  financial  targets. At
present  SARs  are  heavily  focussed  on cost  recovery  issues  for  the  project
as  a  whole. This tends  to  obscure  both  efficiency  and  distributional
objectives.  To address  the  former,  SARs  should  routinely  include  a
comparison  of  proposed  project  prices  and  mortgage  term with their  *ffi-
ciency  levels. In  addition,  disaggregated  efficiency  price  information
would  be useful  in  project  design;  e.g.,  in  examining  trade-offs  in  cost-
minimization  between  lower  standard  infrastructure  and  lower  valued  land.
With respect  to distributional  objectives,  the  efficacy  of existing
mechanisms  (e.g.,  selection  criteria,  restrictions  on land  sales)  should
be reviewed  during  supervision  missions. Additional  research  on low
income  housing  markets  may  be necessary  to  better  target  project  benefits
in  the  absen-e  of  price  rationing.- 74  -
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ANNEX  7.  Review  of Pricing  and  Cost  Recovery  in SARs:
IRRIGATION  SECTOR
A.  THE POLICY
A. 1  Interpretation  of  Efficiency  Pricing
1.  Irrigation  water  is  becoming  an  increasingly  scarce  resource,  and
thus  a  very  costly  input  for  improving  agricultural  production.  Thix
underlines  the  importance  of designing  the  level  and  structure  of  water
charges  in a  manner  that  would  ensure  an optimal  allocation  of irrigation
water  and  maximize  the  project's  net  benefit  to the  economy. CPN  2.10
defines  the  Bank  policies  and  guidelines  for  pricing  irrigation  services  in
accordance  with the  principles  of  economic  efficiency,  income  distribution
and  public  savings. 1 Efficiency  pricing  should  reflect  the  marginal  supply
cost relevant  to  a project;  however,  the  Note  acknowledges  that  its
applicability  may  be appropriate  only  among  pumping  schems  and  tubewells
wherein  the  volume  of  water  delivered  can  be assessed  fairly  accurately.
Where  volumetric  metering  of  consumption  is  not  feasible  or too  costly,  then
the  use  of a  benefit  tax  can  be a necessary  alternative  to strict  efficiency
pricing. Special  levies  on  beneficiaries  (e.g.,  crop  rates  and  land
betterment  taxes)  can  be used to  recoup  partly,  if  not  fully,  the  total
costs  incurred  in  providing  irrigation  services. Ideally,  such  levies
should  be designed  to  be discriminatory  in the  sense  of  placing  the  burden
of recovery  on project  beneficiaries,  and  to  be progressive  such  that
beneficiaries  with large  capacity  to  pay  would  pay  proportionately  more  than
others. Efficiency  considerations  can  then  be satisfied  by ensuring  that
benefit  taxes  are  structured  such  as  not to  discourage  farmers'
participation,  distort  their  production  decisions,  or encourage  wasteful  use
of irrigation  water.
2.  In  addition  to  volumetric  metering  of irrigation  water,  some
countries  have developed  a system  of  marketable  water  rights. These  are
efficiency  prices  in  the  sense  that  they  serve  to  allocate  the  right  of
access  to scarce  water  resources  based  on  willingness-to-pay.  They  are  a
type  of rationing  price  which  has  been  widely  used in  the  western  United
States. Their  applicability  to  developing  countries  should  be assessed.
The low  incomes  of irrigation  beneficiaries  would  not  necessarily  rule  out
their  use  because  water  rights  could  initially  be granted  with land  tenure.
A.2  Constraints  to Imclementing  Efficiency  Prices
3.  Historically,  irrigation  water  has seldom  been  metered. There  are
technical  constraints  to  metering  in  gravity  fed  or canal  irrigation  systems
that  make  volumetric  pricing  infeasible.  There  nay  also  be cases  where
metering  would  be technically  feasible  but  not  cost-effective  because,  for
1/  See  also  SWP  No. 218: A Policy  Framework  for  Irrigation  Water  Charges,
by Paul  Duane.- 76 -
because,  for  example,  many  small  farmers  are  being  served  whose  water  use is
individually  low.
4.  It is our  impression,  however,  that  in  many  cases  metering  has  been
assumed  to  be uneconomic  without  a  quantitative  analysis. There  are
numerous  examples  where,  with  hindsight,  metering  could  have improved  the
allocation  of  water  among  users  and  postponed  or  prevented  the  need  for
drainage  systems  caused  by overwatering.  In addition  to the  allocational
benefits  of  metering,  the  revenues  that  it  generates  would  directly
contribute  to the  provision  of  proper  maintenance. Irrigation  districts
have  not  been thought  of as public  utilities,  although  many  of the  same
pricing  principles  could  usefully  be applied.
A.3  Adjustments  to EfficiencX  Prices
S.  The  compatibility  of  efficiency  pricing  with income  distributional
and fiscal  objectives  is a  principal  issue  when  dealing  with irrigation
projects. The  lank's  traditional  policy  has  been that  to the  extent  that
beneficiaries  have incomes  below  the  "critical  consumption  level"  they
should  not  be charged,  even  for  benefits  received. This  has "eant  that  I-Any
irrigation  projects  fail  to cover  even  their  ongoing  operating  and
maintenance  costs.
6.  Unfortunately,  fiscal  objectives  have generally  been  given  less
attention  than  income  distributional  ones.  In  many  countries,  fiscal
resources  are so scarce  that  revenues  cannot  be assumed  to  be available  for
irrigation  from  other  sectors  where  beneficiary  incomes  are theoretically
higher. At the  same  time,  doubts  have  arisen  about  the  methods  for
measuring  beneficiary  income. It is  the  land  owners  who  benefit  most from
irrigation  projects,  while  many  of the  poorest  rural  inhabitants  are  tenant
farmers. For  ali  these  reasons,  views  are  changing  in favor  of  making  a
greater  effort  to  charge  efficiency  prices  for  irrigation  water.
B.  THE  PRACTICE
B.1  Project  SaaDle
7.  Fourteen  irrigation  projects  (in  nine  countries: Tunisia,
Mauritania,  Madagascar,  Indonesia,  Sri  Lanka,  Bangladesh,  Pakistan,  India
and  Niger)  were  selected  for  this  review. The sample  accounts  for  about  64
percent  of the  total  number  of irrigation  projects  (excluding  oulti-purpose
hydroelectric  and  irrigation  dams)  approved  by the  lank  during  FY84  and
FY85.
B.2  Calculation  and  Discussion  of Efficiency  Prices
8.  There  is  very littlo  discussion  of efficiency  prices  as such  in
irrigation  project  SARs. Generally  there  will  be a calculation  of average
operating  and  maintenance  (O&H)  costs,  which  in  many cases  will  represent
marginal  costs.
9.  Pricing  and  cost  recovery  instruments  used in the  projects  surveyed
are  adequately  discussed. For  recovering  O&M  costs,  these  include
volumetric  water  pricing  (found  in 2  cases),  land  tax (2),  and  crop,77
seasonal  and  other  types  of rates  per  hectare  irrigated  (7). An arrangement
whereby  the  beneficiaries  are  given  the  responsibility  to operate  and
maintain  their  respective  irrigation  schemes  is found  in  5 cases. Overall
management  is coordinated  through  village  cooperatives  or  water  user
associations,  and  members  are  required  to contribute  towards  the  needed
provision  for  O&M.  Contributions  typically  can  be in  cash,  kind (e.g.,
agreed  amount  of  paddy  per  ha),  and/or  labor. Instruments  for  recovering
capital  costs  included  land  betterment  levies  (5),  infrastructuro
improvement  tax (1),  land  ownership  transfer  tax  (1),  and  sales  tax  (3). An
arrangement  for  cooperatives  to  pay  only  for  the  costs  of  pumping  equipment
is  practiced  in two  cases.
10.  The  above-mentioned  policy  instruments  have  varying  potentials  for
influencing  water  use. Volumetric  water  pricing  and  crop  or seasonal  rates,
for  instance,  can  result  in  better  use  of irrigation  water  than  land  or
infrastructure  improvement  taxes,  and  even  sales  tax,  since  the  obligations
to pay  with respect  to the  latter  instrusents  are  linked  only  indirectly
with  water  supplies. Charges  based  on  crops  or seasons  can induce  an
efficient  water  use,  possibly  with  almost  the  same  potentials  as  volumetric
water  pricing,  if  rates  are  assessed  carefully  according  to  water
requirements  of crops  and  irrigation  systems  are  appropriately  designed  to
control  supplies  on the  basis  of these  requirements.  None  of the  cases
reviewed,  however,  claimeui  that  the  existing  policy  instruments  for  cost
recovery  actually  resulted  in  an efficient  allocation  of irrigation  water.
Even  in  Tunisia  and  West Bengal  (India),  where  volumetric  water  pricing  has
been  practiced,  it is  doubtful  that  an efficient  water  use is attained
considering  claims  that  rates  have  been set  too  low  and  that  irrigation
service  has  been  unreliable.  These  situations definitely  would  encourage
overwatering.  In several  cases,  particularly  those  where  charges  are  based
on  unit irrigated  area,  farmers  are  reportedly  encouraged  to take  more  water
than  needed  at the  sacrifice  of those  users  situated  far  from  the  water
source. Presumably  for  self-manag  d irrigation  schemes,  the  allocation  of
water  among  users  should  be within  some  acceptable  degree  insofar  as  group
cooperation  is required  for  its  own  survival.
11.  Even  though  an  efficient  use  of  water  is  not generally  achieved
under  current  cost  recovery  practices,  the  mere  pre;ence  of  water  charges
helps  reduce  the  conspicuous  waste  associated  with  conditions  wherein  water
is treated  as a free  good. This is  true  especially  in  those  cases  where
cost  recovery  policies  have  been  effective  in generating  revenues.
Meanwhile,  no indication  was  made in  the  SARs  if the  various  policy
instruments  have  distorted  farmers'  production  decisions  (e.g.,  input  mix  or
cropping  pattern  and intensity)  or discouraged  participation  in terms  of
deciding  not to irrigate  their  land. Given  claims  that  water  charges  are
acceptable  to  users  (e.g.,  in  Tamil  Nadu  and  Mauritania)  and  that
governments  aim to  provide  strong  incentives  among  farmers  to  utilize
irrigation  services  (e.g.,  in  West  Bengal  and  Tunisia),  it seems  there  is
good  reason  to  believe  otherwise  at least  with regard  to these  cases.
B.3  Discussion  of  Adiustments  to Efficiency  Prices
12.  The  main  adjustments  have  been taker.  on income  distributional
grounds. An index  of ability  to  pay  by beneficiaries  is reported  in  11- 78  -
cases,  based  on some  measures  of critical  consumption  level  (e.g.,  as a
fraction  of per  capita  GNP,  national  or rural  poverty  income  threshold)  and
on certain  charge  limits. Shown  below  is  a summary  of information  regar  ing
the  equity  considerations  in the  projects  reviewed.
NO.  OF CASES
INDEX  RANGE  REPORTING
% of project  beneficiaries  below  CCL  10-44%  3




Limits  on  water  charges  5-12%  of  1
gross  value  of
output/ha
Not  to  exceed  1
20%  of gross
farm  revenues
or 30%  of net
income
13.  The existing  benefit  taxes  appeared  to  be discriminatory  as far
as they  are  imposed  solely  on users. As a consequence  the  burden  of
recovery  is  borne  mainly  by  beneficiaries.  Furthermore,  policies  to
recover  costs  incurred  with  respect  to  public  irrigation  projects  have
been  based  on the  ability  of beneficiaries  to  pay  water  charges,  although
oftentimes  much  attention  is  paid  to the  low  capacity  to  pay  of the
majority  of users. Specifically,  it is  only in the  cases  of  Tunisia  and
Indonesia  where  the  cost  recovery  instruments  can  be considered
progressive--i.e.,  users  having  a large  capacity  to  pay  would  end  up
paying  proportionately  more than  those  with small  repayment  capacity.
Land taxes  in  these  cases  reportedly  vary according  to land  productivity
and size  of holding,  and  as such  are  likely  to  be quite  progressive.
Water  charges  per  hectare  irrigated  vary  by typo,  of  *rigation  schemes,
seasons  and  crops,  but they  are  basically  flat  rates  within  each  of these
categories,  and therefore,  are  distributionally  neutral. These  flat
rates  have  been set  at levels  related  to the  repayment  capacity  of those
farmers  realizing  the  lowest  irrigation  benefits. Land  betterment  levies
in India  as  well as the  infrastructure  improvement  tax  in  Madagascar  are
not  structurally  progressive.  Should  there  be significant  differences  in
the  size  of land  holdings  or incremental  incomes  due  to irrigation  among
beneficiaries,  then  the  current  cost  recovery  policies  in  most  of the
cases  reviewed  could  contribute  to inequities  in  the  distribution  of
income  among  households  with irrigated  farms  and  iimilar  cropping
patterns.- 79 -
B.4  Discussion  of Cost  Recovery  Issues
14.  As far  as cost  recovery  is  concerned,  it  appears  that  recovery
of operation  and  maintenance  costs  is  the  key issue  with respect  to
irrigation  projects. Governments  in  general  aim  to recover  full  O&M
costs  as embodied  in  irrigation  ordinances  which  formally  empower  the
government  to  levy  water  charges  on  users  or through  arrangement  toward
self-management  of irrigation  schemes  by user  groups. Lack  of adequate
revenues  from  the irrigation  subsector  imposes  a  heavy  burden  on fiscal
budgets  and  subsequently  results  in  poor  maintenance  of existing
irrigation  schemes. Full  recovery  of  O&M  costs  ii,  therefore,
rationalized  on the  grounds  of reducing  government  subsidies  and  ensuring
that  irrigation  schemes  are  properly  maintained. In contrast,  there  have
been  no stated  government  policies  which  would  achieve  full  capital  cost
recovery. In  this  regard  policies  are  formulated  to recoup  only  a
'reasonable,  share  of capital  costs,  and  only  if  feasible,  in  view of
sociopolitical  issues.
15.  Although  various  cost  recovery  instruments  exist  in  line  with
govertn  nts' objective  to recoup  fully  OM  costs,  our  review  shows  that
such  an objective  is  not  attained  in  all  cases. The  existing  cost
recovery  levels  in  project  areas  at the  time  when the tppraisal  reports
were  prepared  ranged  from  0  to  100  percent  of  O&M  costs.  Four  cases
apparently  had  100  percent  recovery,  another  four  reported  very
insignificant  collections  from  water  users,  and  three  cases  had levels
that  varied  from  40 to  60  percent. No estimates  were  cited  in three
cases,  but it  was  suggested  in the  appraisal  reports  that  cost  recovery
was at satisfactory  levels. Difficulty  of enforcing  irrigation
ordinances  for  collecting  water  charges  in  rural  areas  or lack  of an
effective  enforcement  mechanism  despite  the  presence  of suitable
legislation;  unreliability  of irrigation  service;  farmers'  reluctance  to
pay in  account  of  perceived  right  to free  irrigation  water;  and  equity
considerations  were  some  of the  factors  that  had  constrained  full
recovery  of  O&  costs. Meanwhile,  only  9 out  of 14  cases  reviewed  made
indications  of  cost  recovery  levels  as a fraction  of capital  costs.
These  levels  ranged  from  0 to 25  percent,  with a  mean  value  of about  5
percent. Thus,  cost  recovery  as  a proportion  of total  costs  amounted  to
only  between  0 aned  37  percent,  and  averaged  as low  as 7  percent.
B.5  Use of  Pricing/Cost  Recovery  Covenants
16.  In general,  projects  have covenants  that  are  aimed  to achieve
100  percent  O&  cost  recovery. The  only  exception  is the  West  Tarum
Canal  Improvement  Project  in  Indonesia  where  no covenants  exist  for
recovery  of O&M  costs;  however,  there  are  agreements  for  land
reclassification  and  reassessment  of the  IPEDA  levies  which  should
eventually  lead  to improvement  in  cost  recovery  levels. Agreements  were
also  reached  for  the  partial  recovery  of capital  costs  in  9  projects,
subject  to  beneficiaries'  ability  to  pay. The implementation  of the
foregoing  covenants  is  proposed  through  increases  in  water  charges  or
revision  of charge  structure  (fourd  in  9 cases),  elimination  of existing
subsidies  to  village  cooperatives  (1),  enforcement  of land  ownership
transfer  (1),  or internaliziiig  construction  and  O&M  costs  via
arrangements  for  self-management  of irrigation  schemes  by user  groups- 80  -
(3). In  view  of these  covenants,  as  well  as Bank  estimates  of the  value
of incremental  farm  outputs,  the  projects'  expected  cost  recovery  indicems
would  range  from  6 to 42 percent,  and  average  24  percent.
17.  Certain  provisions  were  also  incorporated  for  inducing  an
efficient  water  use,  but relatively  little  attention  was  paid  to
improving  the  distributional  attributes  of existing  policy  instruments  in
project  areas. These  provisions  includ,  the  formation  or revitalization
of  water  user  associations  in  order  to  promote  better  water  use  at the
farm  level  (found  in  6 cases),  introduction  of  rotational  water  supply
schedules  in  each irrigable  perimeter  and/or  modifications  of irrigation
structures  to facilitate  controlling  of supplies  (6),  and  experimentation
with a  volumetric  water  charge  systeom  (2). These  provisions  would  be
urqful  both in  monitoring  conxumpcion  among  users  who are  willing  to  pay
for  irrigation  services  and in  avoiding  unauthorized  irrigation.  Such
provisions  demonstrate  the  Bank's  concern  for  emphasizing  incentives
against  wasteful  use  of irrigation  water. In  contrast,  provisions  for
improving  the  progressivity  of  existing  cost  recovery  instruments  are
rather  rare;  found  only  with respect  to the  proposed  projects  in
Indonesia. There  may  be no urgent  need  to revise  the  distributional
properties  of  policy  instrumnts if  the  majority  of  beneficiaries  falls
within  a given  income  category. Lack  of  progressivity,  however,  may lead
to  an inequitable  distribution  of project  benefits  and  forego  the
potential  to tap  more revenues  from  the  minority  of  users  who  have  a
larger  capacity  to  pay for  irrigation  services.
B.6  Sources  of Proiect  Financing
18.  Project  financing  plans  are  shown  in  the  summary  table  below.
On average,  IBRD/IDA  loans  and  government  contributions  accounted  for  81
percent  of project  costs;  beneficiary  contributions  were extremely  low.
SOURCE  AVERAGE  RANGE  COMMENTS
(as  %  of Project  Costs)
IBRD/TDA  Loans  53.1  26 - 72
Other  Loans  18.2  0 - 56  0 in  6 cases
Government  Contributions  27.9  3 - 50
Beneficiary  Contributions  0.8  0 - 9  0 in  9 cases
C.  THE  MAJOR  GAPS
19.  Historically  it  has  been  felt  that  the  technical  obstacles  to
implementing  efficiency  prices  in the  irrigation  sector  gave it  little
practical  value. However,  problems  with  serious  overwatering  in  some
countries  and  with raising  the  funds  for  proper  maintenance  in  others
have led  to a reexamination  of the  metering/charging  question. As a
first  step,  additional  research  is  probably  needed  into  the  pricing
mechanisos  available  (i.e.,  metering,  transferable  water  rights,  etc.)
and  the  circumstances  under  which  each  will  be practical  and  cost-
effective. It  would  be useful  to review  experience  with  volumetric
charges  in  Bank-financed  irrigation  projects. This  would  follow  the
existing  suggestions  in  CPN  2.10  that  the  project  analyst  should
seriously  assess  the  possibility  of implementing  volumetric  pricing  via- 81  -
metering  of supplies  or investigate  alternative  charging  schemes  with the
potential  for  attaining  similar  efficiency  effects.
20.  The  Bank  has  adequate  written  guidelines  with regard  to the
pricing  of irrigation  services,  which  above  all,  define  the  desirable
properties  of a  benefit  tax. Most  of these  guidelines  have  been followed
quite  closely  in the  SARs,  with the  exception  of the  following:
- reflecting  progressivity  in  the  structure  of  benefit
taxes  (e.g.,  in  the  cases  of Sri  Lanka  and  India  where
only  about  10  to 40%  of  project  beneficiaries  fall
below  the  poverty  income  level);  and
- relatively  little  emphasis  is  placed  on the  fiscal
outcome,  vis-a-vis  equity  aspect,  of  projects  (e.g.,
fiscal  impacts  are  discussed  only in  4 out  of 14
projects).
21.  There  has  been a tendency  to  consider  irrigation  (and  fertilizer,
as  discussed  in  Annex  3)  primarily  as  inputs  to the  agriculture  sector  and,
therefore,  to  view their  prices  as  part  of the  overall  system  of
agricultural  input  and faragate  prices. Where  faragate  prices  are  held
down  as  a  matter  of  public  policy,  this  may  be a  necessary  frame  of
reference. However,  the  general  approach  to irrigation  pricing  should  be
based  on the  supply  and  demand  for  irrigation  water. Once  efficiency
prices  have  been determined  on that  basis,  they  can  be adjusted  for  second
best  or other  reasons.
22.  The  rationale  for  adjustments  on  distributional  grounds  should  be
more  carefully  assessed. Irrigation  projects  have  high  economic  rates  of
return,  much  of  which  is reaped  by the  beneficiaries.  Further,  the
incidence  of charges  between  tenant  farmers  and  land  owners  will  often
mitigate  the  effect  on the  lowest  income  beneficiaries. Irrigation
districts  are  often  populated  by a  mix  of income  levels,  and  water  usage
will generally  correlate  with farm  size. For  all  of these  reasons,  the
feasibility  of efficiency  pricing  in  irrigation  projects  merits  renewed
consideration.- 82 -
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ANNEX  8. Review of  Pricing  and  Cost  Recovery  in  SARs:
OIL AND  GAS  SECTOR
A. THE POLICY
A.1 Inter2retation  and  Calculation  of  EfficiencX  Prices
1.  In  the  oil  and  gas  aector,  the  definition  of  efficiency  prices  is
generally  straightforward.  For  oil  and  refined  petroleum  products,  the
efficiency  price  is  the  border  price  plus  internal  distribution  and  market-
ing  costs.  Where oil  is  not  directly  imported  (exported),  the  border  priee
is  generally  the  FOB  price  of  the  crude  or  products  at  the  nearest  vorld
export  center  (e.g.,  Rotterdam,  Persian  Gulf,  Singapore)  plus  (minus)  the
freight  costs  to  (from)  the  domestic  port.
2.  For  natural  gas  the  definition  of  the  efficiency  price  depends  on
the  domestic  demand  and  supply  relationships  over  time. As  sot  out  in  EGY
Paper  24,  the  economic  price  of  gas  is  composed of  its  LRC and  a  depletion
premium,  which  reflects  the  cost  of  future  consumption  foregone  by  using
the  resource  today.  Where supplies  far  exceed  demand,  this  depletion
premium will  be  small  so  that  the  economic  price  will  be  roughly  equal  to
the  LRNC. Where supplies  are  scarce  relative  to  domestic  demand,  gas  may
already  be  replacing  a  tradable  energy  product  (such  as  fuel  oil)  at  the
margin  so  that  the  depletion  premium  is  equal  to  the  full  difference
between  the  LRC  of  gas  and  the  border  price  of  the  fuel  replaced.  In  the
"surplus  window"  cases,  where  supplies  today  are  larger  than  demnd  but  the
point  of  fuel  imports  at  the  margin  to  replace  gas  is  within  the  next
decade  or  two,  then  the  depletion  premium must  be  approximated.
3.  The main  definitional  issue  in  this  sector  is  the  method  of
calculating  the  depletion  premium for  the  *surplus  window" case.  Because
of  the  movement up  the  demnd  curve  as  exhaustion  approaches  and  the
depletion  premium and  economic  price  rise,  it  is  theoretically
inappropriate  to  base  the  depletion  preuium  estimate  on  supply  side
information  only.  However,  estimating  demand elasticities  (both  price  and
income  are  needed)  is  notoriously  difficult.  Given  the  lumpy nature  of  gas
demand in  most  developing  countries,  such  econometric  estimation  is
probably  also  inappropriate.
4.  The method  su"gested  in  EGY  Paper  24  is  a  sector-by-sector
analysis  of  the  demand function  for  gas  and  then  an  aggregation  of  sector-
specific  results  at  the  various  alternative  price  levels.  Gas use  is
generally  concentrated  in  three  or  four  sectors,  and  replaces  different
fuels  and  feedstocks  in  each,  so  the  result  is  an  aggregation  of  stepped
demand functions.  This  aggregate  demand information  can  be  used  in  con-
junction  with  supply  projections  (both  production  and  reserves)  to
determine  the  date  of  economic  depletion.  The depletion  premium can  then
be  easily  calculated,  and  the  whole  procedure  cross-checked  to  ensure  that
the  resulting  economic  price  path  for  gas  is  consistent  with  the  demand and
supply  paths  from  which  it  was derived.- 84 -
5.  Other  definitional  issues  in the  oil  and  gas  sector  include  the
joint  costs  arising  from  exploration  and  production  activities  comon  to
both  sub-sectors. Capital  indivisibilities  are  handled  by using  the
Average  Incremental  Cost  formula  for  approximating  LRMC. A start  has  been
made  on designing  tariff  structures  for  natural  gas  that  follow  the
structure  of LRMCs  but  such  more  work is  needed  to implement  this  approach
in the  developing  countries. The  shadow  pricing  of foreign  exchange  is
sometimes  an issue  in  making  recoe_ndations  about  the  appropriate  level  of
domestic  petroleum  product  prices.
A.2  Constraints  to Implementing  Efficiency  Prices
6.  Implementation  constraints  are  not a  maj9r  issue  in the  sector.
Oil  products  are  always  'metered'  and  charged  on  a  unit  basis.  Sonetimes
the  cost-effectiveness  of  natural  gas  metering  for  residential  consumers  is
a  question,  and  studies  have  been carried  out to  assess  this. The  conclu-
sion  has generally  been that  metering  is  justified  even  for  small  users.
7.  Until  recently  second  best  considerations  often  limited  the  price
that  could  be  charged  for  natural  gas  and sometimes  kerosene  or diesel.
Because  substitution  between  fuels  is  easy  and inexpensive,  the  existence
of subsidies  for  one  or two  fuels  often  makes  it  necessary  to subsidize
other  fuels  to avoid  uneconomic  substitution.  Since  the  1979  oil  price
increases,  however,  most  countries  have  raised  their  domestic  energy  prices
at  least  to  the  level  of  world  parity  and  often  far  above.  Thus  only  in  a
small  number  of  oil  exporting  countries  are  second  best  concerns  still  a
major  constraint  to the  economic  pricing  of oil  and  gas.
A.3  Adiustment  o  Effic4encX  Prices
S.  If  one  compares  efficiency  prices  of oil  and  gas  with  actual
prices,  one  would  probably  conclude  that  the  large  discrepancies  are  due  to
fiscal  objectives  in.  the  case  of oil  products  and  to financial  objectives
in the  case  of natural  gas.  Energy  products  in  general,  and  gasoline  in
particular,  have long  been  favored  objects  of taxation. Demand  is  re-
latively  price  inelastic  and  consumption  is  correlated  with income. Even
where  prices  are  close  to  border  levels,  there  is  generally  a large  wedge
between  domestic  production  costs  and  world  prices. It is  natural  that
much  of this  uresource  rent"  should  be captured  by governments  rather  than
left  in  the  sector.
9.  In  many countries  the  above  arguments  are  equally  valid  for
natural  ga.  However,  it is  unusual  for  fiscal  objectives  to  play  much  of
a role  in setting  gas  prices. Perhaps  because  gas  has traditionally  been
viewed  as a  public  utility,  its  price  is often  based  on financial  grounds.
This often  leads  to  prices  being  below  economic  costs  because  the  depletion
premium  is ignored.
10.  Distributional  objectives  sometimes  influence  the  price  of
kerosene,  the  main  fuel  in the  sector  that  is  used  by the  poor.  Because  of
its  close  substitutability  with  diesel,  the  efficiency  costs  of  kerosene
subsidies  are  often  high,  and  the  Bank  has generally  argued  against  them.-8S  -
B.  THE  PRACTICE
B.1  Prolect  Samnie
11.  Our  sample  consisted  of 10  projects:  six  oil (in  Yugoslavia,
Hungary,  Colombia,  India,  China  and  Benin),  two  natural  gas (Argentina  and
Bangladesh),  one  with  both  oil and  gas (Pakistan),  and  one  a  refinery
restructuring  (Thailand).  Coverage  of pricing  issues  was good,  with  all  10
SARs  providing  details  of retail  and  border  prices  of petroleum  products,
and  eight  discussing  natural  gas  prices. Six  SARs  included  an analysis  of
producer  pricing  arrangements  and  contracts. The sample  accounted  for  91
percent  of the  oil  and  gas  projects  approved  by the  Bank  during  FY84  and
FY85.  Excluded  from  these  figures  are 13  technical  assistance  and  explora-
tion  promotion  projects  for  which  pricing  issues  are  less  relevant  and  SARs
are  not  prepared.
5.2  Calculation  and  Discussion  of Efficiency  Prices
12.  With respect  to oil  products,  comparisons  were  routinely  made
between  domestic  and  border  prices. Over  the  project  sample,  the
consumption-weighted  average  domestic  price  was  $285/ton  while  the  average
border  price  was  $237/ton. Retail  prices  as  a percent  of  border  prices
ranged  from  91 to  174,  with  an average  across  the  ten  countries  of 111.
The relationship  by petroleum  product  is shown  below.
Retail  Price  as
a  of Border  Price  Ran
Gasoline  165  106-351
Diesel  103  92-163
Kerosene  81  62-127
Fuel  Oil  82  43-141
13.  For  natural  gas,  eight  of the  projects  reported  on the
relationship  between  actual  prices  and  efficiency  prices. The former
ranged  fron  $0.79  to  $3.04/WCF  with  an average  of $1.43/MCF.  Average
efficiency  prices  were  nearly  90%  higher,  ranging  from  $1.15  to $4.59/MCF,
with an average  of $2.70/MCF. In five  of the  eight  cases,  the  efficiency
price  of gas  was  defined  in  terms  of its  fuel  oil  substitute  at the  margin.
In two  other  cases  (Bangladesh  and  Colombia)  it  was the  LRKC  plus  depletion
premium. In the  final  case (Yugoslavia)  there  is  a border  price  since  gas
is imported  at the  margin. Domestic  prices  of  natural  gas  ranged  from  38%
to 70%  of efficiency  prices  in these  sample  countries. Clearly  there  is
scope  for  price  increases  on efficiency  grounds.
14.  Questions  of  price  structure  were  dealt  with in the  oil  sector,
but not  generally  in  gas. Most reports  comented on the  differential
taxation  of competing  oil  products  (such  as gasoline  and  diesel)  where  this
was  perceived  to  be a  problem,  and  the  differential  subsidization  of
kerosene  and  diesel.- 86 -
15.  Existing  price  structure  for  natural  gas  bear  little  relationship
to the  structure  of gas  costs. None  of the  projects  surveyed  used  peak
pricing  or time  of  day  or seasonal  differentials.  Six  of the  cases
reported  price  differentiation  by consumer  category,  but  there  was  no
uniformity  across  countries..  For  example,  the  power  sector  receives  gas
for  less  than  its  average  price  in  four  of the  countries,  and  more than  the
average  price  in the  other  two. Feedstock  uses  are  charged  below  average
tariffs  in two  cases  and  above  average  tariffs  in four. Residential  gas
distribution,  which  is the  most  costly,  is  charged  above  average  prices  in
three  countries  and  below  average  in  two. More  attention  should  be paid  to
price  structure  in  the  natural  gas  sector.
B.3  Discussion  of  Adiustments  to Efficiency  Price&
16.  SARS  in the  oil  and  gas  sector  contain  adequate  discussions  of
financial  and  distributional  adjustments  to  efficiency  prices,  but
generally  pay insufficient  attention  to the  fiscal  dimension. Tax  policies
are  usually  noted,  but little  discussion  or  analysis  of them  is  provided.
The exception  to  this  general  statement  is in the  energy  pricing  studies
that  have  been financed  under  several  projects  in  the  sector. Terms  of
reference  for  those  studies  invariably  include  an analysis  of the  fiscal
impact  of the  se.tor,  and  several  of the  studies  have  produced  useful
recomendations  in  this  area. An Energy  Paper  sumarizing the  results  of
those  studies  is  under  production.
17.  Another  area  that  deserves  more  attention  is  the  transfer  price
policy  and  tax  treatment  of  publicly  owned  oil,  gas  and  refinery  companies.
Significant  anomalies  exist  in the  way that  domestic  crude  prices  are  set
both for (government)  prcducer  companies  and  as an input  into  domestic
refineries.  Ex-refinery  prices  of ;etroleum  products  are  seriously  cut  of
line  with  efficiency  prices  in  many iountries.  While  these  "intermediate
prices'  will  have little  effect  on final  consumption  patterns,  they  play  a
major  role in  promoting  or  hindering  the  internal  efficiency  and  financial
viability  of public  enterprises.  A confusion  between  these  objectives,  on
the  one  hand,  and  the  government's  legitimate  desire  to generate  a fiscal
surplus  from  the  sector,  on the  other,  can  lead  to  a transfer  pricing
mechanism  that  frustrates  all  three  objectives.
B.4  Discussion  of Cnt  JRecovery  Issues
18.  Cost  recovery  is  generally  high  in the  oil  and  gas  sector. It is
sometimes  difficult  to  apply  the  Bank's  usual  financial  covenants  to the
enterprises  because  of the  intricate  tax  and  financing  relationships  some
have  with government.  Of the  10  proects reviewed,  only  one specified  a
rate  of return  on revalued  net fixed  assets,  while  another  asked  for  a
"reasonable"  return  on capital  employed. Internal  cash  generation
covenants  were  used in  four  cases  and  ranged  from  26%  to 80%  with  one  case
unspecified.  Debt  service  covenants  were applied  in  two  cases. One
project  imposed  a 90%  ceiling  on the  operating  ratio,  and  one  asked  for  a
15%  discounted  cash flow  return  after  taxer. Two  projects  (China  and
Benin)  did  not  contain  financial  covenants;  in  China's  case  because  the
company  is  not  operated  on a typical  commercial  basis  so the  normal
financial  covenants  would  be of limited  real  significance.- 87  -
19.  To the  extent  that  the  Bank  project  is  representative  of the
sector  as a  whole,  it is  instructive  to examine  the  project  financing  plan.
The  table  below  summarizes  the  average  percent  accounted  for  by each  source
of funds  for  the  10  projects  of our  sample.
Average
Percent  BAnu  Comments
Internal  cash  generation  32  0 - 70  0  in  4 cases;  53%  ave.
in  other  6 cases
IBRD/IDA  30  13 - 59
Other  external  loans  23  0  - 50  0 in 1  case (Hungary)
Government  loans  4  0 - 43  0 in  9 cases;  43%  in
Hungary
Government  equity  7  0 - 35  0 in 6  cases;  17%  ave.
in  other  4 cases
Other  4  0 - 40  0 in 9  cases;  40%  from
private  operators  in 1
TOTAL  100
20.  Beyond  the  financial  health  of the  eniterprise,  it  would  be
useful  to  know the  net contribution  that  sector  revenues  make to the
government  budget. This is generally  significant  in the  oil  producing
countries,  but  such  information  is  rarely  included  in SARs. Most  of the
pricing  studies  financed  under  project  loans  provide  such  figures.
B.5  Use  of Pricing  Covenants
21.  Eight  of the  ton  projects  included  at least  one  pricing
covenant. In  many cases  these  required  specific  changes  in  the  level  or
structure  of  prices,  sometimes  following  from  the  recommendations  of
pricing  studies  carried  out  under  earlier  loans. With  respect  to oil
prices,  four  projects  contained  producer  pricing  covenants  and  two  dealt
with  consumor  prices. In  Pakistan,  producer  prices  were  linked  with
border  prices. In  China  a costing  study  was to  be carried  out  to  provide
better  management  information  and  improve  operating  performance. In
India  and  Thailand  a  cost-plus  formula  was  agreed  for  producer  prices  of
crude  oil (India)  and  ex-refinery  product  prices  (Thailand).  Consumer
prices  were the  subject  of covenants  in  Hungary  and  Argentina. In
Hungary  the  general  principle  of linking  domestic  prices  to  border  prices
was reaffirmed,  while  in  Argentina  specific  increases  in the  prices  of
diesel  and  fuel  oil  were agreed  to  meet  relative  price  targets  in terms
of gasoline  prices. It is inappropriate  to  judge  these  recommendations
out  of context,  but  at least  in this  sample  efficiency  objectives  were
more often  sacrificed  at the  producer  price  level  than  at the  consumer
price  level.- 88 -
22.  Six  of the  projects  contained  covenants  relating  to  natural  gas
prices. In Hungary  and  China  gas  utilization  studies  were  to  be carried  out
to look  at many issues  including  prices. In India  the  producer  price  of gas
was to  be reviewed  to ensure  that  financial  targets  were  met. A specific
price  increase  was  mandated  for  Pakistan  producer  prices  of associated  gas.
In  Yugoslavia  domestic  gas  prices  would  be increased  in two  steps  to equal
import  parity,  and  in Bangladesh  both specific  percentage  increases  in
average  gas  prices  and  a commitment  to  base  the  future  price  structure  on
LRMC  were  agreed. With the  exception  of the  India  covenant,  all  of these
are  based  on efficiency  price  considerations.
C.  TME  HAJOR  GAPS
23.  Efficiency  pricing  is  clearly  relevant  to the  oil  and  gas  sector
and is  the  subject  of  much  attention  both in  EGY  publications  and  in the
SARs. Definitional  issues  have  been identified  in  research  papers  and
specific  procedures  developed  to deal  with  them. The  research  has  been
applied  in case  studies  both for  natural  gas (Pakistan  and  Bangladesh  on
LRMC  estimation  and tariff  structure  design)  and  for  petroleum  products  (at
least  six  studies  firanced  under  Bank loans  and  closely  monitored  by EGY
policy  staff). While  some  of this  work  has  been  disseminated  through  the
Departmental  Energy  Paper  series,  written  guidelines  are  not  yet available
on either  gas  or petroleum  product  pricing.
24.  On the  basis  of our  sample,  the  areas  that  such  guidelines  should
cover  include,  for  natural  gas:
- the  rationale  for  and  calculation  of the  depletion  premium;
- the  calculation  of the  LRMC for  exploration,  production,  storage,
transmission  and  distribution;
- appropriate  fiscal  objectives  for  the  sector;  and
*  the  design  of tariff  structures  taking  into  account  LRMCs, fiscal
objectives  and  the  depletion  premium.
For  petroleum  products  the  pricing  issues  that  are  still  causing  problems
are:
- appropriate  fiscal  objectives  and  tax  mechanisms;  and
- the  basis  for  setting  transfer  prices  (producer  and  ex-refinery).
25.  Overall,  this  sector  has  come  a long  way toward  developing  a consis-
tent  and  widely  followed  approach  to  pricing  issues. It  hap  made  excellent
use  of pricing  studies  financed  under  its  projects,  and  it xecoumends
specific  price  changes  through  project  covenants  more  often  than  most
sectors. In the  borrowing  countries,  more  work  remains  to  be done  on the
gas  side,  both in raising  tariff  levels  toward  efficiency  levels  and in
refining  tariff  structures  to  reflect  LRMCs. In oil  most countries  already
use the  sector  to raise  revenue,  but  more  attention  needs  to  be paid  to the
methods  by which  that  revenue  is  raised  (e.g.,  taxes  or distorted  transfer
prices)  as  well as to the  appropriate  level  of taxation,  given  the  avail-
ability  (or  lack)  of other  fiscal  inst.ruments.- 89  -
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ANNEX  9:  Review  of  Pricing  and  Cost  Recovery  in  SARs:
PORTS  SECT
A.  THE  POLICY
A.1  IntertXatation of Efficiency Pricing 1
1.  Efficiency  pricing  in  the  port sector  is interpreted  as  basing
charges  on shortrun  marginal  cost (SRMC). In a situation  where  the  port is
overbuilt  (thus,  LRMC is greater  than  SRMC),  setting  a price  equal  to  LRMC
would  result  in further  underutilization  of facilities;  when demand  turns
out  to  be much larger  than  anticipated  and  services  cannot  be readily
adjusted  to the  level  of traffic  (hence,  LRNC  is lower  than  SRMC),  pricing
according  to  LRC  would  lead  to inefficient  congestion.  Only  if  port
charges  are  too  costly  or administratively  difficult  to  change  in  view  of
random  variations  in  demand  then  a  longer-run  concept  of cost (e.g.,  a
weighted  average  of the  various  SRiC*)  becomes  the  proper  criterion  to  use
in  pricing  services.
A.2  Adiustments  to  Efficiency  Prices
2.  The  design  of port  charges  can  entail  a  host  of complex  issues,  and
costs  may  provide  only  a floor  on  which  a tariff  system  shodl be
established.  Departures  from  strict  marginal  cost  pricing  can  be
anticipated  on account  of  various  objectives:  financial  viability  of the
public  enterprise,  fiscal  considerations,  and  distributional/social  criteria
(e.g.,  to  use  port  charges  as a means  for  promoting  exports  or  keeping  the
domestic  prices  of essential  commodities  low).
3.  Financial  objectives  often  conflict  with  SRMC  pricing. Port
facilities  cannot  be constructed  continuously.  After  any  large  investment,
or  where  spare  capacity  otherwise  exists,  tariffs  based  on SRKC  would  bo
inadequate  to cover  capital  costs. Even  if facilities  could  be expanded
continuously,  economies  of scale  in  ports  are likely,  and  thus  marginal  cost
pricing  would  result  in financial  deficits. To remedy  this  it  has  been
suggested  that  port  charges  should  include  two  parts: a) a fixed  charge  to
pay  for  the fixed  costs  of the  facilities  and  hence  cover  deficits,  and  b) a
variable  charge  based  on the  marginal  costs  of supplying  services. The
requirement  to recover  costs  would  then  serve  as an incentive  on the  port
authority  to keep its  expenditures  and  expansion  plans  under  efficient
control.
4.  A different  sort  of  problem  arises  in  many  LDCs  where  the  high
demand  for  limited  port  services  causes  congestion.  The  existence  of
congestion  indicates  that  port  services  are  a scarce  resource  whose  marginal
value  exceeds  its  marginal  cost to  users. Congestion  pricing  can  generate
funds  to  expand  services  and  encourage  an efficient  use  of the  port
facilities  as  higher  charges  will  divert  traffic  to  other  ports.
1/  This section  draws  largely  from  Port  Pricing  and  Investment  Policy  for
Developing  Countries  by E.  Bennathan  and  A.A.  Walters.91  -
(Congestion  pricing  must  be  monitored,  however,  to ensure  that  monopoly
rents  are  returned  to government  rather  than  absorbed  through  inflated
sectoral  costs.) In  practice,  tariffs  in  a  congested  port  are  usually  kept
low  due to  government  regulation  or the  belief  that  a  rise in  port charges
would  distort  the  domestic  prices  for  traded  goods  at the  expense  of local
traders  and  consumers. Bennathan  and  Walters  argue  that  even in  the  absence
of congestion  pricing  shipowners  would  be quick  to adjust  freight  rates
according  to queuing  costs;  thus  making  domestic  producers  and  consumers  pay
for  the  real  cost  of congestion.
5.  Finally,  efficiency  pricing  is  complicated  by distributional
issues. The  port  authority  often  has  monopoly  power  and thereby  the  choice
of setting  prices  above  SRMC. If the  participants  in the  market  were  mainly
nationals,  then  the  standard  fiscal  methods  for  regulating  the  distribution
of monopolistic  surpluses  within  an economy  could  be applied. But  ports  are
usually  confi%nted  with organized  and  largely  foreign-owned  shipping  cartels
as  buyers  of services. Thus  regulations  may  necossitate  the  use  of
differential  pricing  to control  the  distribution  of costs  and  benefits
between  nationals  and  foreignerr.  For  example,  it is  not  unusual  for  ports
to  vary charges  by classes  of  vessels,  categories  of customers,  or type  of
comodities to achieve  such  a goal. The  degree  to  which  such  price
discrimination  is effective  is  influenced  by several  factors,  of  which  the
most important  are  the  elasticities  of demand  and  the  presence  of
alternative  competitors.  Even  with  price  discrimination,  it is difficult  to
assess  to  what extent  variations  in  port  charges  are  passed  on to the
residents  of the  country  or absorbed  by the  shipping  companies  or foreign
traders.
B.  THE  PRACTICE
B.1  Project  Samile
6.  Our  sample  covers  all  the  8  port  projects  approved  by the  Bank
durit.g  FY84  and  FY85. The  sample  countries  include  Mexico,  Egypt,  Portugal,
Turkey,  Tanzania,  Indonesia,  India  and  Senegal.
B.2  Discussion  of  Cost  Recoverv  Issues
7.  Efficiency  pricing  is  not  directly  addressed  in the  SARs.  Marginsl
cost  estimates  for  supplying  port  services  are  not  reported  in  any  of the
cases  reviewed  and information  on pricing  policies  is scanty. The  limited
data so far  show  that  tariffs  often  include  port  dues  and  mooring  fees
levied  on vessels,  wharfage  or  cargo-handling  fees,  and  storage  charges. In
some  cases  there  are  concession  levies  payable  by cuztomers  operating  their
own  wharves,  and  charges  for  renting  out  equipment  or land  belonging  to the
port  authority. Different  sets  of prices  are  applied  to  various  classes  of
goods  in  Portugal,  types  of cargoes  (e.g.,  containerized  and  bulk)  in  India,
and types  of shipping  companies  (e.g.,  domestic  versus  foreign  flag  liners)
in Indonesia. No similar  data  are  reported  for  the  other  sample  countries,
and tariffs  for  individual  -oervices  are  made  available  only  in 3  cases.
8.  Where  reported,  even  in the  aggregate,  existing  tariffs  do  not
adequately  reflect  costs  of service. The financial  performance  of port92 -
authorities  in  Portugal,  Indonesia  and  Senegal  has  been  deteriorating  due  to
inadequa-s  tariff  levels  in  relation  to  operating  costs,  or to tariffs  that
have remained  unchanged  for  several  years  despite  continuous  cost  increases
brought  about  by inflation. Inadequate  recovery  of costs,  especially  with
respect  to infrastructure  investments,  via  user  charges  is  acknowledged  as
the  key issue  confronting  the  water  transport  authority  in  Mexico. In Egypt
and  Tanzasia,  overall  port  earnings  have  been  sufficient  to  cover  operating
costs  and  generate  a satisfactory  return  on assets;  however,  tariffs  for
individual  services  do not  correspond  closely  with  costs. By contrast,  port
services  in India  are  priced  in  accordance  with  a tariff  review  undertaken
as recent  as  1983,  and  as such,  may imply  that  existing  tariffs  reflect
costs  to some  reasonable  degree. A cost-based  tariff  structure  is  also
reported  for  Turkey. Of the  sample  countries  Turkey  is  unique  in the  sense
that,  since  1981,  port tariffs  have  been calculated  in  equivalent  US dollar
rates  thereby  effectively  offsitting  inflation  and  depreciation  of the
Turkish  lira.
9.  The  concept  of cost  on  which  tariffs  have  been  based  is  not
specified  in the  SARs. The  interpretation  of "a  cost-based  tariff
structure'  is  therefore  rather  ambiguous,  and  can  also  mean a  pricing
strategy  which  relates  individual  tariffs  according  to  the  average  total
costs  for  each  type  of port  services. As was found  in  a  study  by Bennathan
(Reference  1 ,  port  authorities  usually  favor  the-use  of the  average  total
cost (or '  11  cost"  per  unit)  as the  basis  of tariffs. Meanwhile,  shown
below  are  revenues  strictly  from  user  charges  expressed  as  a proportion  of
total  operating  costs  for  5  countries  with  available  data. The  estimates
are  based  on 1983  data,  and  operating  costs  include  working  expenses  plus  a
charge  for  depreciation  of assets.







10.  The  financial  covenants  for  the  sample  projects  are summarized  as
follows:
NO.  OF CASES
COVENANTS  REPORTING  COMYFNIS
Rate  of return  on revalued  3  Ranged  from  6 to 7.5%
net  assets  annually93 -
Internal  cash  generation  4  From  10%  of annual
ratio  investment  requirements
to  40%  of  average  capital
expenditures  over  a
3-year  period
Debt service  coverage  5
ratio
Financial  nerformance  ta.gets  are  not  specified  in  two  cases  (Mexico  and
India),  but agreements  were reached  on generating  revenues  sufficient  to
cover  operating  costs  and  debt  service  requirements.
B.3  Use  of Pricing  Covenants
11.  Pricing  covenants  are found  in all  projects. On the  whole,  these
covenants  seek  an improvement  in  the  pricing  policies  for  port services,
dealing  specifically  with such  issues  as the  conduct  of studies  or  periodic
reviews  required  to Implement  a cost-based  tariff  system,  and/or  the
formulation  of new  accounting  systems  to  provide  meaningful  information  for
tariff-setting.  Agreements  on tariff  increases  of 50  and  10  percent  are
further  obtained  with regard  to the  projects  in Portugal  and  Senegal,
respectively.  None  of these  covenants,  however,  have  made  a reference  to
disaggregated  marginal  costs  as a  benchmark  for  setting  prices.
3.4 Sources  of Proiect  Financing
12.  Project  financing  plans  are  summarized  below. On average,  IBRD/IDA
loans  and  government  participation  in terms  of equity  contributions  and
credit  accounted  for  about  70  percent  of project costs. Cash  generated
internally  provided  around  14%  of investment  needs. This  is  a  higher
percentage  than  is found  in  the  social  sectors,  but  much lower  than in
sectors  such  as telecommunications  where  there  is  also  scope  for  congestion
pricing.
SOURCE  AVERAGE  RANGE  COMMENS
(As  % of Project  Cost)
IBRD/IDA  Loans  47.6  27  - 77
Other  External  Loans  13.1  0 - 39  0 in  6 cases
Internal  Cash  Generation  13.9  0 - 35  0 in  4 cases
Government  Loans  13.2  0 - 41  0 in  5 cases
Equity  from  Government  8.6  0 - 25  0 in  5 cases
Other  Sources  3.6  0 - 28  0 in  7 cases
C.  THE  YS OR GAPS
13.  Efficiency  pricing  is  defLnitely  a pertinent  issue  when dealing
with  port  proje'et3.  The theoretical  concepts  for  pricing  port  services  have
been  well  elaborated  by Bennathan  and  Walters;  but  have  been applied  in  a
very few  cases  (e.g.,  in  Pakistan  and  Indonesia).  Given  the  complex  issues- 94 -
involved  in  port  pricing,  perhaps  more  research  in this  area is  noeded  in
order  to  come  up  with a  workable  methodology  for  LDCs.  In 1979,  an office
memorandum  outlined  the  policy  statements  relevant  to  pricing/cost  recovery
in  port  projects  (Carmichael);  however,  the  Bank  is  yet  to act  on
formalizing  such  guidelines. Some  of the  issues  raised  in  these  statements
are  as follows:
- SRMC  of providing  port services  should  be the  minimum  level  of
charges  to ievy  on  users.
- Attempts  to implement  marginal  cost-based  tariffs  should
concentrate  on those  services  which  are  critical  to  overall  port
efficiency;  tariffs  for  other  services  may  be based  on the  average
variable  costs  pending  a review  of the  port's  accounting  and
information  systems.
Accounting  and information  systems  should  be designed  to  provide
regular  comparisons  between  tariffs  for  individual  services  and
their  corresponding  marginal  costs.
=  Measures  to recover  overhead  costs  may  take  account  of  various
"non-economic'  objectiver  for  the  port,  but in such  a  way as to
minimize  distortions  from  an efficient  use  of  port facilities.
14.  In addition  to these  efficiency  issues,  the  scope  for  revenue
generation  through  port  pricing  should  be assessed. This  will  be a complex
issue  since  it  involves  demand  elasticities  and  the  degree  of international
competitiveness  of individual  pJrts. However,  the  evident  congestion  of
existing  facilities  in  many  developing  country  ports  suggests  that  there  are
both efficiency  and  fiscal  gains  to  be achieved  through  selectively  higher
charges. Where  this  is the  case,  sights  should  be raised  from  merely
attaining  financial  viability  to  capturing  monopoly  rents  for  the  rest  of
the  economy.
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AN=  10.  Laiew  of Pricing  and Cost  RecoVAEr  in  SARA:
POVE  SECTO
A.  THE POLICY
A.  Interpretation and Calculation of Efficiency Prices
1.  Efficiency  pricing  in  the  power  sector  is  interpreted  as setting
the  price  equal  to  LRMC,  where  LRNC  must  be  evaluated  within  a  disaggregated
framework  (e.g.,  differentiation  of  marginal  costs  by  time  of  day,  voltage
level,  geographic  area,  season  of  the  year.  etc.). 1 The  degree  of
structuring  and  sophistication  of  the  LRKC  calculation  depend.  on  data
constraints  and  the  practicality  of  applying  a  complex  tariff.  Costs
usually  identified  for  LRKC  calculation  include  capacity  costs,  energy
costs,  and  consumer  costs.  Marginal  capacity  costs  are  basically  the
investment  costs  of  generation,  transmission  and  distribution  facilities  for
supplying  an  additional  kV.  Marginal  energy  costs  are  the  fuel  and
operating  costs  of  providing  an  additional  kWh;  and  marginal  customer  costs
include  those  for  connection,  metering  and  billing.
2.  Efficiency  pricing  as  such,  and  peak  load  pricing  in  particular,
avoid  the  problem  of  large  price  fluctuations  associated  with  SRNC  pricing
in  a  sector  with  capital  indivisibilities.  In  practice,  capital
indivisibilities  are  dealt  with  by  using  the  Aver#ge  Incresental  Cost  (AIC)
formula  for  approximating  LRMC. The  AIC  is  a  smoothing  formula  over  future
investments  for  each  part  of  system  costs;  e.g.,  generation,  transmission.
With  an  appropriate  choice  of  the  peak  period,  LRMC-based  tariffs  with  time-
of-use  pricing  generally  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  peak  period  users  (who
are  the  cause  of  capacity  expansions)  should  pay  both  capacity  and  energy
costs  while  off-peak  users  pay  only  the  energy  costs.
3.  Similarly,  analysis  of  LRMC  by  voltage  level  usually  indicates  that
the  lover  the  service  voltage,  the  greater  the  costs  imposed  on  the  system
by  consumers.  Optimum  pricing  thus  requires  that  tariffs  should  adequately
reflect  such  cost  differentials.  Customer  costs,  meanwhile,  are  of  two
types.  Fixed  customer  costs  (e.g.  service  drop  lines,  meters  and  labor  for
installation)  may be  charged  as  a  lump sum or  as  distributed  payments  over
several  years.  Recurrent  costs  associated  with  meter  reading,  billing  and
collection  may  be  imposed  on  users  as  a  periodic  flat  charge.
A.2 Constraints  to  Imnlementing  Efficiency  Prices
4.  Tariff  structure  nay  have  to  be  kept  simple  owing  to  the  practical
difficulties  of  metering  and  billing.  The  degree  of  sophistication  of
metering  depends  on  the  net  benefits  of oetering,  problems  of  installation
and  maintenance,  etc. Thus  moeters  may  vary  from  a  very  simple  current
1/ This  sectior  draws  largely  from  Electricity  Pricing-  Theory  and  Case
Studiea  by  M.  Munasinghe  and  J.  J.  Warford.96 -
limiting  device  for  low-income  consumers  to  highly  sophisticated  devices
(e.g.,  time-of-day  meters  with  synchronous  clocks)  applied  to large
industrial  and  comercial consumers. In some  developing  countries,  there
may  be lack  of technically  skilled  labor  for  installation  and  maintenance  of
sophisticated  meters,  or even  reliable  meter  readers. The  choice  of
appropriate  metering  is  country-specific  and  entails  many  practical
considerations.
5.  Second-best  issues  are  likewise  a  major  constraint  to the  economic
pricing  of power. Where  kerosene  is  subsidized,  it  may  provide  cheaper
lighting  than  LRHC-priced  electricity.  In some  countries  diesel  oil  is  also
subsidized  leading  to competition  from  privately  owned  generators.  The
existence  of these  second-best  problems  sometimes  makes  it  necessary  to
price  electricity  below  LRMC.
A.3  Adustments to Efficiency  Prices
6.  Both equity  and  financial  objectives  are important  to the  power
sector,  and  have  been  used  to  justify  deviations  from  efficiency  pricing.
Equiry  argumente  are  often  advanced  in favor  of a  subsidized  usocialu  block
or *lifeline"  rate  for  low-income  consumrs.  The  argument  is  especially
strong  in  places  where  the  cost  of electricity  accounts  for  a  large  share  of
incone  among  poor  households. Sometimes  income  distributional  goals  are
further  manifested  via  preferential  tariffs  set  for  rur^l  electrification  to
encourage  industries  to locate  in  rural  areas.
7.  Among  state-owned  power  utilities,  financial  autonomy  and  self-
sufficiency  are  an important  goal. A  marginal  cost  pricing  policy  which
results  in failure  to  achieve  minimum  financial  targets  for  continued
operation  of the  power  sector  is  usually  unacceptable  in  view  of subsidy
requirements  and  scarcity  of public  funds. On the  other  hand,  it is
politically  unpopular  when  ma:ginal  cost  pricing  results  in financial
surpluses  well in excess  of revenue  targets. Thus in  either  case  a
divergence  from  the  strict  LRMC-based  tariffs  is  argued. This  divergence
can  be  minimized  by  discriminating  between  various  customer  categories  and
imposing  the  greatest  adjustment  in  tariffs  on  that  group  with  the  lowest
price  elasticity  of  demand.
8.  The  use  of power  pricing  as a tool  for  raising  central  government
revfinues  is rarely  applied  owing  to its  political  sensitivity.  Fiscal
obiectives  are  therefore  accorded  less  importance  in the  sector.
B.  THE PRACTICE
B.1  !roject  Sample
9.  Twenty  projects  were  covered  in this  review. Our  sample  accounted
for  69  percent  of the  total  number  of power  projects  (excluding  multipurpose
water  supply,  irrigation/flood  control  and  hydropower  projects)  approved  by
the  Bank  during  FY84  and  FY85.- 97 -
B.2  Discussion  and  Calculatign  or Efficiency  Pries
10.  The  SARs  provided  an adequate  discussion  of efficiency  pricing
issues,  and  a comparison  between  actual  prices  and  marginal  cost  of  supply
was routinely  made.  Although  LRKC  estimates  (based  on the  average  incre-
mental  cost  concept)  were  reported  only  in 14  projects,  marginal  cost
pricing  was  used in all  sample  cases  as  a  benchmark  for  setting  electricity
tariffs. LRMC  ranged  from  2.4  to 15.6  US cents  per  kWh,  and  averaged  8.4
cents. Actual  tariffs  varied  between  1.5  and  18.0  cents  per  kWh,  with  a
sample  mean  of 6.5  cents. As shown  below,  tariffs  as a proportion  of  LRMC
differed  sharply  across  countries.
Country  Existing  Tariffs  as  No.  of Casoe
arm  a  JA of  I=K  R&RortnUS
Average Range
African  67.8  30-  99  4  Below  68%  in  2 caees
Latin  America  and  114.0  87-141  2  LRMC  not  reported  in 3
the  Caribbean  cases:  specified  tariffs  as
being  close  to  LRMC  in
1 case  and far  below
LR1C  in 2 cases
South  and  East  Asia  77.0  32-118  6LRMC  not  reported  in  3
cases:  specified
tariffs  as  being
higher  than  LRMC
EMENA  84.5  77-  92  2  in 1  case  and  lower  in
2 cases
WHOLE  15U{FLE  807J  30-141  Over 100%  in  3  cases
11.  Tariff  structures  are  often  described  with distinctions  being  made
between  energy  and  capacity  charges. Energy  charges,  which  were levied  to
recover  expenditures  for  fuel,  operation  and  maintenance,  varied  primarily
by type  of customers  (found  in 14  cases)  or  by voltage  level  (4). The  two
projects  in  Brazil  applied  a  uniform  tariff  to  all  customer  categories.
Shown  below  is the  distribution  of the  sample  according  to the  nature  of
tariff  schedules  used  for  charging  energy  costs.*  96 *
un  ~~~~Tariff  S  heule  Cmet
Irnreasing  Decreasing  Flat  Not
Alock  Blok  AUA
------  No.  of  Cases  -------
A. By  customer  category:
Domestic  5  3  2  4  Rates  were  further
differentiated  by
voltage  level  in
cases:  declinin
block  tariff  in
cases  and  and  in
creasing  block
tariff  in  1  case
if  voltage  level
were  correlated
with  consumption
Commercial  3  4  3  4  Declining  block
tariff  in  3  case
and  increasing
block  tariff  in




Industrial  0  6  4  4  Declining  block
tariff  in  5  cases
if  voltage  levels
were  correlated
with  consumption.
Other  0  3  6  5
B. By  voltage  level:
LV users  0  0  3  1
HV or  HV users  0  2  1  1
The  table  intdicates  that  an  increasing  block  tariff  was  more  often  applied  to
domestic  uses,  a  decreasing  block  tariff  to  commercial  and  industrial  uses,  and
flat  rates  to  other  uses.  When flat  rates  were  used  for  all  categories  of
customers  (e.g.,  in  St.  Vincent),  much  higher  tariffs  were  levied  on  non-
residential  users.  LV users  were  also  usually  charged  a  higher  flat  rate  than
and  HV users  since  low  voltage  uses  imposed  greater  costs  on  the  system.
Meanwhile,  a  fuel  surcharge  was  added  on  top  of  the  basic  tariff  in  9  cases  as
adjustment  mechanism  which  would  ascertain  an  automatic  recovery  of  fuel  cost
increases.  This  was  true  especially  in  those  countries  (e.g.  Kenya,  Tunisia,
Haiti,  Yugoslavia,  St.  Vincent  and  India)  which  had  been  relying  heavily  on
imported  fuel  for  power  generat'.on.12.  C2aritv chargps  were selectively  levied  on large  co_mercial  and
industrial  customers  or  NV and  HV  users  to take  account  of the  costs  of
providing  additional  generating  capacity  to  meet  peak demands. Peak  load
pricing  was  observed  ir.  two  forms: time-of-use  pricing  (found  in 7  cases)
and  pricing  by season  (3'. In addition,  charges  based  on  maximum  demand
were  used in  14 cases. The  latter  will  not  allocate  capacity  costs  to
marginal  users  unless  maximum  demand  coincides  with  peak  hour  use.
Further,  unlike  time-of-use  pricing,  demand  charges  will  not  give  consumers
the  incentive  to  switch  from  peak  to  off-peak  periods.
13.  Exports  of electricity  were recorded  for_Uganda  and  Nepal. Bulk
sales  to  Kenya  accounted  for  46  percent  of  Uganda's  output  in 1985,  and  are
expected  to  resain  at  that  level  until  1990. Over  that  period,  tariffs  in
real  terms  would  increase  from  0.25  to 1.05  US cents  per  kWh  sold  to  Kenya
while  sales  inside  Uganda  would  be  priced  fron  1.50  to  2.11  conts  per  kWh.
The lower  price  pegged  to  bulk sales  was  due  to a 50-year  contract  that
started  in  1958,  at the  time  Uganda  was  experiencing  substantial  excess  of
generation  capacity  over  domestic  demand. Nepal's  bulk  sales  to India
amounted  to  8 percent  of total  sales  in  1984,  and  are  expected  to  decline
to  4 percent  in  1991. Tariffs  in  real  terms  would  remain  at 1.40  cents  per
kWh.  Over  the  1984-91  period,  tariffs  for  domestic  consumption  woulL
increase  from  5.06  to 7.36  cents  per  kWh.
B.3  Discussion  of Adjustuents  to  Efficiency  Prices
14.  The  divergence  between  actual  tariffs  and  LUKC  was  often
rationalized  on the  basis  of financial  and  equity  considerations.
Financial  objectives  were  cited  in  7 cases  (with  tariffs  of 92-141  percent
of LRKC),  and  equity/social  considerations  in 5  cases  (32-72  percent). In
Uganda,  a declining  per  capita  consumption  of  electricity  due  to  worsening
economic  conditions  reportedly  resulted  in  very low  tariff  level  relative
to  LRKC (30  percent). No reason  was  given  for  the  deviations  from
efficiency  prices  in the  other  cases  reviewed. On the  whole,  the  SARs  did
not  provide  insights  on the  importance  of fiscal  objectives  for  pricing
electricity.
B.4  Discussion  of Cost  Recovery  Issues
15.  The  financial  covenants  for  the  sample  projects  are  sumnarized  as
follows:
No.  of Cases
CovenVAnts  Averaire  RAM  Re2ortinL_
Internal  cash  generation  21%  15-27%  of investment  3
requirements  during
project  period
28%  15-40%  of annual  5
capital  expenditures
Rate  of return  on reval  Led  7%  6- 9%  per  year  10
net  assets
Rate  of return  on  assets
valued  at  historic  costs  9%  6-14%  per  year  4- 100  -
Of the  14  projects  with  rate  of return  covenants,  only  those  in  China  (two
projects),  India  and  Nepal  were found  to  base  asset  valuation  on historic
costs. The  use  of historic  cost  in the  case  of China  was  justified
according  to its  low  cost  inflation  and  fairly  constant  price  patterns  over
time.  Debt  service  covenants  and  absolute  debt  limitations  were  also
applied  in 12 and  4 projects,  respectively.
8.5  Use of Pricing  Covenants
16.  Agreements  were  reached  in 9  projects  to  undertake  a tariff  study
based  on LRMC  in  order  to formulate  appropriate  revisions  of tariff  levels
and  structures.  Of these  cases,  the  need  to implement  time-of-use  pricing
was specified  in  only  one  project  (Malaysia).  Covenants  in the  other
projects  simply  entailed  setting  tariffs  at  levels  adequate  to  ensure  the
achievement  of financial  targets;  required  tariff  increases  were  specified
in S of these  projects  and  a  methodology  for  calculating  LRHC  was  included
in one  Indian  project.
17.  In light  of the  foregoing  covenants,  the  expected  tariffs  during
project  completion  were  calculated  in  the  SARs. Tariffs  in  real  terms  would
then  range  from  2.1  to  20.5  US cents  per  kWh,  and  average  7.1  cents.  This
would  be  tantamount  to  an  average  annual  growth  rate  of  .1  percent  over  the
entire  sample.  Tariffs  would  decline  in  real  terms  in  4  cases;  Kenya,
Panama  and  India  (2  projects),  at a rate  of 1  to  5  percent  per  year.  The
relationship  between  expected  tariffs  and  LRNC  by country  groups  is shown
below.
Country  Expected  Tariffs  as  No.  of  Cases
,roup  a a  of LRMC  Remorting_  CoNAets
Average Range
African  72.2  42-100  4  100% in  1  case
Latin  America  and  106.5  102-111  2
the  Caribbean
South  and  East  Asia  88.7  47-118  6  At least  100%  in
2  cases
EMA  103.0  99-107  2
WHOLEA  SNPLE  88.6  42-118  At  leastl100%  in  6
cases
Only  five  projects  would  have tariffs  lower  than  the  sample  mean (89  percent
of LRNC),  and  mostly  in  those  countries  where  social  considerations  had  been
accorded  much importance  in the  formulation  of  pricing  policies  for  the
power  sector. Thus if  the  adjustments  in  tariff  levels  are  executed  as
agreed,  over  the  sample  average  revenues  will grow  from  81 to 89%  of LRMCs.- 101  -
B.6  Sources  of Project  Financing
18.  The  financing  plans  for  the  sample  projects  are  shown  in the
sumeary  table  below. On average,  external  loans  accounted  for  63  percent  of
project  costs. Cash  generated  internally  financed  only  about  14  percent.
This is in  contrast  with  oil/3as  and  telecommunications  projects  where
efficiency  pricing  has  also  been  widaly  practiced,  and  where  internal  cash
generation  accounted  for  more  than  30  percent  of  project  costs  on average.
Source  Average  AMU  coments
(As  % of  Project  Costs)
IBRD/IDA  Loans  37.6  18-64
Other  External  Loans  25.7  0-82  0 in  4 cases
Internal  Cash  Generation  13.6  0-40  0  in  6  cases
Govern  ent  Loans  7.4  0-48  0  in  13  cases
Equity  from  Government  5.7  0-47  0  in  15  cases
Other  10.0  0-60  0  in  13  cases
C.  THE WAJOR  GAPS
19.  Much  of the  theoretical  development  of efficiency  pricing  under
conditions  of capital  indivisibility  has taken  place  with  reference  to
electric  power.  The  theory  has  been  applied  in  detailed  case  studies
(References  3  and  4),  and  widely  disseminated  in  the  developing  countries
through  courses  and  projects.  In  this  respect  the  power  sector  provides  a
model  for  other  sectors  of the  process  by  which  efficiency  pricing  can  be
developed  into  practical  guidelines  and  implemented  through  pp.ojects.
20.  In  power,  the  gaps  that  remain  are (i)  the  incorporation  of fiscal
objectives  into  pricing  structures;  (ii)  the  development  of  betteroeans  to
promote  cost-minimization  in  public  monopolies,  consistent  with  economic
pricing;  and  (iii)  increased  focus  on implenentation  issues,  including  the
structure  of  tariffs  and  the  metering/billing/collection  system.  In  many
countries  the  power  sector  represents  a  neglected  source  of  much needed
public  funds,  both  through  direct  taxes  and  through  improvements  in  X-
efficiency  that  can  bring  about  financial  surpluses.  The  potential  and  mean
for  achieving  such  should  be  explored  through  case  studies  that  include
other  public  enterprises,  in  order  to  evaluate  the  role  that  the  power
sector  should  play  within  a  broader  fiscal  context.102  -
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ANNEX  11:  Review  of Pri-ing  and  Cost  Racovery  in  SARs:
RAILWAYS  SEC
A.  THE  POLICY
A.1  Interpretation of Efficiency Pricin
1.  Both  short-  and  long-run  marginal  costs  have  been  suggested  as  an
efficiency  pricing  guide  for  railways.  In  expanding  systems  tlhe  two
definitions  often  merge,  whlle  in  stagnant  or  declining  traffi;  systems,
SRMC  will  gentrally  produce  a  more  elficient  lovel  of  capacity
utilization.  Whichever  is  the  better  guide  for  a 'particular  place,
tariffs  should  be  discriminatory  in  terms  of  reflecting  the  marginal  costs
at  different  points  on  the  network,  time  or  season,  and  in  levying  higher
mark-ups  on  that  traffic  which  is  less  price-elastic.  The  opportunity  for
peak  load  pricing,  for  instance,  lies  in  the  fact  that  some  major  cargoes
are  highly  seasonal  (e.g.,  agricultural  produce)  and  the  demand  for
passenger  train  services  can  be  differentiated  according  to  time  of  day
(e.g.,  rush  versus  nonrush  hours).  The extent  to  which  price
differentiation  can  be  implemented  is  influenced  by  the  degree  of
competitiveness  of  railways  vis-a-vis  other  transport  modes.  Trains  have
a  comparative  advantage  in  carrying  dense  flows  of  traffic  over  fairly
long  distances;  nevertheless,  price  differentiation  would  be  economically
sound  whenever  the  resulting  net  additional  revenues  more  than  cover
short-run  marginal  costs.
A.2 Constraints  to  InDlementing  Efficiency  Prices
2.  A major  constraint  to  implementing  efficiency  prices  is  the
complexity  of  cost  allocation  to  different  types  of  load  (e.g.,  passenger
versus  freight)  and  over  different  routes  or  times  of  day. Joint  costs
are  everywhere  in  a  well-managed  railway,  and  marginal  increases  or
decreases  in  one  type  of  traffic  have  cost  repercussions  throughout  the
system.  Even  average  cost  figures,  such  as  the  frequently  quoted
cost/ton/km,  are  almost  meaningless  in  a  system  with  such  a  high  ratio  of
fixed  to  variable  costs.  At  the  same  time,  long-run  system  costing  is  a
more  difficult  exercise  in  the  railway  sector  than  it  is  in  power  or
telecommnications.
3.  A second  factor  that  complicates  the  calculation  of  efficiency
prices  in  railways  is  the  difficulty  of  forecasting  demand.  Much  railway
use  is  a  derived  demand  that  is  dependent  on  general  economic  conditions.
Close  substitutes  exist  on  both  the  freight  and  passenger  side. Public
subsidies  are  prevalent  throughout  the  transport  sector,  and  policy
changes  in  one  sub-sector  have  immediate  effects  on  the  others.  For  all
of  these  reasons,  traffic  projections  have  been  a  major  problem  in  railway
projects.- 104  *
A.3 Austment.  EfficiencY  Price
4.  Both  financial  and  fiscal  objectives  are  important  ln  railways,
and  hav,  been  uwed  to  justLfy  deiations  from  marginal  cost  pricing.  In
such  cases,  as  suggested  in  OHS  3.78,  the  Bank's  conditionality  for
lending  has  focused  on  the  railway's  gnerational  efficiency.  Such
conditionality  includes  tariff  lnereasos,  closuro  of  uneconomic  lines  and
services,  improvements  in  managerial  porformance,  tho  avoidance  of
uneconomic  investments,  and  increasing  the  freedom  of  rail  management  in
setting  tariffs  to  ensure  a  viable  competition  with  other  transport  modes.
5.  Along  with  this  emphasis  on  X-officiency  achieved  via  non-price
measures,  financial  objectives  appear  to  dominate  the  sector.  Budgetary
equLlibrium  is  sought,  which  requires  the  enterprise  to  earn  at  least
enough  revenues  to  cover  all  working  costs  and  to  service  debts.  This
principle  has  now  been  widely  accepted,  both  for  fiscal  and  managerial
efficioncy  reasons.  Publie  subsidios  to  railways  have  clearly  beon
reducel  in  recent  years  in  response  to  the  Bank's  renewed  focus  on  fiscal
constraints.
6.  Equity  considerations  are  sometimes  important  for  pricLng  rural
train  service  or  non-express  lntercity  lines.  Generally,  however,  trains
provide  a  higher  standard  of  servieo  (and  for  a  higher  price)  than  busos,
so  lower  ineom  households  are  not  major  consumers.
B.  THE PRACTICE
B.l Proiect  SaMgle
7.  A sample  of  7  projects  (in  Zaire,  Zambia,  Korea,  China,  India,
Brazil,  and  Mexico)  is  used  for  this  review.  The  sample  accounts  for  88
percent  of  the  total  number  of  railway  projects  approved  by  the  Bank
durLng  FY84  and  FY85.
B.2 Discussion  of  Cost  Recovery  Issues
8.  The  foregoing  should  shed  light  on  the  nature  of  data  collected
for  doeumenting  current  pricing/cost  recovery  practices  in  railway
projects.  Efficioney  prices  are  not  addressed  in  the  SARs;  and  the
adequacy  of  tariffs  ls  gauged  not  according  to  the  marginal  costs  of
providing  rail  servieos,  but  based  on  the  relationship  between  total- 105  -
revenues  and total.  expenditures.  Annual  expenditure  and  roverue  data for
the  sample  couvtries  are  suumarized  below:
Total  Operating  Expenses  1,624.0  47  - 4,776
(US$  Millions)
Working  Expeaditures  72.6  48 - 88-  Over  70%  in
(As  % of total  operating  5 cases
expenses)
Total  Revenues:
As %  of  working  expenses  124.0  93  - 186  Over  100% in
6  cases
As % of  total  iperatlng  90.3  49  - 145  Over 100%  in
expenses  1  case
Total  op.ratinj  expenditures  (also  referred  to in  the  SAks  as  long-
term  variable  costs")  are  comprised  of  working  expenose,  depreciation
allowances  and  intorest  charges  on outstanding  debts,  if any. Working
expenditures  include  salaries,  material  and  fuel  costs,  taxes  and  other
cost  components  which  are  considered  variable  in the  short  run. Total
revenues  include  passenger  fares,  freight  tariffs,  and  charges  for  the
provision  of services  other  than  transport;  e.g.,  mail  delivery,
catering,  etc. They  are  exclusive  of govermnnt subsidies  for  those
countries  where  compensation  payments  to  the  railway  authority  are
being  practiced.
9.  Revenues  from  user  charges  varied  between  93  and  186  percent
of working  expenditures,  with  a sample  mean of 124  percent. It is  only
in the  case  of  Brazil  where  total  revenues  amounted  to  less  then
working  expenditures.  Nonetheloss,  operating  losses  are  found  in the
majority  of  the  countries  reviewd.  Total  revenues  were  only  49
percent  of  total  operating  expenditures  in  Brazil;  62  percent  in
Mexico;  and  ranged  from  91  to  97  percent  in  the  other  sample  countries.
China  is  a  major  exception,  with  revenues  of  145  percent  of  operating
expenditures.  The  shortfalls  in  revenues  relative  to  operating
expenses  have  been  attributed  to  low  tariffs,  lack  of  tinely  approval
by  governmnt  of tariff  increases,  and/or  simply  the  reluctance  of
government  to  grant  adequate  adjustments  in  charges  for  rail  services
on account  of social  policies. Losses  have  also  been  associated  with
operational  inefficiencies  such  as the  continued  operation  of
uneconomic  lines,  low  locomotive  availability,  overstaffing,  etc.
10.  Freight  tariffication  is  generall- ased  on distance,  weight
and  type  of comaodity. Passenger  fares  vary  by class  of travel  (e.g.,106
express  trains,  otiinary  trains,  and  sometims  mixed freight/passenger
trains  for  servicing  outlying  low  dersity  areas),  and  by distance.
Disaggregated  information  on the  relationship  between  average  operating
costs  and  average  prices  is  very limited  as shown  below:
NO_  OF CASES
fITEMS  RANGE  REPORTING  CONMENTS
A.  Freight  services:
Average  reverjes/  0.72 - 3.80  6
ton-km  (US  cents)
Average  operating  0.47 - 1.66  3  Reported  only for
costs/ton-km  (cents)  Brazil,  China  & Mexico
Average  revenues  as  73 - 153  3  Over  100%  in  2 cases
percent  of average  (China  & Nexico)
operating  costs
B.  Passenger  services
Average  revenues/  0.47 - 7.71  7
pass-km  (cents)
Average  operating  0.54  - 1.96  3  Mexico,  China  &  Korea
costs/pass-km  (cents)
Avorage  revenues  as  54 - 135  3  Over  100%  in  2 cases
percent  of  average  (Korea  & China)
operating  costs
Thus  profitable  operations  with  regard  to the  provision  of  both  freight  and
passenger  services  are  *vident  only in  China.  This  conforms  with  the
earlier  observation  that  revenues  greatly  exceeded  total  operating  expenses
only in  this  country.
11.  Distortions  in tariff  structures  are  specified  in  6 cases,  where
there  is  crose-subsidization  from  one type  of service  to another. In Zaire,
for  example,  mineral  exports  are  priced  below  cost  of service. Losses  on
this  particular  traffic  are  compensated  to  some  extent  through  higher
tariffs  for  general  cargo  and  passenger  services,  thus  making  overall
tariffs  not  well related  to  costs. In  Korea,  ordinary  passenger  trains  are
operated  at a substantial  lops  due  to  controlled  low  tariffs  in furtherance
of government's  social  objectives  while  express  train  services  are  charged
highly  profitable  fares. Pricing  practices  that  tend  to subsidize  passenger
services,  with preferential  pricing  often  given  to intercity  passenger
traffic  or  ordinary  train  services,  and/or  to  certain  types  of products
(e.g.,  grains,  cement,  fertilizer  and  iron)  are  likewise  found  in  India,
Zambla,  Brazil  a-d  Mexico.- 107
12.  Government's  provision  of  direct  subsidies  to  railway  authorities
are  found  in  Brazil,  Mexico and  Korea.  In  AzI.U,  the  government  makes
normalization  payments  for  the  nonremunerative  services  which  it  requires
th.  railway  authority  to  operate--e.g.,  operations  in  the  northeast  region
which  are  not  commercially  viable  but  nonetheless  are  maintained  for  social
reasons;  intercity  passenger  services  at  controlled  low  tariffs,  etc.
Normalization  payments  for  freight  services  are  made  according  to  a  simple
formula  representing  a  fixed  percentage  (e.g.,  80  or  85 percent)  of  the  net
losb,  whereas  for  passenger  services  the  payments  cover  the  entire  loss.
The existing  fora  of  normalization,  as  pointed  out  in  the  SAR, is
unsatisfactory  since  it  gives  the  railway  authority  little  incentive  to
improve  the  efficiency  of  the  services  for  which  normalization  payments  are
made. Annual  normalization  paynints  during  thle 1979.83  period  represented
about  20  percent  of  total  operating  revenues.
13.  In  Mexico,  the  governmnt  provides  a  passenger  subsidy  to
compensate  for  the  railway's  losses  arising  from  restrictions  on  raising
fares.  Apart  fron  social  considerations,  which  have  kept  passenger  fares
below  cost  of  service,  the  govonrent  is  also  isluctant  to  grant  adjustments
in  fares  sufficient  to  cover  operating  costs  on  the  grounds  that  the  rolling
stock  is  old  and  services  provided  are  generally  poor.
14.  In  Korea,  losses  on  ordinary  pasaenger  train  services  are  recovered
partly  through  retroactive  payments  from  the  government.  The subsidy
approximates  the  underrecovery  of  operating  costs,  given  the  requirement
that  the  railway  authority  should  cover  some  of  the  losses  via  improvements
in  efficiency  and  profits  on  other  services.  Losses  amounted  to  W51.2
billion  in  1982,  of  which  W35.4 billion  was reimbursed  by  the  government  in
1983.
1S.  In  addition  to  these  cases  of  direct  subsidies,  in  India  the
railway  authority  receives  an  indirect  subsidy  from  the  government  through
exemptions  from  payment  of  dividends  on  government  funds  invested  in  the
construction  of  certain  strategic  lines  or  in  maintaining  nonremunerative
branch  lines.  In  China,  practically  all  cash  generatad  in  railway
operations  is  remitted  to  the  State,  while  the  latter  finances  all
investment  expenditures.  The net  flow  of  funds  has  been  very  profitable  for
the  State;  amounting  to  Y3.1  billion  in  1983.
16.  Financial  covenants  are  reported  for  most  of  the  sample  projects.
Rates  of  return  on  revalued  net  assets  are  found  in  two cases:  3 percent  a
year  in  Zaire  and  an  average  of  about  5 percent  per  year  in  Korea.  Three
other  countries  have  internal  cash  generation  agreements  ranging  from  20
(Zambia)  to  48  (Brazil)  percent  of  total  investment  expenditures,  with  one
case  unspecified.  Debt  service  coverage  ratios  are  also  used  in  three  of
these  projects.  Annual  operating  ratios  amounting  to  an  average  of  1.03  are
applied  in  the  Brazilian  project;  no  financial  covenants  are  found  for
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s.3  Use of  Pricing  Covenants
17.  roadly  stated,  pricing/cost  recovery  agreements  include:  to
complete  a  tariff  costing  system  with  the  objective  of  relating  tariffs  to
costs  (found  in  two  cases);  to  ensure  government  cooperation  in  terms  of
approving  proposed  tariff  increases  as  endorsed  by  the  railway  authority  or
maintaining  tariffs  at  levels  necessary  to  achieve  agreed  financial
performance  criteria  (3);  to  adjust  freight  and  passenger  fares  to  levels
that  will  recover  long-term  variable  costs  or  simply  to  ensure  full  recovery
of  operating  costs  (2);  and  to  establish  administrative  mechanisms  for  the
closure  of  not  commercially  viable  lines  (1). While  these  covenants  are
directly  compatible  with  operational  etficiency  and  profitability
objectives,  only  the  costing  studies  touch  on  the  application  of  marginal
cost  pricing  principles  as  a  benchmark  for  tariff  setting.  Experience  with
such  studies  in  the  past  has  been  that  they  provide  useful  insights  but  are
rarely  implemented.
5.4  Sources  of Prolect  Finaning
16.  A sumary  of  the  project  financing  plans  is  shown  below. IDRD/IDA
loans  and  government  participation  in  the  form  of  credit  and  equity
contributions  constitute  the  major  sources  of  funds,  altogether  accounting
for  an  average  of  67  percent  of  project  costs.  Internal  cash  generation
varies  widely  across  countries.
SOURCE  AVERAGE  RANGE  COHMENTS
(As  %  of  Project  Costs)
IBRD/IDA  Loans  31.5  15 - 47
Other  External  Loans  16.2  0 - 44  0 in 3  cases
Internal  Cash  Generation 16.4  0 - 72  0 in  4  cases;  72%  in
China
Government  Loans  23.9  0 - 72  0 in  4  cases;  72%  in
India
Equity  from  Government  12.0  0 - 74  0 in  5  cases;  74%  in
Mexico
C.  THE  MAJOR  GAPS
19.  A great  deal  of attention  has  recently  been  focused  on the  severe
financial/fiscal  problems  of  the  railways  sector.  This  focus  has  resulted
in  a  more  systematic  approach  to  cost  recovery  and  more  stringent  targets- 109 -
for  operational  efficiency.  Our  review  of FY84/85  projects  indicates  that
this  new  emphasis  is  bearing  fruit  in  the  countries  with  which  the  Bank  is
involved.
20.  Once the  underlying  financial  requirements  for  continued  operation
have  been  met,  attention  can  be broadened  to include  issues  of tariff
structure  and  efficiency  pricing. The  sample  SARs  provided  little  coverage
of tariff  differentials,  peak  pricing,  or  even  disaggregated  costs. While
recognizing  the  inherent  difficulties  of fine  cost  separation,  it  would  be
useful  to  compare  user charge  categories  with  attributable  costs  in  advising
on tariff  changes. In addition  to  contributing  to  better  railway
utilization,  such  an  analysis  would  be helpful  in evaluating  sector-wide
pricing  policy  including  road  user  charges  and  port  fees.
21.  To our  knowledge,  no  practical  methodology  is available  on
efficiency  pricing  in  developing  country  rail transport.  An excellent
*traffic  costing"  report  was  prepared  12  years  ago (Referenee  4),  but it
stops  short  of the  transition  from  costs  to tariffs. If staff  are  to  devote
more  attention  to tariff  structure  issues,  a  review  of current  practice  and
guideline  for  tariff  design  based  on efficiency  criteria  will  be needed.
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ANNEX  12:  Reviev  of Pricing  and  Cost  Recovery  in  SAks:
TELECOMMUNICATIONS  SECTOR
A.  THE  POLICY
A.1  Interoretation  of EfficiencX  Pricing
1.  The  application  of  marginal  cost  pricing  concepts  in the
telecommunications  sector  is  usually  met  with  a  number  of
difficulties,  of  which  the  most  important  are  the  issues  of declining
unit  costs  and  positive  externalities. 1 Telecommunications  is  a
declining  unit  cost  industry;  thus  if  prices  are  set  equal  to  the
sarginal system  costs  of  supplying  services  then  financial  losses  are
likely  to  be incurred.  Positive  externalities  are  encountered  in  two
ways:  a)  each  tim  a  new  subscriber  is  connected  to  a  network,  the
value  of  the  other  parties'  telephones  is  increased  in  terms  of  more
potential  contacts;  and  b)  making  a  call  can  be beneficial  to  both  the
caller  and  the  party  called.  The  presence  of  such  externalities
suggests  that,  in  order  to  achieve  an  officient  allocation  of
resources,  prices  should  be less  than  the  installation  costs  and
marginal  call  costs.
2.  In  view  of the  financial  implications  of declining  unit  costs
and externalities,  efficiency  pricing  is interpreted  within  the
context  of tariff  structures.  In cases  where  the  excess  demand  for
connections  is  not  large  and  traffic  congestion  is  not  a  significant
problem,  efficiency  pricing  can  be approached  by structuring  tariffs
to  consist  of  a  lump  sum charge  that  would  cover  subscriber  plus  other
non-marginal  costs  and  call  charges  that  would  reflect  marginal  call
costs.  However,  in  most  LDCs  the  usual  scenario  is  one  of  tremendous
unsatisfied  demand  for  services,  as evidenced  by long  waiting  lists
and  high incidence  of  call  failures. Efficiency  pricing  in  this  case
requires  that  prices  reflect  not  only  the  marginal  system  costs  of
supplying  services  but  also  the  marginal  opportunity  costs  of
connections  or calls. The  uarginal  opportunity  costs  can  be
approximated  by the  maximum  amount  that  potential  users  deprived  of
service  would  be willing  to  pay to  obtain  it.  The application  of
efficiency  pricing  into  practice  would  then  mean adjusting  charges  to
levels  that  would  clear  the  market  and  allocate  supply  according  to
the  costs  of services  and  peoples'  willingness  to  pay.  This is
attainable  through  various  pricing  strategies,  the  most  common  of
which  is the  use  of  highly  differentiated  tariff  schedules. Price
differentiation  in the  telecoinunications  sector  has  been related  to
factors  such  as type  of  users,  time  of use,  size  of service  area,  and
distance  over  which  the  call  is  made.  Thus  on the  basis  of supply
1/  This section  draws  largely  from  'relecommunications  Pricing  and
Investment  in  Developing  Countries'  by R.J.  Saunders  and  J.J.  Warford.
Also,  this  review  is  focused  on telephony  alone.c  111 -
costs  and  value-of-use,  tariff  structures  should  lean  toward  higher
charges  for  calls  made  during  peak  than  off-peak  hours;  toward  higher
connection  charges  for  business  than  for  residential  users;  higher
unit  charges  for  long  distance  than  for  local  calls;  and  variations
across  subscription  rates  within  a large  service  network.
A.2  Adjustments  to  Efficiency  Prices
3.  Telecommunications  pricing  is  discussed  in  OHS  3.72  and  in  the
1983  book  by  Saunders  at.  al.  (Reference  4).  They  suggest  the  use  of
efficiency  prices  as  a  benchmark  and  as  one  that  vould  be  compatible
with  mobilizing  financial  resources  for  expansion  of  the
telecounications  network  or  for  general  government  expenditure
purposes.  The  financial  viability  of  the  enterprise  and  fiscal
considerations  thus  play  a  major  rols  in  the  design  of  appropriate
tariff  lev!'ls  and  structures.  There  are,  however,  certain  practical
lisitatic-,.  For  example,  tine  of  use  pricing  is  somtimes
constrained  by  technical  difficulties  in  mtering  consumption  and  the
choice  of  proper  peak  periods;  or  there  is  political  sensitivity  to
increasing  tariffs  to  meet  financial  and fiscal  goals.
4.  The  importance  of  distributional  issues  in  telecom.unications
pricing  is  well  accepted  in  the  Bank,  although  in  practice  equity
issues  are  handled  with  relatively  lower  priority.  It  has  long  been
argued  that  prices  can  be  structured  to  reflect  income  differentials
by  user groups  or  to  cross-subsidize  from  urban  to  rural  subscribers,
but  in  practice  few  examples  can  b" found.  This  may  be  because
telephone  ownership  and  use  is  highly  concentrated  in  higher-income
households.
B.  THE PRACTICE
1.1  Proect  SAMMIe
5.  A  total  of  six  telecommnications  projects  were  approved  by  the
Bank  during  FY84 and  FY85.  All  these  projects  were  used  in  this
review.  The  sample  countries  included  Algeria,  Oman,  Ethiopia,  Kenya,
Guatemala  and  Nepal.
B.2  Calculation  and  Discussion  of  Efficiency  Prices
6.  Neither  the  calculation  of  efficiency  prices  nor  a  comparison  of
existing  tariffs  with  the  economic  costs  of  service  is  reported  in  the
SARs.  As  noted  below,  all  projects  provided  for  costing  studies  to  be
undertaken,  presumably  reflecting  inadequate  data  at  time  of
appraisal.  Nonetheless,  existing  price  structures  for  telephone
services  in  the  countries  reviewed  seemed  to  conform  with  some  of  the
general  aspects  of  efficiency  pricing  discussed  in  para.  2.  On  the
whole,  tariffs  are  structured  to  consist  of  the  following  elements:  a
nonreinbursable  fee  for  initial  connection  to  the  network;  a  monthly
subscription  fee  for  terminal  equipment  and  continued  connection;  and
charges  for  local,  long  distance  and  international  calls.  In  five- 112
cases  the  installation  and/jor  monthly  subscription  fees  are
differentiated  according  to  various  factors. For  instance,
nstallatio  _fes vary  by type  of users  in  Oman  where  connections  for
business  purposes  are  charged  ten  times  more  than  residential  users;
and  by distance  in  Guatemala  as  well  as in  Kenya.  In  Kenya
installation  charges  increased  at  an increasing  rate  with  distance
(reportedly  reflecting  overall  cost  patterns),  subject  to a  maximum
ceiling. The  opposite  is  true  in  Guatemala  where  connections  within
the  capital  city  are  levied  a  much  higher  fee  than  those  in other
places,  due  to smaller  service  network  in  the  latter. Subscriti=n
fj=n increased  with subscriber  capacity  in  Algeria;  are  differentiated
by type  of users  in  Guacemala;  and  vary  according  to  both categories
in  Ethiopia. In these  two  countries  business  users  pay  at least  twice
as much in  monthly  rentals  as residential  users. Meanwhile  in  Nepal
connections  to the  network  are  charged  an exceptionally  high fee,  and
there  is a  requirement  to  pay  a  deposit  which  is refundable  upon
termination  of service. It thus  appears  that  in  Nepal  available
services  are  rationed  largely  through  these  price  instrumnts.
7.  IsotaLcall are  typically  not timed  or subject  to  any  time
limit. This is true  in  Algeria,  Ethiopia,  Kenya  and  Nepal;  moreover,
rates  do  not  vary  by time  of use.  In the  other  sample  countries  calls
are  pulse  coded,  allowing  a much  longer  pulse  duration  for  calls  made
at night  than  during  the  day.  Thus  while  the  unit  call  charge  is
fixed  as  in the  case  of  Oman,  rates  effectively  differ  for  calls  made
during  peak  and  off-peak  hours. Peak  and  off-peak  pricing  of local
calls  is  also  practiced  in  Guatemala,  with  different  charge  schedules
for  business  and  domestic  uses.  Long  4distanc  calls  are  levied
charges  that  progress  according  to  specified  dLstance  intervals.  The
per  kilometer  rate  in  most  cases  is  lower  for  calls  over  longer
distances. The  costs  associated  with  long  distance  transmission  and
switching  decline  rapidly  with  distance. Time  of use  pricing  is
generally  practiced  with  respect  to  long  distance  calls,  but rarely
applied  to international  calls. Shown  below  is the  distribution  of
the  sample  according  to the  foregoing  discussions  on tariff
structures: 
Kith Price  Differentiation
By Customer  By  Time  Without  Price
EUt  Cate  pr...  of  Use  Other  Differentiation
--  No. of Cases  ---------
Installation  1  Not  applicable 2(By_distance)  3
Monthly  Subscription  2  Not  applicable 2(By  size  of network) 3
Local  call  1  2  4
Long  distance  call  0  5  5(By  type  of call;  0
e.g.  STD  versus
operator-assisted)
l(By  distance  alone)
International  call  0  1  4(By  country)  2- 113  -
Evidently,  there  remains  a  wide  scope  for  improvement  in  pricing
policies  for  telephone  services.  Attention  should  be  paid
specifically  to  time  of  use  pricing  of  local  and  international  calls,
and  price  differentiation  by  type  of  users.  Only  one  country  in  the
sample  applies  the  business-residential  distinction  to  both  the
monthly  and  call  charges.
8.  Excess  demand  is  comon  among  the  sample  countries.  On  average,
nearly  33  and  19  percent  of  long  distance  calls  and  local  calls,
respectively,  failed  due  to  circuit  congestion  at  busy  hours.
Congestion  problems  are  least  acute  in  Algeria  vhere  the  proportions
of  uncompleted  calls  to  total  call  attempts  are  usually  below  the
sample  mean;  they  are  most  serious  in  Kenya with  about  55  percent  of
uncompleted  local  calls  and  a failure  rate  for  long  distance  calls  of
as  high  as  87  percent.  Furthermore,  lines  in  service  as  a  proportion
of  total  demand  for  -elephone  line  connections  ranged  from  as  low as
33  percent  in  Nepal  co  67  percent  in  Ethiopia.  The  sample  mean  is
about  50  percent--suggesting  considerable  waiting  lists  in  the
countrie  reviewed  with  about  half  of  the  demand  not  being  met.
9.  In  the  absence  of  marginal  cost  estimtes,  the  internal
financial  rates  of  return  (IFR)  for  the  projects  should  be  useful  in
evaluating  the  adequacy  of  tariff  levels.  IFP  on  average  amounts  to
slightly  over  15  percent,  and  is  higher  than  the  generally  accepted
measure  of  8  to  10  percent  for  the  opportunity  cost  of  capital.  Since
projects'  benefit  and  cost  streams  have  been  valued  at  constant
prices,  this  su"gests  that  tariffs  at  their  prevailing  levels  are
above  the  average  system  costs  of  supplying  service.  However,  the
presence  of  substantial  waiting  lists  and  traffic  congestion  implies
that  existing  tariffs  are  still  inadequate  vis-a-vis  marginal
opportunity  costs  associated  with  frustrated  demands.  Such  pricing
strategies  as  raising  installation  fees,  monthly  rentals  and/or  call
charges  together  with  properly  differentiated  tariff  schedules  are
thus  required  for  an  efficient  allocation  of  supply  among  competing
users.
B.3  Discussion  of  AdjustMents  to  Efficiency  Prices
10.  Efficiency  prices  are  not  reported  in  the  SARs. Thus  both  the
extent  to  which  existing  tariffs  diverge  from  the  efficiency  prices
and  reasons  for  such  divergence  are  not  dealt  with  in  the  appraisal
reports.  However,  tariffs  in  the  sample  countries  remained  virtually
unchanged  between  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s.  Reportedly,  cost
escalation  and  the  absence  of  periodic  tariff  reviews  have  led  to
inabilities  of  the  telecomaunications  authorities  to  sustain  efficient
operation  and  execute  development  plans.  The SARs provide  an  adequate
discussion  of  the  need  to  adjust  existing  tariffs  on the  basis  of
efficiency  pricing  principles,  taking  also  into  consideration
nonefficiency  objectives.  Sufficient  emphasis  is  placed  on  financial
and  fiscal  issues. This is  evidenced  by  agreements  on  pricing  and
financial  performance  targets  which  are  designed  to  ensure  a  viable
operation  of  the  enterprise;  and  an  analysis  of  the  fiscal  impacts  of
projects  is  almost  routinely  included  in  the  SARs. Equity  issues  are
directly  addressed  in  only  two  cases  (Ethiopia  and  Guatemala)  which114 -
cited  adjustments  to accomodate a cross-subsidization  from  urban  to
rural  subscribers.
B.  Discussion  of Cost  Recovery  Issues
11.  Cost  recovery  is  usually  high  in the  telecoounications  sector.
All six  projects  used  for  this  review  have  rate  of return  covenants
based  on  revalued  net  assets,  which  generally  amount  to  at least  11
percent  a  year.  Rates  of return  on invested  capital  serve  as a
measure  of the  extent  of cost  recovery  from  users  of the  services
provided. In three  cases  an internal  cash  generation  target  is
specified,  ranging  from  23 to 50  percent  of_capital  requirements
during  the  implementation  period  of  projects.  Debt  service  and  debt
limitation  covenants  are  applied  in  one  and  two  projects,
respectively.  Fiscal  objectives  are  well  addressed  in  the  SARs,  and
an  analysis  of  the  fiscal  impacts  of  projects  was  done  in  five  cases.
The  net  fiscal  surplus  that  would  accrue  to  the  goverrments  as  found
in  these  analyses  is  shown  below:
Countrs  Amount  (US  SMiillion)  Period
Ethiopia  .06.9  1984-88
Algeria  282.6  1983-88
Nepal  45.0  1986-92
Kenya  20.3  1984-88
Guatemala  82.0  1984-87
B.5  Use of Pricing  Covenants
12.  It  is  only  in  the  cases  of  Kenya  and  Nepal  that  tariff
increases--30  and  20 percent,  respectively--are  specified  as
conditions  of loan  effectiveness.  In  all  caseig,  studies  were  required
to  compare  tariffs  with  costs  of  services  and  to  lay  down principles
on  which  to  base  future  price  adjustments.  These  studies  in  general
include  a)  traffic  congestion  analysis  with  emphasis  on  peak  call  use;
b)  local,  long  distance  and  international  call  rate  analyses;  and  c)
assessment  of  the  sensitivity  of  demand  for  each  services  offered  with
respect  to  changes  in  prices.  In  all  cases  tariff  studies  are  based
on  efficiency  price  considerations.
B.6  Sources  of  Project  Financing
13.  Project  financing  plans  are  shown  in  the  summary  table  below.
In  sharp  contrast  to  most  other  sectors,  cash  generated  internally  was
the  primary  source  of  funds,  followed  by  IBRD/IDA loans  and  other
external  donors.Sourc  Arau  Rana  Coments
(As  % of Project  Costs)
Internal  Cash  Generation  39.1  15-69  15% in  Nepal
IBRD/IDA  Loans  27.7  10-41  10%  in  Oman
Other  External  Loans  29.7  0-52  0 in 2  cases;  52%  in  Nepal
Governront  Loans  3.5  0-21  0 in  4 cases
C.  THE  MAJOR  GAPS
14.  Clearly,  efficiency  pricing  is relevant  to the  telecomunications
s*ctor;  and  the  theory  and  application  to  LDCS  have  been  well  defined  in
works  done  within  the  Benk.  Nonetheless,  there  still  reains a  wide scope
for  improvJemnt  of  pricing  practices  In the  sector. The  pricing  studies
carried  out  by consultants  under  Bank  projects  have  not  been  very
satisfactory.  The  need  for  more  applied  work in  this  area  and  the
development  of specific  guidelines  for  tariff  analysis  in
telecommunications  projects  have  been  the  subject  of  a recent emosrandum  on
telecowmunications  pricing. This  Memo  sug"ests  that  a guideline  for  tariff
analysis  should  be  prepared  along  with  a  simple  computer  model  for
cost/price/revenue  analysis.
15.  Our  review  indicates  that  more  attention  is  needed  in  the  following
areas:
- time  of  use  pricing  and  price  differentiation  by type  of
users;
- the  application  of  marginal  opportunity  cost  concepts  in
LDCs; and
- the  design  of  appropriate  equity  objectives  for  the  sector.
There  is  good  reason  to  believe  that  borrowing  countries  would  take
genuine  *fforts  to  put  pricing  recoinendations  into  practice.
Telecommunications  is  one  of the  few  public  sector  enterprises  that
can  earn  a  surplus  for  governments.  In  view  of  scarce  fiscal
resources  for  overall  economic  development  progrms, this  should
provide  a  powerful  incentive  to  implement  rationing  prices  where  those
are  appropriate.116 -
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ANNEX  13:  Review  of ticing  and  CoatL  Recovery  in  SARs:
WATER  SUPPLY  AND  SEWERAGE  SECTOR
A.  THE  POLICY
A.1  InteDroetatlon  of Efficiency  Pricing
1.  Efficiency  pricing  in  the  water  supply  sector  is  generally
interpreted  as  long-run  marginal  cost  because  of the  lumpiness  of
investment.l  In the  presence  of capital  indivisibility,  a condition
typical  of  water  supply  projects,  short-run  marginal  cost  pricing  would
result  in sharp  fluctuations  in  price  which  consumers  are  bound  to
resent. To resolve  this  situation,  Saunders  la  Al  proposed  the  use  of
the  longrun  average  increomntal  cost  concept  as  an approximation  to
optimal  pricing. Efficiency  considerations  would  then  require  that  price
should  equal  the  average  unit  cost  of incroemntal  output. Average
incremental  costs  can  be calculated  by dividing  the  discounted  value  of
future  supply  costs  by the (similarly  discounted)  amount  of additional
water  to  be produced.
A.2  Constraints  to Imolementing  Efficiency  Prie.
2.  The  main  constraint  to  implementing  efficiency  pricing  for  water
supply  is  the  cost  of  metering.  The  case  for  metering  large  industrial
and  commercial  consumers  is  often  not  a  matter  for  serious  dispute  since
the  cost  of metering  is  normally  small  relative  to the  value  of  water
consumed. The  crucial  issue  is  whether  or  not to  moeter  domestic  and
small commercial consumors.  Especially in rural areas, the costs
associated  with  meter  reading  and  maintenance  tend  to  be high due  to  low
population  density. In  addition,  where  consumption  is  lower,  the
potential  gains  from  conservation  of  water  are  limited. Thus,  the
appropriate  source  of supply  may  be coinunal  standposts  or  wells  rather
than  house  connections  in  rural  areas.
A.3  Adjustments  to  Efficiency  Prices
3.  Both  equity  and  financial  objectives  are  important  in the  water
supply  and  sewerage  sector. When  average  costs  are  falling  (and  thus
marginal  cost  is less  than  average  cost),  marginal  cost  pricing  would
entail  financial  losses  for  the  enterprise.  This  situation  could  be
temporary;  e.g.,  where  there  is excess  capacity,  or of some  permanence;
e.g.,  if longrun  average  costs  are  declining. In  practice  a two-part
tariff  is  often  used (e.g.,  consumers  pay  a  sum  per  thousand  gallons
equal  to  marginal  cost  and  a lump  sum  to cover  fixed  costs)  or  charges
are  based  on  "what  the  traffic  will  bear"  (e.g.,  industrial  consumers  are
charged  higher  prices  than  residential  users).
1'  This section  is  based  mainly  on SWP  #259,  Alternative  ConceRts  of
!arginal  Cost  for  Public  UtilitX  Pricing: Problems  of ADRlication  in
the  Water  Suoi;ly  Sector,  by R.J.  Saunders,  J.J.  Warford  and  P.C.  Mann.- 118  -
4.  In  several  instances  the  willingness-to-pay  criterion  is
modified  to  provide  cheap  water  to  low  income  groups.  An  increasing
block  tariff,  with  the  first  block  normally  priced  at  "lifeline'  rates,
is  used  to  ensure  access  to  services  by  poor  urban  dwellers.  A  rule  of
thumb  used  in  the  rural  areas  is  that  the  poorest  households  should  not
spend  more  than  five  percent  of  their  income  for  water.
5.  Relatively  little  emphasis  has  traditionally  been  placed  on
fiscal  issues.  Recently,  however,  a  draft  paper  from  WUD  proposed  that
more  emphasis  be given  to  cost  recovery  in  rural  water  supply  projects
because  fiscal  resources  are  inadequate  to  support  sector  expansion.
B. THE  PRACTICE
B.1  Pro1jct  Sau1a2
6.  This  review  is  based  on  14  projects  (in  11  countries:  Yemen,
Tunisia,  Algeria,  Jordan,  Honduras,  Colombia,  India,  Korea,  Mali,
Nigeria,  and  Liberia).  Ten  projects  are  for  urban  water  supply  and  four
are  intended  to  supply  potable  drlnking  water  in  rural  areas.  Eight
projects  have  a  sewerage  component  in  addition  to  water  supply.  The
sample  represents  67 percent  of  the  total  number of  water  supply  and
sewerage  projects  (excluding  multi-purpose  projects  with  major  provisions
for  power  distribution  and  irrigation/flood  control)  approved  by  the  Bank
during  FY84  and  FY85.
B.2 Discussion  and  Calculation  of  Efficiency  Prices
7.  Efficiency  pricing  issues  are  adequately  discussed  in  the  SARs.
The  longrun  average  incremental  cost  concept  was  used  in  calculating  the
efficiency  prices.  LRMC  for  water  sunDlX  servigaa  was reported  in  13
projects,  ranging  from  10  to  117  US cents  per  mo,  and  averaging  55 cents.
Small  agglomerations  of  rural  population  or  locational  mismatch  between
water  sources  and  consumption  centers  resulted  in  relatively  high
investment  costs  for  some projects  (e.g.,  Yemen and  Jordan).  The  water
tariffs  at  the  time  when  the  appraisal  reports  were  prepared  ranged  from
4  to  72  cents  per  m3,  with  a  sample  mean  of  29  cents.  Thus  tariffs  on
average  represented  45  percent  of  LRMCs.
8.  Differences  in  the  structures  of  water  tariffs  are  quite
evident.  Tariffs,  which  were  levied  on  metered  consunotion  of  water,
varied  primarily  according  to  customer  categories  (e.g.,  residential,
coomercial  and  industrial)  as  observed  in  seven  cases;  location  (i.e.,
urban  and  rural  areas)  in  three  cases;  supply  system  (i.e.,  piped  and
standposts)  in  Tunisia;  and  type  of  water  (i.e.,  raw  and  treated)  in
Korea.  The  tariff  schedule  was uniform  across  different  classes  of
customers  in  Liberia.  Furthermore,  10  of  these  13  cases  applied,  or  had
given  government  approval  to  institute  during  project  implementation,  an
increasing  block  tariff  on  residential  users  with  the  first  block  being
priced  at  a  rate  considered  affordable  by  low  income  families.  Flat
rates  and  increasing  block  tariffs  levied  on  other  users  were  reported  in
seven  and  six  cases,  respectively.  More  importantly,  commercial  and
industrial  users  were  generally  charged  a  much  higher  price  per  unit  of
water  consumed  than  residential  users.  The  higher  unit  price  was119  -
intended  to give  commercial  and  industrial  customers  an incentive  to use
water  efficiently,  and  thus  postpone  the  need for  future  capital  outlays.
9.  Meanwhile,  the  incidence  of metering  varied  notably  among
countries. Metering  of  consumption  had  never  been  widespread  in  Yemen.
In  Nigeria  metering  was  applied  to  only  about  five  percent  of all  house
connections. In  Tunisia,  around  15 and  70  percent  of the  rural  and  urban
population,  respectively,  with  access  to public  water  supply  systems  werc
served  through  metered  connections;  the  corresponding  figures  for  Jordan
were 60 and  90 percent. All  house  connections  in Bogota  (Colombia)  were
metered.  Metering  ranged  from  34  to  60  percent  of  connections  in
Honduras,  India  and  Liberia. No information  on the  extent  of  metered
connections  was  available  for  Algeria  and  Korea,  while  the  issue  was  not
relevant  in the  case  of  Mali.
10.  Unmatered  consunntion  :f  water  was  charged  fixed  monthly  fees.
These  fees  usually  differed  according  to  customer  categories.  In  some
areas  in  Colombia,  for  example,  fixed  monthly  fees  were  based  on  a  socio-
economic  index  which  defined  the  capacity  of  various  users  to  pay  for
water  supply  services.  Residential,  commercial  and  industrial  users  were
each  grouped  further  into  sub-clases  and  were  charged  monthly  fees  that
progressed  according  to  their  respective  socio-economic  indices.
Residential  users  in  Nigeria  with  unmetered  connections  were  levied  fixed
monthly  fees  that  varied  by type  of dwelling. Equity  issues  and
sociopolitical  pressures  against  metered  tariffs  had contributed  to the
incidence  of urmtered consumption  of  water  in  rural  areas. Also,  the
administrative  costs  associated  with  metering  consumption  in  areas  with
small  and  dispersed  communities  imposed  a constraint  on the  economic
feasibility  of metering  in these  places.
11.  Of the  eight  projects  with sewerage  components,  only  four
reported  the  LRMC  of supplying  sewer  ge services  which  varied  from  7  to
82  cents  per  u3 of  water  consumed. Existing  tariffs  ranged  between  4 and
63 cents  per  i 3;  and  accounted  for  about  75 to 143  percent  of the  average
incremental  costs  of installing,  operating  and  maintaining  *swerage
disposal  facilities.  The  highest  tarIff  levels  relative  to  LRIC  (143
percent  for  sewerage  and  95  percent  for  water)  were  recorded  for  the
project  in  Bogota,  where  the  water  authority  reportedly  was allowed  to
raise  tariffs  in order  to  finance  investment  requirements.
12.  The  structure  of sewerage  tariffs  was reported  only in  four
sample  countrias. Charges  for  sewerage  services  in  Honduras,  Colombia
and  Liberia  were  formulated  as  a  fraction  of  water  bills--ranging  from  30
to  60 percent. Sewerage  tariffs  in  Jordan,  by contrast,  consisted  of a
surcharge  linked  to  water  consumption  plus  a  four  percent  annual  tax  on
the  rental  value  of  property.  Only  in  Jordan  were  sewerage  connection
fees  levied. These  fees  amounted  to 25  percent  of the  annual  rental
value  of property  to  be  paid in  a lump  sun.
B.3  Discussion  of  Adlustmerts  to Efficiency  Prices
13.  As made  explicit  in the  SARs,  adjustments  to  efficiency  prices
were  ruled  by  equity  objectives.  The  wide  divergence  between  existing
tariffs  and  LRMC  was influenced  by such  factors  as  the  social  character- 120 -
of providing  water  supply  services  especially  in rural  areas;  oppositior.
to  raising  tariffs  in  view that  potable  water  is  a "public  good";  and  the
equitability  of access  to  services  through  cross-subsidization  from  large
(high  income  consumers)  to small  coinunities  (low  income  consumers).  The
affordability  index  used in  each  sample  project  for  assessing  the  equity
aspects  of pricing  domestic  water  consumption  is  routinely  provided  in
the  SARs.  The ind-x,  defined  as the  water  bill  expressed  as  a proportion
of monthly  income  of the  poorest  households  in  the  project  area,  ranged
from  1.3  to 5 percent. The  sample  mean  was 2.7  percent  (about  one-half
the  generally  accepted  norm  of 5  percent).
14.  Of the  cases  reviewed,  Mali  was  unique  in the  sense  t  .. t  no
direct  charges  were  instituted  for  rural  water  supply. These  services
nevertheless  were  not  totally  free. Rural  co  unities  paid  for  handpumps
and  were  delegated  the  responsibility  of operating  and  maintaining  the
water  points  in  the  villages. Such  an  arrangemnt reportedly  had  been
widespread  throughout  the  Sahelian  Region  as it  resulted  from  reflections
on the  excessive  burden  on governments'  capacity  to sustain  large  scale
maintenance  of water  supply  systems. Recovery  of capital  costs,  except
for  those  related  to  handpumps,  had  never  been  possible  on account  of low
rural  household  incoL
3.4  Discussion  of  Cost  RecoverY  Issues
15.  Financial  covenants  were  used in  all  projects  except  Mali.
These  covenants  were  stated  in  reference  to target  rates  of return  on
revalued  net  assets  (found  in five  cases)  and internal  cash  generation
ratios  (8). Target  rates  of  return  on revalued  assets  averaged  slightly
over  four  percent  per  year.  Internal  cash  generation  ratios  averaged
nearly  12  percent  of capital  expenditures.  In addition,  debt  service
coverage  and  absolute  debt  limitation  covenants  were  applied  in six  and
two  projects,  respectively.
3.5  Use  of Pricint  Covenants
16.  Covenants  dealing  with  pricing  water  supply  services  were
reached  in  all  projects,  except  the  Fourth  Bogota  Water  Supply  and
Sewerage  Project  in Colombia. These  included  adjustments  in tariff
levels  and/or  revision  of tariff  structures  (found  in  11 cases);  changes
in  tariff  policies  toward  more  metering  of consumption  (3);  and  ensuring
financial  participation  of project  beneficiaries  in  the  construction,
operation  and  maintenance  of the  water  points  (1). Covenants  related  to
pricing  sewerage  services  were  comprised  of  adjustments  in tariff  levels
(1);  and  the  development  of a cost  recovery  mechanism  with subsequent
implementation  of user  charges  sufficient  to  cover  full  O&K  costs  (5).
These  pricing  agreements  were  mostly  based  on efficiency  considerations.
17.  On the  basis  of the  preceding  agr-ements  on pricing  and
financial  performance  of the  water  authorities,  estimation  was  done  with
respect  to the  expected  levels  of tariffs  for  water  supply  and  sewerage
services  upon  project  completion.  The  relationship  between  expected
tariffs  and  LRMC  is swumarized  below:- 121  -
Expected  Tariffs  in  Expectod  Tariffs  as  a
Services  Real  Terms  (C/n 3 )  Percent  of  LRMC
Average  Range  Range  No.  of  Casos
Water  Supply  50.0  5-'117  50-  57  2
80-  96  4
100-131  6
80  Mean  value
using  14  cases
Sewerage  28.0  6-77  94-157  4
118  Mean  valu,  using
4  cases  reporting
LRMC
59  Mean value  based
on 8  projects
with  seworage
component
Thus  on  average,  water  tariffs  would  represent  80 percent  of  LRMC  once
projects  become  operational;  sewerage  tariffs  would  account  for  118
percent.  The lowest  proportion  of  50-57  percent  for  water  supply
services  were  for  those  projects  in  Korea  and  Yemn  where  strong  public
opposition  to  raising  tariffs  was  coupled  with  policies  to  cross-
subsidize  consumption  in  small  towns  and  rural  areas.  Nonetheloss,  the
above  estimates  show  considerable  success  with  marginal  cost  pricing  rule
within  the  limits  imposed  by  the  social  character  of  these  services.
3.6  Sources  of Protect  Finnncin;
18.  The  financing  plans  for  the  samplo  projects  are  susnerized
below.  IBRD/IDA  loans  were  the  major  source  of  funds,  accounting  for
more  than  half  of  project  costs  on  average.  Cash  generated  internally
provided  a  smaller  share  of  project  financing  than  did  government  equity.
Source  Average  Rannogs  Co.ntl
(As  % of  Project  Costs)
IBRD/IDA  loans  53.0  37-100  100%  in  1  case
(India)
Other  External  Donors  9.2  0-  43  0  in  10 cases
Internal  Cash  Generation  10.4  0-  49  0  in  5 cases
Governmont  Loans  1.5  0-  21  0  in  13  cases
Equity  from  Government  22.6  0-  54  0  in 5  cases
Other  3.3  0-  24  0  in  10  cases
C.  THE  MAJOR  GAPS
19.  Efficiency  pricing  has  been  carefully  applied  in  the  water  and
sewerage  sector,  even  in  the  face  of  distributional  and  financial
objectives.  Refinements  in  the  tariff  structure  have  been  employed  to- 122  -
reconcile  diverse  aims. The  priority  for  future  pricing  work in the
sector  is  different  for  the  cases  of  urban  and  rural  water/sewerage.
20.  For  urban  systems,  LRMC is  clearly  an important  benchmark. This
is  well reflected  in SARs,  and  major  tariff  studies  are  often  financed
under  Bank  projects  to refine  LRNC  estimates.  Yet  experience  with
achieving  targeted  rates  of return  (using  tariffs  as the  benefit  measure)
has  been  poor.  This  is  partly  due  to  slippages  in  the  chain  leading  from
tariff  approval  to revenue  collection. In  particular,  the
metering/billing/collection  systems  of  many  urban  utilities  produce
unreasonably  high  proportions  of  unaccounted  for  water. A shift  in
effort  is  called  for  from  sophisticated  LRMC  analyses  to the  practical
aspects  of improving  collection  efficiency.
21.  In  addition,  demand  estimates  have  been  consistently  optimistic.
Research  into  the  determinants  of  vater  demand  in  developing  countries
may  be needed  to  gain  a  better  understanding  of  the  relationship  between
price,  income  and  other  factors  affecting  consumption.
22.  For  rural  water systems,  fiscal  constraints  have  become
dominant. A recent  draft  report  from  WUD suggests  that  unless
governments  are  willing  to co_it themselves  to sector  programs  stressing
cost  recovery,  the  Bank  should  not  be involved  in  rural  water  in those
countries. It focuses  on the  development  of financial  intermediaries  and
locally  based  enterprises  to fund  and  maintain  rural  systems. The
report's  recoumendations  are  controversial,  but  it  provides  an excellent
stimulant  to a reexamination  of the  problems  that  rural  water  supply
programs  have  faced.
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